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Niektóre pytania rodza˛ sie˛ dopiero po odpowiedziach.
Some questions come to being only after their answers.
Stanisław Jerzy Lec, Mys´li nieuczesane wszystkie, p. 471.
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0 INTRODUCT ION
overview
In this work I defend two main theses, relevant both for ethics
and for legal philosophy: that responsibility is fundamentally
normative and that responsibility should be normative.
Part I (’The Concepts of Responsibility’) aims at:
(i) first, clarifying what kinds of entity ’responsibility’1 refers to,
and, using a structured taxonomy, distinguishing concepts,
conceptions, conditions and justifications of responsibility;
(ii) second, clarifying what ’normative’ in the phrase ’normative
responsibility’ means.
In the remainder of this work, I shall put forward four argu-
ments to back up my thesis.
In Part II, I shall put forward three negative arguments. In
particular:
In Chapter 2 (Responsibility and Mens Rea), I consider the claim
that since responsibility should have a descriptive content,
it cannot be based on mens rea (on mental elements) be-
cause mens rea is not objectively or scientifically ascertain-
able.
In Chapter 3 (Responsibility and Neuroscience), I then consider
the claim that cognitive sciences (ie. neuroscience) would
1 A convention on the use of quotation marks: quotation marks are simple (’ ’)
only for terms used in suppositione materiali; quotation marks are double (“ ”)
for all other uses: scare quotes, irony, etc. Here is an example: ’When talking
about “use”, use ’use’.’ 1
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be able to objectively measure mental states, thus giving
a plausible descriptive foundation to responsibility. I re-
fute this claim both for theoretical and practical reasons. I
propose, instead, to endorse a normative notion of respon-
sibility.
In Chapter 4 (Responsibility and Causation), I consider (and re-
fute) an even more extreme argument: that responsibility
attribution should be completely descriptive because it is
based on (one of its conditions:) causality. The evaluative
component would then (almost) disappear.
In Part III (The Language of Responsibility), I shall put forward
a fourth and positive argument: using a pragmatic analysis of
negation (of normative statements), I shall consider negations of
responsibility and shall show the normative nature of responsi-
bility judgments.2
In the Appendices, I make available part of four works (espe-
cially important for my last chapter and for philosophical deon-
tics) hard to find or not yet translated into English.
responsibility: the name, the thing
Names of Responsibility
At the end of this Introduction (Figures 0.1 and 0.2), I shall pro-
vide the reader with a list of some xenonyms, of some counter-
parts, of ’responsibility’ in 50 natural languages, most of which
are Indo-European.
In most Indo-European languages, the words for “responsibil-
ity” are connected to the words for “answer”. I shall present five
examples and then try to give an etymological sketch, to show
2 This is by no means the standard theory. When judgments of responsibility
are kept separate from responsibility or concepts of responsibility, they are
usually considered non-normative; for example, judgments of responsibility
are considered explanatory by Björnsson and Persson, 2012, forthcoming.
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that while the connection with ’answer’ may seem immediate,
the matter is more complicated.
The word for “responsibility” is connected to the word for
“answer” in at least five different groups of Indo-European lan-
guages. First, it is obviously connected to answer in Romance
languages. Second, it is connected to answer in most Germanic
languages. Third, it is connected to answer in most Slavic lan-
guages. Polish ’odpowiedzialnos´c´’ [“responsibility”] is obviously
connected to ’odpowiadac´’ [“to answer”]. Fourth, it is connected
to answer in some Goidelic languages. Irish Gaelic ’freagracht’
[“responsibility”] is connected to ’a fhreagairt’ [“to answer”].
Fifth, the word for responsibility is connected to the word for an-
swer in some Baltic languages, such as Lithuanian. Lithuanian
’atsakomýbe˙’ [“responsibility”] is connected to ’atsakýti’ [“to an-
swer”].
But things are more complicated than that. Hart (Hart, 2008,
Postscript) points out the connection between ’responsibility’ and
Latin ’responde¯re’, not in the sense of answering questions, but in
the sense of responding to accusations. Latin ’re-sponde¯re’ is
obviously a compound made by ’re’ and ’spondeo¯’. ’Spondeo¯’ has
been sharply investigated by Benveniste, 1969.
’Spondeo¯’ has, in fact, the primary meaning of “to pledge, promise,
make a contract”;3 briefly: engaging oneself in an obligation
(like a promise), and likely responding for that.
Germanic languages — at least according to Benveniste, 1969
— show a parallelism with Romance languages and Latin: ’Ver-
antwortung’, ’ansvar’, ’answerability’ all come originally from a
verb akin to Gothic ’swaran’ (cf. German ’schwören’, English ’to
swear’) with the sense of “swear”, “undertake an oath”, but
whence we got Icelandic ’svara’ “to answer”, Old High Ger-
man ’and-swara’ “to re-spond”, akin to the meaning of Latin ’re-
sponde¯re’.4
While doing philosophy from etymology can be risky or use-
less, I think that both Latin (and mediately Romance languages)
3 Cf. Vaan, 2008, p. 582 and for the related Greek ’σpiένδω’ ’spéndo¯’ “to offer a
libation, pour” cf. Beekes, 2009.
4 For this line of reasoning, cf. Benveniste, 1969, pp. 165, 209–221.
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and Germanic languages suggest that responsibility’s (linguistic)
ancestor is connected to a normative entity, be it an obligation, a
promise or an oath.
In the rest of this work, I shall try to show that there is more to
be added to this (partial) philological evidence. I shall try to show
that there are philosophical reasons to think that responsibility is
primarily a normative notion.
Aitiologics
For the study of responsibility, I would propose the term ’Aitio-
logics’ [’Aitiologique’, ’Aitiologica’, ’Aitiologik’, ’Ajtiologyka’ vel ’Ai-
tiologyka’].
But why use ’aitia’, if ’aitia’ means “cause”, such as in ’etiol-
ogy’? Even intuitively, “cause” and “responsibility” are not the
same.
’Αἰτία’ ’Aitía’, in Ancient Greek meant both “guilt” (one could
try to say, employing contemporary categories: “responsibility”)
and “cause”.5
So, why use ’aitiologics’ to designate the study of responsibil-
ity? For three main reasons.
First, the primary meaning of ’αἰτία’ ’aitía’ is something akin
to modern “guilt”.6
Second, the primary use of ’αἰτία’ ’aitía’ was in social, legal and
medical contexts, in order to mean “guilt”.
Third, the conceptualization of “causality”, from blame or guilt,
developed in medical thinking. It is from medicine that ’αἰτία’
5 Cf. for instance Beekes, 2009, ad vocem.
6 The word ’αἰτία’ ’aitía’, from a reconstructed ’*αῖτος’ ’aîtos’ “share” (cf. Beekes,
2009, p. 45), was already used in Homeric texts (cf. for instance Iliad, XIX, 86)
but it is does not seem likely that the concept expressed is comparable to the
modern “guilt”, because of the notorious lack of subjectivity in archaic Greek
thought. On this last aspect, see at least Adkins, 1960; Gernet, 1917, Snell,
1946, Vernant, 1971; Vidal-Naquet and Vernant, 1972, Saïd, 1978 and Vegetti,
2007b, 2010.
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’aitía’ in the sense of “cause” (the idea of causality) passed on to
natural thinking (for instance in physics).7
linguistic/semantic remarks
My work has been carried out mostly in an English-speaking set-
ting and with primary sources mainly in English or concerned
with an English-based legal system and categories. Nonethe-
less, the author’s personal background is from continental law
— a domain with different categories and a different semantics.
This cross-contamination seems a useful experiment, because it
forces me to look anew and from different perspectives at both
the “lived” and the “learnt”, in a process of mutual enlighten-
ment.
It may therefore be useful to give a sort of linguistic and se-
mantic map for the reader from another legal system, with the
usual caveat that all translations are imperfect and approxima-
tive: not all xenonyms are also synonyms.
The non-bijectivity of these terms is splendidly shown by the
very eponym of my work: ’responsibility’. In Romance lan-
guages, the xenonyms for ‘responsibility’ cover not only what
in English is called ’responsibility’ but also what is called, re-
spectively: ’answerability’, ’accountability’ and, most importantly
I think, ’liability’ (German: ’Verantwortung’, Swedish, Danish and
Norwegian: ’ansvar’; Dutch: ’verantwoordelijkheid’, ’aansprakelijk’,
‘toerekeningsvatbaar’).8
methodological remarks
Now, four methodological remarks.
7 These theses are backed up, in various forms, by Snell, 1946, Vernant, 1971;
Vidal-Naquet and Vernant, 1972, Saïd, 1978, Irwin, 1980, 2007–11, Frede, 1980,
1987, B. A. O. Williams, 1993, Vegetti, 2007a,b, 2010 and Mondolfo, 2012.
8 For an early analysis of these words in Dutch from a legal semiotic perspec-
tive, see de Haan, 1912, 1916, 1919. I owe Paolo Di Lucia this clue.
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First, the word ‘responsibility’ is usually qualified: moral re-
sponsibility, legal responsibility, criminal responsibility. Further-
more, responsibility is kept separate — if not distinct — from
liability. When the word ‘responsibility’ is not qualified, I usu-
ally refer to the general phenomenon.
Second, ’responsibility’ is an umbrella term in the sense that it
covers both blame and praise. Usually praise is ignored to focus
only on blame. I shall follow this general use somewhat, but the
scope of the following considerations should hopefully also be
symmetrically applicable to praise.
Third, I am aware of at least two latent issues: the relation-
ship between moral and legal responsibility, and, more generally,
between law and morals. For both, personal and external con-
straints suggest that I do not engage directly with these points.
Fourth, I shall try to investigate responsibility and not one of
its (possible) conditions: freedom of the will. For this reason I
shall not be concerned directly with the debate on freedom and
(moral) responsibility.
This dissertation hopes to be philosophical, if not in nature,
at least in its intention. Occasional examples or doctrines taken
from the law are considered mainly from a philosophical per-
spective and for their philosophical import.
As always (at least in analytic philosophy), the arguments I
offer in the following pages are in no way definitive proof of
anything.
I shall try to highlight those issues arising from various philo-
sophical (and non-philosophical) theories I think problematic. I
shall picture a detailed theory to account for these issues and
my aim is to offer an alternative possible solution. I then try
to address obvious and not so obvious objections and counter-
arguments and argue why this particular approach might be the
best explanation.
My proximate aim then will be to show that the position de-
fended here has at least some pros (or less cons) than its main
rivals.
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Language Aitionym(s) Transliteration Notes
Afrikaans verantwoordelikheid
Albanian përgjegjësi
Arabic ةةييللووؤؤسسمم
Basque erantzukizun
Belarusian адказнасць adkaznasć
Bulgarian отговорност otgovornost
Catalan responsabilitat
Chinese 责任 zérèn
Croatian odgovornost
Czech odpovědnost
Danish ansvar, ansvarlighed
Dutch verantwoordelijkheid 
aansprakelijk, 
toerekeningsvatbaar
English responsibility, 
accountability, 
answerability, liability
Estonian vastutus
Finnish vastuu
French responsabilité
Galician responsabilidade
German Verantwortung,
Verantwortlichkeit
Greek (modern) ευθύνη
Hebrew תוירחא
Hindi िज#$दारी Jim'mēdārī
Hungarian felelősség
Icelandic ábyrgð
Irish freagracht
Figure 0.1: Aitionyms/1
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Language Aitionym(s) Transliteration Notes
Italian responsabilità
Japanese 責任 sekinin
Korean 책임 chaeg-im
Latvian atbildība
Lithuanian atsakomýbė
Macedonian одговорност
Maltese responsabbiltà
Norwegian ansvar
Occitan respondoiretat
Persian تتييللووئئسسمم
Polish odpowiedzialność
Portuguese responsabilidade
Romanian responsabilitate
Russian ответственность otvetstvennostʹ
Sardinian responsabbilidàde
Serbian одговорност odgovornost
Slovak zodpovednosť
Slovenian odgovornost
Spanish responsabilidad
Swedish ansvar
Turkish sorumluluk
Ukrainian відповідальність vidpovidalʹnistʹ
Urdu ییرراادد ہہممذذ
Welsh cyfrifoldeb
Yiddish סעַיירַכא ’akryya‘s
Figure 0.2: Aitionyms/2
Part I
The Concepts of Responsibility
9
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1.0 introduction: concepts, concep-tions, conditions
We are up against one of the great sources of philosophical
bewilderment: we try to find a substance for a substantive. A
substantive makes us look for a thing that corresponds to it.
Wittgenstein, 1958
’What is responsibility?’ is a misleading question. It is mis-
leading because it has two false presuppositions.1
First, it concedes that there is at least such a thing as responsi-
bility.2
Second, it assumes that there is at most one thing such as re-
sponsibility.3
Undeniably there are several phenomena referred to, collec-
tively or separately, as responsibility. I shall start from the phe-
nomena to try and clarify not what the word ’responsibility’
means, but what the constellation of concepts umbrella-termed
’responsibilities’ consists of.
The thesis of this work is that responsibility is normative. Now,
in this equation there are (at least) two unknowns: responsibil-
ity and normativity. One of the aims of this work is to shed
light on the concept of responsibility through a close study of its
relationships with normativity.
In this chapter I therefore shall conceptually explore both re-
sponsibility and normativity, whereas in the rest of this book I
1 In this work ’presupposition’ is used technically with reference to the the-
ory of presuppositions (for an introduction see Beaver and Geurts, 2011, for
other works on the topic see for instance Atlas, 1977; Balasubramanian, 1984;
Carston, 1998; Karttunen, 1976, 1977; Kripke, 2009; Peters, 1979). For the non-
technical usage, I shall adopt such words as ’supposition’, ’assumption’ and
so on.
2 That there is no such thing as responsibility has been maintained at least by
G. Strawson, 1994, 2009 and Waller, 2011.
3 That there is more than one such thing as responsibility has been argued at
least by Di Lucia, 2013b; Hart, 2008; Heller, 1988; Ross, 1975; Vincent, Van
De Poel, and Van Den Hoven, 2011.
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shall investigate their mutual relationship from different per-
spectives.
This chapter is organized in two parts.
In the first part (Sections 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3), I shall investigate
responsibility. In particular I shall show that responsibility is not
a unitary entity.
Firstly, in Section 1.1, I show that the concepts of responsibility
are at least four-fold. Secondly, in Section 1.2, I try to separate the
investigation on responsibility from the enquiry on its conditions
(such as free will). Thirdly, in Section 1.3, I put forward some
reasons to keep separate the concepts of responsibility (“what is
responsibility?”) from the justification of the social practices of
holding responsible (“why responsibility?”) and from general
conceptions of responsibility (“how should responsibility be?”).
Concepts [concetto, concept, concepto, Begriff and Konzept, poje˛-
cie, ponjatie], however, differ from conceptions [concezione, concep-
tion, concepción, Auffassung, koncepcja and uje˛cie, koncepcija].
I shall focus on the various concepts of responsibility in Section
1.1.
I shall focus on the various conditions of responsibility in Sec-
tion 1.2.
I shall focus on the various conceptions of responsibility in Sec-
tion 1.3.
In the second part (Section 1.4), I shall investigate normativity.
’Normativity’ and ’normative’ have several different senses.4
In particular, I shall contrast two senses of ’normativity’: nor-
mativity explicitly related to rules (nomophoric normativity) with
normativity conceived as an evaluation (axiological normativity).
Arguably, the two most pregnant for this kind of inquiry are
thus the following.
4 An investigation of normativity is beyond the scope of the present
work. I shall, however, attempt an heuristic dichotomy in Sec-
tion 1.4. To get a glimpse of the broadness of this subject, see:
http://philpapers.org/browse/normativity.
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First, ’normative’ is something somewhat5 related to norms.6
I shall suggest for this concept the term ’nomophoric’ (or ’nomo-
logical’) [’nomoforico’, ’nomophorique’, ’nomophorisch’, ’nomofory-
czny’].
Second, ’normative’ as something prima facie opposed to the
’descriptive’, ’non-normative’ and thus involving an evaluation.7
I shall suggest for this concept the term ’axiological’ (or ’axi-
otic’) [’axiologico’ or ’assiologico’, ’axiologique’, ’axiologisch’, ’aksio-
logiczny’].8
1.1 responsibility concepts: four di-chotomies
I shall not investigate what responsibility is, its essence or nature
(das Wesen der Verantwortung), but — for starters — I shall con-
sider what kinds of entities it can be predicated of. I shall try to
show that among these different concepts of responsibility there
are Familienähnlichkeiten [Family Resemblances] — common traits
hard to identify analytically.
If we see responsibility as a trivalent9 concept (subject a is re-
sponsible for thing x to person(s) b), then in this section I shall
limit my enquiry mostly to the “things” one may be responsible
for.10
5 I shall explore in particular two types of relationship to norms: responsibility-
related norms, and norm-related responsibility. Vide infra, Section 1.4.3.1.
6 For the polysemy of the term ‘norm’, see Conte, 2007b.
7 For a similar suggestion, see Finlay, 2010.
8 The disciplines studying the nomological and the axiotic are, respectively,
nomologics (for which vide Conte, 2013b) and axiotics (in a related, although
different, sense, vide Conte, 2008.)
9 I refer here to the concept of valency in linguistics, proposed by Tesnière in
Tesnière, 1959. In recent literature, this thesis is echoed by Duff, especially in
Duff, 2008, 2009.
10 But note that Lenk and Maring, 1993 deals with responsibility as a hexavalent
concept. In particular, the authors maintain that the concept of responsibility
[Verantwortung] has the following six valencies:
“jemand: Verantwortungssubjekt, -träger (Personen, Korporationen) ist;
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I shall propose these dichotomies not because I have seen
them, but in order to see (ut videam) — to better see the phe-
nomena I shall investigate in the remainder of this work.
1.1.1 I: Praxical vs. Non-Praxical Responsibility
Praxical responsibility is responsibility for (human) actions, deeds.
The etymology of ’praxis’ is straightforward: the verb ’piράσσω’
(’piράσσειν’), meaning “(I) do”, especially contrasted to ’piοιέω’,
“(I) make”.11
Non-praxical responsibility is responsibility not exclusively for
human actions, but for intentions, thoughts or more generally,
outcomes. Example of non-praxical responsibility are causal re-
sponsibility (for instance as described by Hart, 2008, Postscript)
and virtue-responsibility, that is, responsibility for one’s character
(for instance as described by Vincent, in Vincent, Van De Poel,
and Van Den Hoven, 2011) or blameworthiness (for instance as
proposed by P. A. Graham, forthcoming). Other examples in-
clude responsibility for believing (Hieronymi, 2008) and beliefs
(sometimes referred to as doxastic responsibility) or dreams (Mul-
lane, 1965) and for mere intentions (Jackson, 1975).12
für: etwas (Handlungen, Handlungsfolgen, Zustände, Aufgaben usw.);
gegenüber: einem Adressaten;
vor: einer (Sanktions-, Urteils-) Instanz;
in bezug auf : ein (präskriptives, normatives) Kriterium;
im Rahmen eines: Verantwortungs-, Handlungsbereiches verantwortlich (p.
229).”
11 The distinction between a manipulative/creative aspect and a mere bringing
about of something apparent in Ancient Greek is echoed, I suppose, in a
similar distinction at least in modern English and German: piράσσειν prássein
: to do/tun = piοιεῖν poieîn : to make/machen. For philosophical remarks on
these verbs, see Conte, 2001b. For the semantics of the verbs of doing and
making in Indo-European languages, see Yoshioka, 1908. Varro, in De lingua
latina, notes that besides ’agere’ and ’facere’ there is a third word in Latin for
’officia’: ’gerere’. On this point, see also Di Lucia, 2013b.
12 To expand fully on this point I’d need a developed philosophy action I do
not have.
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1.1.2 II: Nomophoric vs. Non-Nomophoric Responsibility
Nomophoric responsibility (or rule-related responsibility) is respon-
sibility arising because of a rule (or a set of rules). I shall focus
on nomophoric responsibility infra in Section 1.4.3.1.
Non-nomophoric responsibility is responsibility but not because
of moral or legal rules, implicitly or explicitly stated.
As an example of praxical, non-nomophoric responsibility, I
propose to consider moral responsibility (broadly understood),
as investigated for instance by Strawson.13 The attribution of
responsibility depends on (moral) reactive attitudes and it is not
reducible to a system of (moral) rules.
1.1.3 III: Regulative-Rule-Related vs. Constitutive-Rule-RelatedResponsibility
Regulative-rule-related responsibility is responsibility for the vi-
olation of a regulative rule. An example of regulative-rule-related
responsibility is responsibility arising because of the violation of
a rule prohibiting murder.
Constitutive-rule-related responsibility is responsibility aris-
ing because of some interaction with a constitutive rule. An
example of constitutive-rule-related responsibility is responsibil-
ity arising because of the violation of anakastic rules on canonic
marriage.
Regulative rules “regulate antecedently existing forms of be-
havior”, whereas constitutive rules “create or define new forms
of behavior [. . . ] The activity of playing chess is constituted by
action in accordance with these rules. Chess has no existence
apart from these rules”.14 All constitutive rules are conditions
13 Cf. especially P. F. Strawson, 1968 (2008).
14 Searle, 1964, p.55. The distinction between constitutive and regulative rules
comes from Rawls, 1955, but has had various sources in the history of thought.
Many ideas on constitutive and regulative rules are indebted to Amedeo Gio-
vanni Conte. See for instance Conte, 1995c, 2007c.
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of their content: conditions of conceivability and conditions of
the possibility of their content.15.
Those rules ruling on responsibility must be distinguished
from responsibility arising because of a “violation” of a rule. Of
these rules, those I call (eidologic) conditions of responsibility
shall be discussed in Section 1.2.
1.1.4 IV: Role-Related vs. Role-Unrelated Responsibility
Role-related responsibility is responsibility arising because of the
presence of rules codifying a type of conduct, a role.
Examples of type-responsibility include all role-responsibilities,
such as the responsibility of bearing the role of a ship captain, a
firefighter, a GP.
Role-unrelated responsibility is — instead — responsibility aris-
ing because of the presence of norms “ruling” on the validity of
a single act, but non-relatedly to roles.
Think of a catholic priest. The role-responsibilities (the type-
responsibility) of a catholic priest include, among others, cele-
brating baptisms, masses and marriages according to the Church’s
law. In this respect, this is comparable to the duties of a ship cap-
tain.
Now, say our catholic priest marries two people. Let’s say
that the Bishop forbids wedding ceremonies in a given period,
but our priest goes ahead and marries our two friends. The
priest can be punished because he disobeyed that (regulative)
rule. One of the necessary conditions for the validity of that
marriage according to canon law (let’s imagine) is the fact that
these two people can’t be close relatives. The priest knows, but
he goes ahead and celebrates the wedding, which turns out to be
15 Constitutive rules can be further divided in deontic and adeontic constitutive
rules. An example of the former is: ‘The Bishop ought to move any number of
squares diagonally, provided it does not leap over other pieces’. An example
of the latter is: ‘Stolica˛ Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej jest Warszawa’ [Warszaw is
the capital city of Poland]’ (art.29 of the Polish Constitution) cf. Passerini
Glazel, 2007. Apart from Conte’s works, see also Carcaterra, 1974, Searle,
1964, Azzoni, 1988 and Roversi, 2006, 2012
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invalid. He hasn’t broken any regulative rules, but it seems he
is still responsible for having celebrated an invalid marriage —
he is token-responsible, responsible for that specific invalid act.
Can he be punished? And if so, according to which rules?
Examples of type-responsibility include the responsibility of
doing invalid acts (marrying people against impedimenta dirimen-
tia according to 1917 Canon Law, signing a sentence if one is not
the judge), acts that do not carry with them common sanctions if
invalidly done (marrying people against impedimenta impedientia
is forbidden and carries sanctions with it).16
I shall focus on these two kinds of responsibility (type- vs.
token-responsibility) infra in Section 1.4.3.1.
1.1.5 List of Responsibility Concepts
Here, I summarize the four dichotomies I have introduced. Their
interplay may be seen in Figure 1.2.
1. Praxical responsibility vs. non-praxical responsibility;
2. Nomophoric responsibility vs. non-nomophoric responsi-
bility;
3. Regulative-rule-related responsibility vs. Constitutive-rule-
related responsibility;
4. Role-related responsibility vs. role-unrelated responsibility
1.2 normative responsibility condi-tions
From concepts of responsibility must be distinguished the con-
ditions [condizione, condition, condición, Bedingung, warunek, sosto-
janie] of (a concept of) responsibility.
16 The situation with catholic marriage according to 1917 Canon Law is studied
with reference to constitutive and anankastic rules by Azzoni, 1988.
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Conditions can pertain necessarily to a concept of responsi-
bility, or can pertain non-necessarily to that concept but, for in-
stance, be dependent on rules or laws.
Accordingly, I distinguish two kinds of conditions of responsi-
bility:
• (i) eidologic conditions (necessary conditions for that con-
cept), in Section 1.2.1;
• (ii) eidonomic conditions (conditions posited by rules or laws),
in Section 1.2.2.
Of course, conditions may be different for different concepts
of responsibility (for instance, those I highlighted in the last sec-
tion). I shall rhapsodically enumerate some of these for illustra-
tive reasons.
1.2.1 Eidologic Conditions of Responsibility
Eidologic conditions of responsibility are necessary conditions
for that concept. For the concept of moral responsibility, for
instance, several necessary conditions have been required:
• (i) freedom: especially in modern contexts as the possibility
to do otherwise;
• (ii) voluntariness: for instance by Ethica Nicomachea, Book
III;17
17 This is disputed. The first thematization of the debate on responsibility (bet-
ter: blameworthiness) is considered Ethica Nicomachea, Book III. There, Aris-
totle begins an analysis of the conditions of responsibility. Blame and praise,
he argues, apply to voluntary actions. But — with a strategy followed as
recently as those by Hart, 1948 and Austin, 1956 — he does not define volun-
tary except in reference to the involuntary, that is, what is done under duress
or by ignorance.
Both duress and ignorance are topics still debated nowadays in moral phi-
losophy and criminal law, as it is clear from discussion in other parts of my
work.
While the discussion on duress seems fit to stand for modern excuses, it is
especially the discussion on ignorance which seems to capture all those ele-
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• (iii) identity of a person over time: for instance by Ingarden,
1970, 1987.
It is important to notice that necessary conditions of a con-
cept must be kept separate from that concept. The investigation
of freedom, for instance, is not automatically an investigation of
responsibility, closely connected as the two may be. This observa-
tion will become particularly significant when I consider scien-
tific investigations in Chapter 3.
1.2.2 Eidonomic Conditions of Responsibility
Eidologic conditions of responsibility are conditions posited by a
rule or a group of rules.
While in Section 1.4.3.1 I refer to nomophoric responsibility, that
is, responsibility related to rules, I am considering here the op-
posite relation, namely, rules related to responsibility.
An example of nomophoric responsibility is the responsibility
arising from the violation of a rule prohibiting murder.
An example of a rule on responsibility is Art. 27.1 of the Ital-
ian Constitution: “La responsabilità penale è personale”.
These rules related to responsibility I call eidonomic condi-
tions of responsibility.
Those norms ruling directly on responsibility in a given sys-
tem differ, then, from responsibility arising for the violation (in
some sense) of generic rules, being its conditions.
But since there are different kinds of rules (for instance reg-
ulative and constitutive rules), there are different kinds of rules
conditioning responsibility.
ments captured by the expression ’mens rea’ or combined in ’colpa’ and ’dolo’,
namely intention, knowledge, recklessness and negligence.
Now, two problems with Aristotle’s approach: first, a metaphilosophical prob-
lem. It is not at all clear whether his approach is descriptive or prescriptive,
whether he merely reports what is the case (blamable actions are those vol-
untary) or what must be the case (blamable actions must be those voluntary).
Second, it is not clear at all whether what is blamable are voluntary or deliber-
ately chosen actions. In the first case (blamable are voluntary actions) praise
and blame should be attributed also to animals and small children — which
seems neither the case nor acceptable.
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I shall distinguish between regulative rules, eidetic-constitutive
and anankastic-constitutive rules conditioning responsibility, with
the warning that these are only some possible rules. A full anal-
ysis has not yet been completed.
1.2.2.1 (Responsibility-Related) Regulative Rules
I define regulative-rule-related responsibility (in short, regula-
tive responsibility, RR) as responsibility for actions, behaviors or
state-of-affairs prescribed by regulative rules.
Here are two possible examples: (i) “Ogni reato, che abbia
cagionato un danno patrimoniale o non patrimoniale obbliga al
risarcimento il colpevole e le persone che, a norma delle leggi
civili, debbono rispondere per il fatto di lui (Art. 185, It. Penal
Code).”
(ii) “Qualunque fatto doloso o colposo, che cagiona ad altri un
danno ingiusto, obbliga colui che ha commesso il fatto a risarcire
il danno (art. 2043, It. Civil Code).”
1.2.2.2 Responsibility-Related Constitutive Rules
I define constitutive-rule-related responsibility as responsibility
related to constitutive rules.
responsibility-related eidetic-constitutive rules I de-
fine re-sponsibility-related eidetic-constitutive-rules as responsi-
bility constituted by eidetic-constitutive rules, rules that define the
concept of responsibility, rules that are necessary conditions of (that
concept of) responsibility.
Here is an example, taken from the Italian Constitution, Art.
27.1: “La responsabilità penale è personale”.18
If eidetic-constitutive rules change, the concept of responsibil-
ity itself changes accordingly. Take the example above. If the
article were to change, then we would get another concept of
“responsabilità penale”, quite different from the original one.
18 Here I am not interested in the meaning of this article, but in the fact that it
is a condition of criminal responsibility in Italian law.
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(responsibility-related) anankastic-constitutive rules
I define responsibility-related anankastic-constitutive-rules as re-
sponsibility constituted by anankastic-constitutive rules, rules that
posit a necessary condition to responsibility.
Here is an example, taken from the Italian penal code, Article
97: “Non è imputabile chi, nel momento in cui ha commesso il
fatto, non aveva compiuto i quattordici anni.”
If an anankastic-consitutive rule changes, the concept of re-
sponsibility does not change: what changes are the conditions
of applicability of that concept. In our example, if the minimum
age for imputability were 13 or 15 there would be no change in
the concept itself, but only in its condition(s) of application.
As a matter of fact, of course, since its (necessary) conditions
change, also the resulting synolon changes as well — but not
conceptually.
1.3 conceptions vs. justifications ofresponsibility
I distinguish conceptions of responsibility from justifications of re-
sponsibility.
While conceptions try to answer the question: ’how should
responsibility be?’, justifications presuppose a given conception
of responsibility, and answer the question: ’why is one held re-
sponsible?’
Justifications thus presuppose a given conception, but cannot
be reduced to it, nor be deduced from it.
1.3.1 Conceptions of Responsibility
I distinguish two main conceptions of responsibility: one descrip-
tive, one normative.19
19 Two caveats: first, there are different ways of conceptualizing these positions.
Vargas, 2013, p. 137, for instance, describes (i) a characterological account of
responsibility “if the action in some way expresses a deep fact about the
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1.3.1.1 Descriptive Responsibility
(DR) A’s being responsible for x depends on facts20
prior to/independent from our assessment or evalua-
tion.
Descriptive responsibility can be declined in two sub-positions:
(i) the metaphysical realist; (ii) the eliminativist.
the realist position The metaphysical realist holds that
(DR) responsibility depends on natural facts independent from
us, and that those facts exist.21
The “Ledger View” A particular stream of thinkers represent-
ing this position is that called the “ledger view”, usually identi-
fied with Feinberg, 1970,22 Glover, 1970 and Zimmerman, 1988.
To give a gist of the theory, I shall sketch here the position
of Feinberg in a part of Feinberg, 1970. This position does not
exhaust Feinberg’s theory of responsibility.
As opposed to legal responsibility, moral responsibility should
be:23
• independent from practical considerations (for instance the
specific aim of punishment one has);24
agent (Vargas, 2013, p. 137)” (for instance Hume, 1902, 2011, Watson); (ii) a
reason-responsiveness one (“a particular power to respond to the world (Vargas,
2013, p. 137)”); and (iii) an attributionist one (for instance: Scanlon, 1998 and
Angela Smith).
Second, parsimony leads me to identify only these two neat ones: a descriptive
conception; and a normative conception.
20 These facts need not be natural, of course.
21 This of course does not imply that the attribution of responsibility isn’t itself
an evaluation.
22 I should warn the reader that Feinberg explored this conception of responsi-
bility and in the end found it untenable for several reasons, one of which was
the existence of moral luck.
23 Please note that Feinberg does not describe moral responsibility (he’s not say-
ing that responsibility is so-and-so); he is telling the reader how moral re-
sponsibility should be. There are evaluative considerations involved here.
24 Cf. Feinberg, 1970, pp. 52-3.
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• absolute: independent from social policy (ie the aim of
punishment);25
• luck-independent.26
Responsibility judgments are (or should be) — according to
Feinberg — descriptive, that is, consisting in merely looking up
a given individual’s moral ledger and “seeing” whether his re-
sponsibility is written there.27
The “ledger view”, however, is more complex. All these fac-
tual elements we have seen constitute what is called by Feinberg
“imputability”. But imputability is only a part of the problem of
responsibility.
In fact, imputability is distinguished from liability, which is
responsibility in its fuller sense: while imputability is an objec-
tive judgment such as “He is blamable”, liability is a judgment —
expressed or not — as “He is to blame”. Liability is more akin to
an evaluation and is bound to social interactions and social pol-
icy, so to speak, but refers to a series of factual conditions (those
qualifying for imputability).28
To sum up, this interpretation of the “ledger view” may be
considered descriptive not because responsibility is not evalua-
tive, but because evaluating responsibility requires a necessary
reference to factual elements that are objective.29
the eliminativist position The metaphysical realist holds
that (DR) responsibility depends on natural facts independent
from us, and that those facts do not exist.
For the eliminativist responsibility could only be rooted out
there in the physical world — but since there are no facts point-
25 Cf. Feinberg, 1970, pp. 31.
26 Cf. Feinberg, 1970, pp. 32.
27 For this interesting metaphor of the register — and the most appropriate
verbs ’to impute’ [imputare] and ’to ascribe’ [ad-scribere, zuschreiben] — taken
to be the conceptual ancêtre of responsibility (at least by Ricœur, 1994, but
see Fonnesu, 2013) — see my note on Zurechnung in Chapter 5.
28 Feinberg contrasts imputability and liability explicitly in Feinberg, 1970, pp.
119–151.
29 I thank S. F. Magni for discussion on this point.
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ing in that direction, then there is no such a thing as responsibil-
ity.
Examples would be G. Strawson, 1994, 2009 and Waller, 2011.
1.3.1.2 Normative Responsibility
(NR) A is responsible for x iff it is appropriate to hold
A responsible.
Normative Responsibility can be declined in at least two fash-
ions: (i) an objectivist position; (ii) a conventionalist position.
the objectivistic position The objectivist holds that (NR)
responsibility depends on some standard of appropriateness, and
that this standard both exists, is unique, and can be known.
the conventionalist position The conventionalist holds
that (NR) responsibility depends on some standard of appropri-
ateness, and that this standard is merely conventional, depend-
ing on the social community we are considering.
Among proponents of a normative concept of responsibility,
there are at least Bayertz, 1995 and Lenk and Maring, 1993, Wal-
lace, 1994 and McGrath, 2005; Thomson, 2003.
Ingarden, 1970 may be included here with some doubts.
1.3.2 Justifications of Responsibility
We have seen that conceptions of responsibility try to answer
to questions such as “what is responsibility?”, whereas justifica-
tions of responsibility are concerned with aim of responsibility,
and try to answer to questions such as “why do we consider
someone responsible?”30
Historically, at least three distinct justifications of responsibil-
ity have been emerging. In this section I aim to give a minimal
account of them.
30 I urge the reader not to mistake justifications of responsibility for justifications
of punishment. Responsibility may be considered equal to punishment (as
Mill, 1865 alleged) — but this need not necessarily be the case.
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In Section 1.3.2.1, I shall sketch a retributionist justification of
responsibility;
In Section 1.3.2.2, I shall present a predictive (consequentialist)
justification of responsibility;31
There is also a more recent, subject-centered justification of
responsibility, for instance the agency cultivation model — cf. Var-
gas, 2013, Ch. 6, that I cannot engage with here.
1.3.2.1 Retributionist Responsibility
A retributive justification of responsibility is (usually) concerned
with reward (retribution): an individual must be held responsible
because of what he has done, because of his guilt. Using a rather
worn out motto of Seneca, one is held responsible quia peccatum
est.
The prototype of this stance in modern philosophy is usually
considered Immanuel Kant — cf. (Kant, 1797, Ch. 49)32.33
31 Note that a hard-line distinction between retributionist and consequentialist
theories of responsibility is hard to come by. Contemporary writers seem
to have taken a sort of via media. This middle way is exemplified — for
justifications of punishment — by Hart, 2008, Postscript, §3.
32 Judicial or juridical punishment (poena forensis) is to be distinguished from
natural punishment (poena naturalis), in which crime as vice punishes itself,
and does not as such come within the cognizance of the legislator. juridical
punishment can never be administered merely as a means for promoting
another good either with regard to the criminal himself or to civil society,
but must in all cases be imposed only because the individual on whom it is
inflicted has committed a crime. For one man ought never to be dealt with
merely as a means subservient to the purpose of another, nor be mixed up
with the subjects of real right. Against such treatment his inborn personality
has a right to protect him, even although he may be condemned to lose his
civil personality. He must first be found guilty and punishable, before there
can be any thought of drawing from his punishment any benefit for himself or
his fellow-citizens. But what is the mode and measure of punishment which
public justice takes as its principle and standard? It is just the principle of
equality, by which the pointer of the scale of justice is made to incline no
more to the one side than the other. It may be rendered by saying that the
undeserved evil which any one commits on another is to be regarded as
perpetrated on himself (Kant, 1797, Chapter 49, translation by W. Hastie).
33 Richterliche Strafe (poena forensis), die von der natürlichen (poena naturalis),
dadurch das Laster sich selbst bestraft und auf welche der Gesetzgeber gar
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1.3.2.2 Consequentialist Responsibility
A consequentialist or predictive justification of responsibility is
(usually) concerned both with prevention and correction: an indi-
vidual must be held responsible to avoid the repetition of what
he has done and to better him and/or to benefit society in gen-
eral.34 Following Seneca, one is held responsible ne peccetur.
The prototypes of this stance in modern philosophy are usu-
ally considered Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill — cf. Mill,
1865.
1.3.3 Relationships among Concepts, Conceptions and Justifi-cations: Dimensions of Responsibility
I have distinguished supra among conceptions, concepts and jus-
tifications. In this subsection, I shall explore their mutual rela-
tionships by way of combinatorics and illustrate their interplay
in a three-dimensional figure (1.1).
In particular, I shall limit my investigation to pairs of concep-
tions (normative and descriptive), pair of justifications (backward-
looking and forward-looking) and pair of concepts (here moral
and legal concepts of responsibility).
If we have three pairs of elements to combine, we shall obtain
nicht Rücksicht nimmt, verschieden, kann niemals bloß als Mittel ein an-
deres Gute zu befördern für den Verbrecher selbst, oder für die bürgerliche
Gesellschaft, sondern muß jederzeit nur darum wider ihn verhängt werden,
weil er verbrochen hat; denn der Mensch kann nie bloß als Mittel zu den Ab-
sichten eines Anderen gehandhabt und unter die Gegenstände des Sachen-
rechts gemengt werden, wowider ihn seine angeborne Persönlichkeit schützt,
ob er gleich die bürgerliche einzubüßen gar wohl verurtheilt werden kann.
[. . . ] Welche Art aber und welcher Grad der Bestrafung ist es, welche die
öffentliche Gerechtigkeit sich zum Princip und Richtmaße macht? Kein an-
deres, als das Princip der Gleichheit, (im Stande des Züngleins an der Wage
der Gerechtigkeit) sich nicht mehr auf die eine, als auf die andere Seite
hinzuneigen (Kant, 1797, §49).
34 As S. F. Magni suggests (private conversation and Magni, 2005, Ch. 4) a conse-
quentialist justification of responsibility needs not be purely forward-looking:
in fact, consequentialists are concerned mostly with one already did, and not
only with future actions.
1.4 two senses of ’normativity’: nomophoric vs. axiological 29
23 = 8 combinations
In particular,
1. Normative, backward-looking, moral responsibility;
2. Normative, forward-looking, moral responsibility;
3. Descriptive, backward-looking, moral responsibility;
4. Descriptive, forward-looking, moral responsibility;
5. Normative, backward-looking, legal responsibility;
6. Normative, forward-looking, legal responsibility;
7. Descriptive, backward-looking, legal responsibility;
8. Descriptive, forward-looking, legal responsibility;
These 8 combinations are illustrated in three dimensional gra-
phic 1.1.
1.4 two senses of ’normativity’: no-mophoric vs. axiological
’Normativity’ and ’normative’ have several different senses.35
Arguably, the two most pregnant for this kind of inquiry are
first, the nomophoric; second, the axiological.
35 An investigation of normativity is beyond the scope of the present
work, and the heuristic dichotomy I sketch here is by no means ex-
haustive. To get a glimpse of the broadness of this subject, see:
http://philpapers.org/browse/normativity.
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1.4.1 Nomophoric Normativity
First, ’normative’ is something somewhat36 related to norms.37
I shall suggest for this concept the term ’nomophoric normativ-
ity’ (or ’nomological normativity’) [normatività nomoforica, nor-
mativité nomophorique, nomophorische Normativität, nomoforyczna
normatywnos´c´].
1.4.2 Axiological Normativity
Second, ’normative’ as something prima facie opposed to the ’de-
scriptive’, ’non-normative’ and thus involving an evaluation.38 I
shall suggest for this concept the phrase ’axiological normativ-
ity’ (or ’axiotic normativity’) [normatività axiologica or assiologica,
normativité axiologique, axiologische Normativität, aksiologiczna nor-
matywnos´c´].39
1.4.3 Nomophoric vs. Axiological Responsibility
In which sense, then, can responsibility be normative, as in the
phrase ’normative responsibility’?
Since I have distinguished two senses of ’normativity’, I main-
tain that responsibility can be considered normative in two senses:
• (i) nomophoric responsibility, when it is related explicitly to
norms;
• (ii) axiological responsibility, when it is considered in an
evaluative dimension.40
36 I shall explore in particular two types of relationship to norms: responsibility-
related norms, and norm-related responsibility. Vide infra, Section 1.4.3.1.
37 For the polysemy of the term ‘norm’, see Conte, 2007b.
38 For a similar suggestion, see Finlay, 2010.
39 The disciplines studying the nomological and the axiotic are, respectively,
nomologics (for which vide Conte, 2013b) and axiotics (in a related, although
different, sense, vide Conte, 2008).
40 There is further room for inquiry here. According to some reasons are funda-
mental in the normative domain, and thus responsibility can be considered
normative in the further sense of being tied to reasons. Since it’s not clear
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1.4.3.1 Nomophoric Responsibility
The first sense of “normative responsibility”, that is, nomophoric
responsibility is rule-related responsibility.
In this subsection, I shall consider three kinds of rule-related
responsibility:
• (i) regulative-rule-related responsibility (in Section 1.4.3.1);
• (ii) constitutive-rule-related responsibility. In particular,
– (ii.i) eidetic-constitutive rule-related responsibility (in
Section 1.4.3.1);
– (ii.ii) anankastic-constitutive-rule-related responsibility
(in Section 1.4.3.1)
regulative-rule-related responsibility I define regulative-
rule-related responsibility as responsibility for actions, behav-
iors or outcomes regulated by regulative rules.
Two examples: (classical) moral responsibility, Aquilian re-
sponsibility (liability to pay damages).
constitutive-rule-related responsibility I define constitutive-
rule-related responsibility as responsibility arising for some sort
of interaction with constitutive rules.
Eidetic-Constitutive-rule-related Responsibility I define eidetic-
constitutive-rule-related responsibility as responsibility arising
from interactions with eidetic-constitutive rules, rules that are
condition(s) of (the concept of) something.
An example is the responsibility of a cheater: eidetic-constitu-
tive rules of that game are necessary for him to cheat, but can
exhaust his responsibility.
whether the nomophoric or the axiological route are more basic than the rea-
son approach, I leave this path open for future research.
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Anankastic-Constitutive-rule-related Responsibility I define anan-
kastic-constitutive-rule-related responsibility as responsibility aris-
ing from a “violation” of anankastic-constitutive rules, rules that
posit condition(s) of (the validity of) something.
An example is the responsibility of doing an invalid exam,
when this option is not already considered by regulative rules.
1.4.3.2 Axiological Responsibility
The second sense of “normative responsibility”, that is, axiological
responsibility is responsibility considered in its evaluative dimen-
sion, with reference to values.41
This is the most difficult to characterize, because any qualifi-
cation cannot be neutral and has to build on a meta-normative
theory. In some respects (that is, according to some — but not all
— metanormative theories) it can be characterized as opposed to
what is descriptive.
It is in this sense that I primarily refer in the rest of this work.
By the end of my investigation, I hope that a clearer sense of
normative responsibility will emerge.
Further Problems Now, it seems that these two senses of norma-
tivity (and of responsibility) can be distinguished at least heuris-
tically.
But are they irreducible to one another?
As far as I know, several attempts have been made to explore
the relationships between what I call the nomophoric and what
I call the axiological.
I only sketch here the possible stances on the relationships
between the axiological and the nomophoric. I suppose they
can be distinguished — at least prima facie.
First, deontic panagathism: normativity coincides with the axio-
logical, and therefore the nomophoric is reduced to the axiolog-
ical. An example of deontic panagathism is Judith Jarvis Thom-
41 Of course the reference to “values” does not clarify the matter. In fact, what
kinds of values? Are epistemic values akin to moral values? I leave this
problem open here.
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son’s stance: duties and oughts, for instance, can be reduced to
goodness.42 “Teleological” theories usually also hold that deontic
concepts are to be explained with reference to values (for one
G. E. Moore, 1922, p. 25; for a direct argument against this the-
sis, besides supererogation, see Sesonske, 1964, pp. 70, 75; cf.
Schroeder, 2012 and van Fraassen, 1973).
Second, pandeonticism: normativity coincides with the nomo-
phoric, and therefore the axiological is reduced to the nomopho-
ric. An example of pandeonticism is Uberto Scarpelli’s work
(Scarpelli, 1981); another example is the family of theory called
“fitting attitudes account”, including Scanlon’s famous buck-passing
account of value, according to which (roughly) value can be ex-
plained with other reasons-providing properties (cf. Scanlon,
1998).
It seems to me that this is a fundamental problem I can only
touch on here, hoping for more research to come. For instance,
I haven’t touched on the relationship between reasons and nor-
mativity. Reasons are taken to be fundamental (in the normative
domain) by more than one prominent theorists such as Scanlon,
1998, 2014 and Skorupski, 2010.
connection with the remaining parts of this work In
this chapter, I have engaged in two different conceptual investi-
gations:
- in the first part, I have considered the nature of responsibility,
distinguishing among concepts, conceptions, justifications and
conditions of responsibility;
- in the second part, I have considered the nature of normativ-
ity.
The rest of this work deals with the mutual interactions of
responsibility and normativity.
In Part II, I shall consider and try to refute three negative ar-
guments, against the thesis that responsibility is normative. In
particular:
42 For Thomson’s stance, see Thomson, 2007, 2008, 2010.
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in Chapter 2 (Responsibility and Mens Rea), I consider the claim
that since responsibility should have a descriptive content,
it cannot be based on mens rea (on mental elements) be-
cause mens rea is not objectively or scientifically ascertain-
able.
In Chapter 3 (Responsibility and Neuroscience), I then consider
the claim that cognitive sciences (ie. neuroscience) would
be able to objectively measure mental states, thus giving
a plausible descriptive foundation to responsibility. I re-
fute this claim both for theoretical and practical reasons. I
propose, instead, to endorse a normative notion of respon-
sibility.
In Chapter 4 (Responsibility and Causation), I consider (and re-
fute) an even more extreme argument: that responsibility
attribution should be completely descriptive because it is
based on (one of its conditions:) causality. The evaluative
component would then (almost) disappear.
In Part III, I consider directly what I call the pragmatics of re-
sponsibility. I try to put forward an argument for the thesis that
responsibility is normative, based on an analysis of responsibil-
ity judgments and norm negation (negation of normative state-
ments).
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Figure 1.1: Dimensions of Responsibility
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“Otro demérito de los falsos problemas es el de promover soluciones
que son falsas también.”
Jorge Luis Borges
In this chapter, I consider (and, eventually, try to refute) the
claim that the attribution of responsibility — if done without ref-
erence to mental elements — is a value-free, non-normative task.
Attributing responsibility without considering mental elements
has been suggested, for instance, by Lady Wootton. Wootton
proposed to abolish the mens rea requirement for criminal re-
sponsibility and to attribute liability only for the outward con-
duct, with reference to the behaviorism dominating in her age.
Since establishing mens rea has traditionally been an (the?) eval-
uative task par excellence, Wootton’s proposal — if enacted —
would then understand the ascription of responsibility as a pu-
rely behavioral-based (almost mechanical) process.
I critically assess the Hart–Wootton debate on whether crimi-
nal trials should be based on strict liability, waiving the mens rea
requirement. In Section 1, I present Lady Wootton’s stance: she
argued for getting rid of mens rea to define criminal offences. In
Sections 2 and 3, I consider Hart’s and Ross’ criticisms: neither
agreed with Lady Wootton’s proposal but for different reasons.
In Section 4, I try to assess Lady Wootton’s arguments and I
note that even a mental-free liability attribution would still be
normative, because it is based on many kinds of evaluations.
2.0 introduction: how criminal sys-tems work
This is how a criminal legal system works, in the words of one of
the most prominent legal philosophers of last century, Herbert
Lionel Adolphus Hart [Harrogate, 1907 — Oxford, 1992]:
[i]n all advanced legal systems liability to conviction
for serious crimes is made dependent, not only on
the offender having done those outward acts which
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the law forbids, but on his having done them in a cer-
tain frame of mind or with a certain will. These are
the mental conditions or ’mental elements’ in crimi-
nal responsibility and [. . . ] they are broadly similar
in most legal systems. Even if you kill a man, this
is not punishable as murder in most civilized juris-
dictions if you do it unintentionally, accidentally or
by mistake, or while suffering from certain forms of
mental abnormality.1 Lawyers [. . . ] use [. . . ] mens rea
as a comprehensive name for these necessary mental
elements; and according to conventional ideas mens
rea is a necessary element in liability to be established
before a verdict (Hart, 2008, p.187).
2.1 lady wootton’s strict liability sys-tem
This section explores Lady Wootton’s [Barbara Adam, later Ba-
roness Wootton of Abinger, Cambridge, 1897 – Surrey, 1988] con-
tribution to the debate on responsibility and criminal liability.
This debate is very often overlooked by both scientific and philo-
sophical literature. This is unfortunate. In fact, Lady Wootton’s
stance (which dates back to 1963) is mirrored — sometimes with
pretence of novelty — by very fortunate writers and papers more
than forty years later, such as Greene and Cohen, 2004, Sapolsky,
2004, Dawkins (passim), Cashmore, 2010 (see the introduction of
Vincent, 2013 and Chapter 3 for a general survey).
In particular, Lady Wootton’s main thesis is that responsibility
(defined as reference to mens rea, i. e. mental elements) should
be eliminated from criminal law as we are heading towards a
1 Please note Hart’s begging of the question. It is clear that if murder (murder
and not: killing) is defined as killing with mens rea (i. e. intentionally, know-
ingly and so on), a killing without those requirements cannot be consistently
punished as murder. It is not a murder. In other words, mental elements are
part of the wrong and partly characterize it. I shall touch on the question in
full with constitutive rules below.
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preventive system. Her strategy is threefold: (i) she shows that
the aim of a modern criminal system must be fundamentally
preventive (Section 2.1.1), and (ii) since the current system of
responsibility and punishment attached to mental elements is
tied up with a fundamentally retributive system (Section 2.1.2),
then (iii) responsibility via mens rea should be eliminated from
the criminal system, as the cases of negligence and mental ab-
normality already show (Section 2.1.3).
2.1.1 Retribution vs. Prevention
The starting point of the relevant portion of the 1963 Hamlyn
Lectures2 I am interested in is the sharp contrast Lady Woot-
ton sees between modern “forensic science in the detection of a
crime” and the “prescientific character of the criminal process
itself”, together with the “extreme conservatism of the legal pro-
fession”. Testimony for instance, still widely used, has been
shown by psychology to be unreliable.
The ultimate contrast, however, is about the aim of punish-
ment. The “traditional”, historical idea for Lady Wootton is that
of retribution, of justly punishing the guilty qua guilty: everyone
would get what he deserves. The modern idea she favors is that
of reform or prevention of further harm for the offender and for
society.
The implications of the traditional view are necessarily linked
to an objective moral content: “the wickedness which renders
a criminal liable to punishment must be inherent either in the
actions which he has committed or in the state of mind in which
he has committed them (p. 38).” Lady Wootton moreover quotes
Lord Devlin3 as a supporter of this view and his distinction be-
tween criminal (roughly: morally wrong, mala in se) and quasi-
criminal (roughly: conventional, mala prohibita) acts as untenable.
Since for Wootton this distinction is the byproduct of a tradi-
tional view, what is morally wrong (and therefore fully crimi-
nal) is what has been always considered as such (mala antiqua);
2 Given in 1963 and reprinted definitely in Wootton, 1963, whence I shall quote.
3 Devlin, 1965. Devlin was a famous opponent of Hart’s views
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whereas what is only conventionally wrong (and therefore quasi-
criminal) is what is (technologically) new. But what is considered
to be morally wrong or not is subject to change — even with the
help (or under the push) of technology.4
More interestingly, Lady Wootton points out that there is noth-
ing inherent in the physical actions alone that makes them “wrong”
or at least criminally punishable. The action of firing a gun or
of driving are in themselves perfectly legal; furthermore, one
could have had the intention to perform exactly those actions
that lead to criminal consequences, without intending those con-
sequences.
This is even more apparent in stealing: as a physical sequence
of actions, stealing consists merely in the translation of an x from
region of space s1 at time t1 of the same x to region of space s2
at time t2. But it is only the circumstances (plus the mental ele-
ments, presumably) that make this physical translation a “real”
theft.
The very same talk about “punishment” — even by people
otherwise non-retributivist such as Hart in (Hart, 1962) — pre-
supposes a punitive view of the courts functioning. But all these
concerns must be discarded, because they are all attached to
a backward looking function of courts, whereas the sole justifi-
able aim of the criminal system is to prevent harm and to reform
criminals.
2.1.2 Criminal Liability = Strict Liability
Even the fear or repulsion for a possible spread of strict liability
crimes, i. e. crimes without reference to mental elements (mens
4 Let me note here in passing two things: first, the greatly different (metaeth-
ical) premisses of Devlin and Wootton — which leads to a de facto impossi-
bility to discuss — Devlin in fact would probably reply that moral principles
used to tell what is wrong and what is right do not change at all; whereas
Wootton’s criteria for what is wrong and what is right probably depend on
what people in general deem wrong or right; second, the splendid straw man
of Wootton’s discussion: she quickly and imperfectly summarizes Lord De-
vlin’s arguments in a fashion such that she can accuse him of the faults of
another theory.
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rea), is maybe meaningful, Wootton goes on, only in a retributive
framework. In fact,
[i]f, however, the primary function of the courts is
conceived as the prevention of forbidden acts, there
is little cause to be disturbed by the multiplication of
offenses of strict liability. If the law says that certain
things are not to be done, it is illogical to confine this
prohibition to occasions on which they are done from
malice aforethought; for at least the material conse-
quences of an action, and the reasons for prohibiting
it, are the same whether it is the result of sinister ma-
licious plotting, of negligence or of sheer accident (p.
46).
Here you can read an act-consequentialist. In a more refined
way, Hart would have specified that the voluntariness of an action
adds more to its effects than the mere consequences. Voluntari-
ness is therefore an important element of moral and social life —
even if it turns out to be illusory.5
Is Lady Wootton ignoring this remark? Not really. As a matter
of fact, she does not argue for a total elimination of the mens rea
requirement. Mens rea should not be taken into consideration
for the definition of a crime, because if we aim for prevention,
every harm — voluntary or not — is to be taken care of:
If the object of the criminal law is to prevent the oc-
currence of socially damaging actions, it would be
absurd to turn a blind eye to those which were due
to carelessness, negligence or even accident (p. 47).
Mens rea, however, makes a comeback later, after the convic-
tion stage. The presence or absence of a guilty mind is relevant
for the sentence, that is, not to give criminal liability, but to de-
cide what kind of liability, for instance imprisonment vs. medical
treatment. In her words,
5 This seems echoed in P. F. Strawson, 1968 (2008) and cf. Nichols and Knobe,
2007 on intuitions about moral responsibility.
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[where] this argument leads is, I think, not that the
presence or absence of the guilty mind is unimpor-
tant, but that mens rea has [...] got into the wrong place.
[...] The question of motivation is in the first instance
irrelevant. But only in the first instance. At a later
stage, that is to say, after what is now known as a
conviction, the presence or absence of guilty inten-
tion is all-important for its effect on the appropriate
measures to be taken to prevent a recurrence of the
forbidden act (pp. 47-8).
Offenses of strict liability do not lead directly to punishment,
but only to a sort of liability to further consequences that “must
be taken to prevent the occurrence of such actions (p. 49)” The
gravity of (strict liability) offenses is estimated more by their con-
sequences than by the offender’s state of mind. A fit example
is (very characteristically for Lady Wootton) a driving offense:
careless driving is criminally relevant only if it had some (seri-
ous) consequences; otherwise is in fact seldom prosecuted.
Since (i) the general aim of the criminal system is that of pre-
vention and minimization of social harm, it does not really mat-
ter, prima facie, if this harm was voluntary (i.e guilty, with mens
rea) or not. And since (ii) in technologically advanced societies
“much and more damage is done by negligence, or by indiffer-
ence to the welfare or safety of others, as by deliberate wicked-
ness (p. 50)”,6 then (iii) if those offenses are to be judged by
criminal courts, than most of them should be offenses of strict
liability. But apparently mental elements are a problem only at
the beginning, because it is on them that the choice of treatment
is made.
6 And again, “an increase in strict liability offenses would be merely the latest
adaptation of the long evolution of our legal system to the changing condi-
tions of human life and to the growth of human understanding. That system
is already outdated in a world in which negligence, careless- ness and indif-
ference cause more injury and damage than the total that is attributable to
deliberate intent (p. 63).”
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To sum up, according to Wootton, “the concept of guilty mind
has become both irrelevant and obstructive” (p.51), especially in
the cases of negligence and even more of mental abnormality.
2.1.3 Mental Abnormality and the Elimination of Responsibil-ity
Mental abnormality is the epitome of Wootton’s theory.7
The very neat distinction between punishment as retribution
and treatment as prevention (and the absolute absence of any
via media, in Wootton’s view) becomes apparent in the case of
mentally abnormal offenders.
The traditional retributive system is linked to guilt and culpa-
bility: the more mentally ill an offender, the less culpable he is,
the less he deserves punishment.
The proposed preventive system is linked to future risk and
treatability: the degree and severity of mental illness entails
medical or other kinds of treatment.
But the traditional is the wrong approach and the concept of
responsibility should be eliminated from criminal law: in fact,
any attempt to distinguish between wickedness and
mental abnormality was doomed to failure; and that
the only solution for the future was to allow the con-
cept of responsibility to "wither away" and to concen-
trate instead on the problem of the choice of treat-
ment, without attempting to assess the effect of men-
tal peculiarities or degrees of culpability (p. 71).
And a key reason for this is Lady Wootton’s idea that it is
scientifically impossible “to get inside another man’s skin”:
neither medical nor any other science can ever hope
to prove whether a man who does not resist his im-
pulses does not do so because he cannot or because
he will not. The propositions of science are by defini-
tion subject to empirical validation; but since it is not
7 For a thorough analysis of mental illness and law, see Morse, 1977.
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possible to get inside another man’s skin, no objective
criterion which can distinguish between "he did not"
and "he could not" is conceivable (p. 78).
This (nowadays) radical position of Lady Wootton should be
understood in reference to behaviorism.8 If we consider that be-
haviorism was dominant in philosophy and social sciences at
the time Lady Wootton was writing,9 then it is easier to see why
she was trying to avoid all potentially dangerous references to
the inner sphere, and in particular to intentions and volitions to
impartially attribute responsibility.
Responsibility was to be based on external observable behav-
ior.
2.1.4 Side Remarks: Taxonomies, Determinism, Semantics
Taxonomical approaches such as the later Hart’s postscript (Hart,
2008), Fisher’s physiognomy (Fischer and Tognazzini, 2011) or
Vincent’s structured taxonomy (Vincent, Van De Poel, and Van
Den Hoven, 2011) are de facto irrelevant for criminal courts:
I cannot think that anyone can listen to, or read, the
sophisticated subtleties in which legal disputations
about degrees of responsibility persistently flounder
and founder, without reaching the paradoxical con-
clusion that the harder we try to recognize the com-
plexity of reality, the greater the unreality of the whole
discussion. Indeed it is hardly surprising that in prac-
tice most of these subtleties probably pass over the
heads of juries, whose conclusions appear to be reached
on simpler grounds (p. 76).
8 Behaviorism is the theory that human and animal behavior can be explained
in terms of conditioning, without appeal to thoughts or feelings, and that
psychological disorders are best treated by altering behavior patterns, cf. New
Oxford American Dictionary, ad vocem.
9 Think of Ryle’s The Concept of Mind. I thank S. F. Magni for discussion on this
point.
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But there is a difference, or distinction, Lady Wootton deems
fit to preserve: that between causal responsibility (concerning au-
thorship of an act: perfectly fine in criminal law) and capacity
responsibility (concerning the mental state in which the act was
committed: to be eliminated).10
It is the latter, capacity responsibility, that raises all the con-
cerns we have explored in this section. The capacity responsi-
bility requirement is to be eliminated in all cases (and not only
when mental abnormalities are detected) but not because of a
metaphysical impossibility, such as a possible incompatibility
with determinism via absence of free will. Lady Wootton is in
fact clear in denying her acceptance of determinism.
Lady Wootton, consequently, wishes for a progressively blur-
red distinction between prison and hospital and that
eventually obliterated altogether. Both will be sim-
ply "places of safety" in which offenders receive the
treatment which experience suggests is most likely to
evoke the desired response (p. 82).11
A very natural question follows, given (a) Wootton’s refusal
of determinism and (b) her wished “medical treatment for all”:
how would you know that your treatment was going to be ef-
fective, if there were no minimal causal or deterministic connec-
tion? This should not be a problem: it is one thing to deny
that there is freedom of the will (that the will is deterministi-
cally caused), another to deny that determinism is true tout court.
More problems with Lady Wootton’s approach will be dealt with
in the comment section, infra in Section 2.4.1.
10 These terms are not used in the original Hamlyn lectures and have been
popularized by Hart, 2008.
11 Then of course you will loose the social, expressive, function of punishment,
as highlighted by Feinberg, 1970, 1990.
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2.1.5 Lady Wootton’s Proposal: recap
In Wootton, 1963, pp. 47–52 Lady Wootton maintained that the
mens rea12 requirement was to be ignored in convicting criminal
offenders. The crime was to be defined only as the outward
conduct, without any reference to the mental state at the time of
the offense. All offenses then were strict liability offenses.
Lady Wootton’s thesis came from a very neat premise: the
sole aim of criminal law is “the prevention of socially damaging
actions”. Punishment is justified inasmuch as it causes the best
consequences for society and for the offenders.
The offender’s state of mind at the time of the offense (i.e. his
mens rea) is therefore irrelevant to determine now his liability to
be punished. His state of mind would be relevant if the aim of
criminal law were retribution for past wrongs.
In Lady Wootton’s approach, the offender’s mens rea is used
only after conviction, in order to establish penal punishment,
medical treatment or nothing altogether.
2.2 hart’s reply
2.2.1 Hart’s Moderate Proposal
H. L. A. Hart addresses his first Jerusalem 1964 lecture13 to reply
to Lady Wootton’s proposal.
He makes clear that there are two of Lady Wootton’s assump-
tions he does not share:
First, she thinks that the doctrine of mens rea is tenable only if
accompanied by a retributive theory of punishment. Since she
refutes this and endorses a consequentialist understanding of
punishment, then she can discard the mens rea requirement on
12 Mens rea stands for purpose, knowledge, recklessness and negligence, at least
in the Model Penal Code, §2.02 (1985). Other formulations apply, depending
on jurisdiction.
13 In Hart, 1964, pp. 5–29, reprinted in Hart, 2008, §8.
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that basis. Hart believes this is a philosophical confusion, as he
argues in Hart, 1962.
Second, Lady Wootton holds that the question of what was
the offender’s state of mind is “in principle unanswearble (Hart,
1964, p.22)” because “it is not possible to get inside another
man’s skin (Wootton, 1963, p.74)”.
Hart calls Lady Wootton’s tenets the “extreme form” (p.14) of
this new theory (because it would do away with the entire mens
rea requirement) and moves on to consider only a “moderate”
form concerning “the legal responsibility of the mentally abnor-
mal”.
Hart, then, is not interested in a new system of attributing lia-
bility for criminal punishment, but more modestly in a reform of
the existing system with respect to mental illness, the Achilles’
heel often used to force current jurisprudence. In fact, since
most critics of responsibility have been concerned with mentally
abnormal offenders, Hart proposes to keep the mens rea require-
ment as a condition to liability, in order to show that one need
not to throw the baby out with the bath water and discard the
whole theory of responsibility because of some problems with
one of its parts.
Hart’s moderate reform is thus conceived. He keeps separated
conviction and sentencing: mental illness would be irrelevant
at conviction (an “accused person would no longer be able to
adduce any form of mental abnormality as a bar to conviction
(p.25)”) but investigated at the sentencing stage in order to de-
cide the most efficacious punishment (or treatment), and thus
the defendant’s abnormal state of mind is only relevant at the
time of the trial, and irrelevant at the time of the offense. I shall
not discuss Hart’s proposal — with the very obvious problems
it raises — here, but will focus on his critiques to Wootton.
2.2.2 Hart’s Threefold Critique to Lady Wootton
I shall now present Hart’s objections to the abandoning mens
rea as a necessary condition for criminal liability and offer some
thoughts on them.
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In particular, Hart puts forward three objections to Lady Woot-
ton’s model: (i) a threat to individual freedom; (ii) moral and
sociological objections to Lady Wootton’s identification of pun-
ishment and medical treatment; (iii) a practical consequence of
Lady Wootton’s model for criminal law.
(i) hart’s first criticism: individual social freedom In
a system like Lady Wootton’s “every blow, even if [...] purely
accidental or merely careless [...] would be a matter for inves-
tigation (p.26)” with the associate effect of greater discretionary
power of the authority and great possibility of intervention in
everyday life that constrains individual freedom.
If the doctrine of mens rea were swept away, [...] very
considerable discretionary powers would have to be
entrusted to them [the police] [...]. No one could view
this kind of expansion of police powers with equa-
nimity, for with it will come great uncertainty for the
individual: official interferences with his life will be-
come more frequent but he will be less able to predict
their incidence if any accidental or careless blow may
be an occasion for them (Hart, 2008, p. 206).
(ii) hart’s second criticism: identification of punish-ment and treatment Wootton thinks that both penal punish-
ment and medical treatment are equal forms of social hygiene,
enforced to obtain the best consequences for society and the of-
fender. Hart raises two objections: penal punishment and med-
ical treatment cannot be considered alike. Morally speaking,
Hart believes that we need a moral justification (or “licence”,
p.27) to use a man for the benefit of society (i.e. with deterrence
or example by imprisoning him when he has broken the law).
These moral grounds are for Hart to be sought in the “demon-
stration that the person so treated could have helped doing what
he did (p.27)” — a proof we cannot obtain from the mentally ab-
normal.14
14 This seems a reference to what Hart calls capacity-responsibility and indeed,
to some notion of freedom of the will.
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Sociologically speaking, Hart notes, “a sentence of imprison-
ment” — unlike a medical treatment — “is a public act express-
ing the odium [...] of society for those who break the law (p.28)”.15
With the identification of the two, the law would lose a powerful
instrument of deterrence, both for society and the offender.
(ii i) hart’s third criticism: practical consequences Hart
notes that there are some crimes identified only by reference to
mental elements, such as attempted crimes. In Lady Wootton’s
model these are likely to disappear.
Consider the idea of an attempt to commit a crime.
It is obviously desirable that persons who attempt
to kill or injure or steal, even if they fail, should be
brought before courts for punishment or treatment;
yet what distinguishes an attempt which fails from an
innocent activity is just the fact that it is a step taken
with the intention of bringing about some harmful
consequences (Hart, 2008, p. 209).
It seems to me that none of Hart’s objections are decisive,
since they rest either on further implicit (moral) premises to be
proved or on required psychological and sociological empirical
research. Hart himself admits this (Hart, 2008, p. 209) and calls
only for an answer to his objections, without claiming that they
defeat Lady Wootton’s proposal. In fact, it has to be said that
the first two objections are peculiar to Lady Wootton’s model,
and do not apply to a strict liability system more utiliarian-
free than Wootton’s. But Hart crafted several other arguments
against strict liability tout court, without any (specific or direct)
reference to the “extreme” model we have so far taken into ac-
count. The next subsection is devoted to analyzing and evaluat-
ing them.
15 For similar remarks, see Feinberg, 1970.
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2.2.3 Hart’s Two Critiques to Strict Liability
In this subsection, I summarize two Hart’s arguments against
strict liability and offer a critical evaluation of them. Strict lia-
bility, I recall, is defined as criminal liability without mens rea
required for the offense to take place — where the actual “com-
ponents” of mens rea vary according to jurisdiction.
(a) mens rea and the rule of law The Rule of Law as a gen-
eral ideal and aim for the law to pursue had always been dear
to Hart in his writings. But it is his Hart, 2008, Chapter 2 that
the Rule of Law is explicitly linked to the mens rea requirement.
The Rule of Law16 is concerned with protections against the
possible absolute power of the State via “unjust” means such
as vague, secret and retroactive laws, in particular via the legal
maxim: actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea.
Hart therefore thought that the mens rea requirement was an-
other assimilable warrant of the Rule of Law, a requirement that
excludes the punishment of an “innocent”, that is when there
are no “subjective elements” (p.152) and relevant “mental condi-
tions” (p.35). Why is it so? Because the law — according to Hart
— ought to give its subjects a fair warning to let them organize
and live their lives, clearly in order to be law in the name of the
rule of law.
(b) mens rea, the rule of law and freedom Furthermore,
not punishing the innocent (he who lacks mens rea) “maximizes
individual freedom within the coercive framework of law” (p.23).17
These critiques, as far as I can understand them, are two sides
of the same coin: Hart’s liberal concern that citizens can live as
free from the coercive power of the state as much as they can.
16 Rule of Law is a formula peculiar to common law countries. To my under-
standing, it is comparable to Fr. état de droit, Ger. Rechtsstaat, It. stato di diritto,
Pol. praworza˛dnos´c´, Russ. pravavoe gosudarstvo.
17 For an interesting discussion on this point over the contemporary political
framework, see Gardner’s introduction to Hart, 2008, pp. xxxvii–xliv.
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The law should also serve as an instrument to organize one’s
life — a tool giving certainty and security.
In this respect, strict liability crimes (crimes without mens rea
required) seriously endanger one’s plan, because one is never
sure that a punishment could not follow for an action he did not
intend or want and this, in turn, may jeopardize one’s life plan.
Hart’s concerns are reasonable, but there are at least two dif-
ferent issues here.
First, the fact that mens rea has not to be proven to hold some-
one liable for an offense is not the same as punishing an innocent.
The equivalence between mens rea and guilt18 is not self-evident
and must be proved.
Hart seems unable to see the conceptual difference between
absence of mens rea (volition, intention, etc.) and absence of guilt
(i.e. a criminal offense — with the required mens rea — but
an excused one: duress, provocation, etc.). A mens rea element
(eg intention to kill) is an element of the wrong; an excuse is
instead a defense for the wrong already committed (eg duress
when killing). But in no way can legal excuses guide our lives as
a priori principles — they serve only a posteriori. Hart’s failure
to distinguish the two made him implausibly stretch the rule of
law to also include excuses — excuses are not exceptions, and
were someone to adapt his behavior to “benefit from excuses
that he believes the law will grant him, the law is likely to react
by denying him the excuse” (p.xlvii).
Second, as long as people consider themselves rational and in
self-control, the law can still be their ally in planning their life
as they want, even if there are strict liability crimes. People
would be able to think that as long as they act rightly criminal
law won’t touch them. Mens rea elements are not required for
the offense to take place, but an offense (even if only material,
or “external”) still needs to happen. Even if the law ignores
18 I take as a working definition that innocent is one who is not guilty. I am not
able to provide the reader with reliable synonyms in other languages, due to
differences in legal systems. In fact, the obvious xenonyms are not synonyms.
Sp. culpa, Fr. faute, It. colpa are a part of what would be called mens rea, along
with Sp., Port. and It. dolo at least according to a plausible interpretation of
Art. 42, Italian Penal Code.
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mental elements, people might still feel that mental elements
are there and can be controlled, and that mental elements in
the end determine external acts. So if they control their mind,
they roughly control their actions, even if the law is ultimately
concerned only with their material, external actions, and not
with those mental elements that brought them about. Moreover,
it has been argued19 that strict liability crimes may even increase
law’s deterrence.
Interestingly and at a more general level, Hart shifts the ar-
gument from within (formal) philosophy of law towards more
substantive moral claims. In a way, it seems that from the mere
form of punishment one ends up with the general justifying prin-
ciple of the whole social activity of punishment. In other words,
it seems (I won’t argue for it here) that Hart is loosing sight of
his own positivism to root the practice of legal (rectius: criminal)
punishment in the moral practice of blaming, as if he were to “in-
stitutionalize certain moral practices”, as Gardner subtly notes
(p.xlix).20
To sum up, Hart’s two main critiques to strict liability crimes
(they are against the rule of law, they are against freedom) have
not proven definitive. I pointed out that one is misleading be-
cause of Hart’s failure to discriminate between mens rea and guilt;
the other — apart for being confused and ill-directed — is (sur-
prisingly perhaps for a legal positivist like Hart) founded on a
defeasible moral claim.
2.3 a. ross’s reply
Alf Ross [1899 – 1979], one of the leading legal philosophers of
the 20th century, linked his critique to Lady Wootton’s proposal
to the wider and richer picture of his understanding of moral
and legal responsibility.
19 Cf. Simester, 2005.
20 For some interesting remarks on positivism and the separation of law and
morals, see Gardner, 2012, §2 and L. Green, 2008.
2.3 a. ross’s reply 57
This section is organized in two parts. In Section 2.3.1, I
present Ross’s conception of moral and legal responsibility; in
Section 2.3.2, I present and assess Ross’s critique to Lady Woot-
ton.
2.3.1 Ross’s Conception of Responsibility
Ross, 1975 is very careful in keeping separate guilt, responsibil-
ity and punishment. Guilt [skyld]21 (pp. 1–12) is when one can
be blamed according to the normative system in question. Guilt
is different from feelings of guilt, which can be sometimes lack-
ing (in psychopaths, for instance); it does not refer to a tangible,
or measurable, state-of-affairs: it is a tû-tû concept, i.e. an empty
concept, without natural reference, that nonetheless is still mean-
ingful in a given linguistic community.22
2.3.1.1 The Conditions of Responsibility
The conditions of responsibility are profoundly different from its
concept or its meaning: analyzing the former does not exhaust
analysis of the latter. Some conditions of responsibility are, for
instance, free will and alternative possibilities. These are just
part of the problem: they in fact may be one of the “criteria [...]
for the presence of responsibility (p.16)” but not the meaning of
responsibility itself.
Moreover, the conditions of responsibility are normative rather
than descriptive. Among other reasons, this is apparent because
different sets of morality are at stake. Choosing one out of them
(even before conditions for responsibility apply) is an evaluative,
rather than descriptive, task.
That “moral responsibility is excluded when the conditions
for it are not fulfilled” is not a descriptive account, but “is itself
21 For an analysis of guilt and culpability in speech acts, see infra at §5. For a
philosophical analysis of the names of guilt, see Conte, 2001a.
22 For tû-tû concepts, see Ross, 1957; for a critical reconstruction, see Roversi,
2012.
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a moral statement which says that under these conditions it is
unjustified (immoral) to invoke responsibility [...] (p.113).”
But what about determinism then? I shall not tackle the issue
here, but it is not a great problem for Ross, who doubts both
that determinism is true and that, were it true, in a relevant
formulation it would be compatible with the conditions required
for responsibility.
2.3.1.2 The Concept of Responsibility
Responsibility is a trivalent23 concept:24 it is always someone
who is responsible for something to someone else. R(a,X,b)
hereby means that “ person a is responsible for X to person(s)
b”.25
Ross distinguishes between two senses of responsibility:
• Responsibility1 = accountability [tilregnelighed] = be right-
fully accused;
• Responsibility2 = liability [ansvarlighed] = be rightfully sen-
tenced.26
Accountable or responsible1, then, is the person who can right-
fully be brought to account for some state-of-affairs.
Liable or responsibile2 is the person who can rightfully be sen-
tenced for some state-of-affairs, i.e. one that “fulfil[l]s all the con-
ditions, subjective and objective, which are jointly necessary and
sufficient for his being convicted and sentenced (p.20).”
’Rightfully’ and some ’state-of-affairs’ are necessary requirements
both for accountability and liability. In other words, there can-
not be any kind of responsibility but in (i) a certain presupposed
normative system (either legal or moral) and (ii) for a certain,
definite act or action someone committed or omitted.
23 I refer here to the concept of valency in linguistics, proposed by Tesnière in
Tesnière, 1959.
24 In recent literature, this is echoed by Duff, especially in Duff, 2008, 2009.
25 But cf. Ladd, 1992; Lenk and Maring, 1993, 2011 for hexavalent responsibility.
26 I owe the Danish terms to the kindness of professor Alastar Hanney, who
worked with Ross to Ross’s English translation. I have not been able to find
the original Danish book.
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Ross focuses on liability [ansvarlighed]: liability is the connec-
tion between “conditioning facts” (i. e. guilt) and “conditioned
legal consequences” (i. e. punishment) (p.21). But this
“connection is not a ’natural’ (causal or logical) one,
but exists only by virtue of the legal rule [. . . ].
Responsibility[2] is an expression of a legal judgment,
and the latter consists of a directive (normative) de-
mand that occurs as the conclusion of an inference:
since such and such facts obtain (in short, A’s guilt),
and since the law is such and such, it follows that A
is punishable (p.21).”
Responsibility is therefore a tû-tû concept: not an objective
state-of-affairs but rather a “legal connection between facts and
consequence (p.23).” Responsibility “lacks semantic reference”
but it is still a meaningful concept, because it lets us “express
the connection between facts and consequence (p.23).”27
2.3.1.3 The Concept of Moral Responsibility (and the Aim of Pun-ishment)
Even if primarily legal, Ross’s analysis of responsibility can be
extended to the moral domain with some adjustments. Moral
responsibility presupposes the existence of moral norms, their
violation, accusations, trials and judgments — even if in a non-
institutionalized manner. In morality, however, judgment and
sanction coincide in censure (i. e. disapproval), while in law
conviction and sentence occur at different stages.
Interestingly, censure (or disapproval) as punishment retro-
spectively enlightens the very aim of punishment itself. Censure
is justified both because it is “a form of retribution (an emotive,
hostile reaction) for guilt” and because it has a “guiding, preven-
tive effect upon actions (p.28).” Punishment is a mixture of retri-
bution and prevention: the traditional opposition between these
27 On this point, see how Kelsen, 1943 characterizes in an analogous fashion
(that is, as purely normative) the “primitive” notion of imputability [Zurech-
nung, Zurechenbarkeit] and the “modern” notion of causation [Kausalität].
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two aims is therefore “meaningless”. This thesis is fundamental
for Ross’s subsequent criticism of Lady Wootton’s assumption of
an exclusively preventive aim for punishment (see infra, Section
2.3.2).
Ross, then (cf. Ch. 5, Chapters 2 and 3) argues that even
the conditions that would exclude the possibility of deeming
someone morally or legally responsible are in fact normative, i.e.
pertaining to a moral or legal system. This requirement (say, a
particular kind of mental incapacity) merely affirms that would
be immoral (illegal) to blame (punish) someone subject to those
conditions (say, who is mentally ill). But in themselves, they are
not any more than an empty container with a normative shell.
2.3.1.4 Ross’ Two Problems: a Relational Critique
I see at least two relevant issues in Ross’s account of moral and
legal responsibility. One is — so to speak — horizontal: (a) the
relationship (and connection, if any) between moral and legal
responsibility. The other is rather vertical: (b) what is (if any)
the connection between responsibility[1] and responsibility[2], i.
e. between accountability and liability?
As for (a), Ross’s moral responsibility mirrors legal responsi-
bility. The former differs only at the sanctioning stage: censure
for moral responsibility vs. sentence and conviction for legal
responsibility. Is this a legalistic bias? Moral and legal respon-
sibility seem different concepts. Even if they are formally or
genetically (so to speak) related, it is still to be argued which is
modeled on which.
A natural law theorist (such as John Finnis, for one) may well
think that legal (criminal) responsibility comes after moral re-
sponsibility, because of the very fact that law is part of moral-
ity.28
As for (b), Ross does not explain if liability presupposes ac-
countability and if accountability entails liability.
28 See for instance Finnis, 1991: “[...] the moral theory which the criminal law
as we know it more or less steadily embodies and enforces (p.38).”
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The distinction Gardner, 2008 drawn between a basic and a
consequential responsibility seems to parallel Ross’s accountabil-
ity vs. liability — even though it is different in many relevant
senses.
2.3.2 Ross’ Fourfold Critique to Lady Wootton
Ross harshly criticizes Lady Wootton’s arguments, finding them
implausible and ill-founded (1975, pp.72–100). His strategy is
twofold: he lays bare Wootton’s assumptions and subsequently
tackles them.
The four assumptions Ross points out are (iv) the misunder-
standing of retribution — “if retribution for guilt is not the pur-
pose of punishment, then retribution and guilt have no place at
all in the philosophy of punishment (p.83)”; (v) the unnecessary
connection between guilt and metaphysical freedom: “if guilt
(imputation and imputability) is to be accorded any relevance
in penal law, [...] man’s will [must be] free in the metaphysical
sense (p.83)”; (vi) the impossibility of knowing the offender’s
state of mind — his “mental responsibility” and (vii) the impos-
sibility of making sense of actions without reference to mental
elements.
(iv) ross’s first criticism: misunderstanding of retri-bution According to Ross, “it is altogether unreasonable to
suppose that retribution should be an aim, that is to say an in-
tended and deliberately pursued effect of criminal legislation
(p.88)” and that Wootton simply assumes, without explanation,
that the purpose of criminal law should be preventive. From
this assumption, she jumps to the conclusion that responsibility
should be dropped because it can be only retributive. Ross in-
stead argues that the current system based on guilt and respon-
sibility is already (at least partially) preventive and this would
work as a counterexample to Wootton’s assumption.
(v) ross’s second criticism: determinism and free will
On this unjustified assumption, men can be guilty (and respon-
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sible) only if they could have acted freely. Responsibility is di-
rectly linked with free will: if the latter is not real, then the for-
mer is ill-founded. In general, Ross believes that “metaphysical
problems have no significance for practical criminology (p.84)”.
Moreover he argues that determinism is scientifically unproven
(p.85) and anyhow he adopts a compatibilist stance.
(vi) ross’s third criticism: impossibility of a scientif-ically responsibility ascription Wootton thinks that (ir-)
responsibility cannot be established with scientific objectivity,
and therefore it is too high a cost to carry on punishing people
without any certainty. Ross reckons that the criterion of respon-
sibility ascription is not as scientifically objective as diagnosing
cancer.
But this is the “normal condition” pertaining to many human
practices. The “normal condition” of moral and juridical judg-
ment (including but not limited to responsibility) is blurry and
imprecise. As far I can see, it may be said that Ross holds respon-
sibility is partially a normative concept that in the end depends
on estimates and judgments more than on accurate description
of states-of-affairs.29
(vii) ross’s fourth criticism: acts and actions A very
powerful, but underestimated, remark of Ross’ must be taken
into account. Ross, contra Wootton, who pushed to deem rele-
vant for criminal conviction only outward conduct, replied that
an act cannot be “described objectively as a purely physical se-
quence of events, without introducing into its description a ref-
erence to mental components (p. 80).”
Throwing a stone to someone is manifestly different, Ross tells
the reader, if this same act is done in a game between two friends,
or when the stone is targeted at a police officer during a revolt.
Intention is what differs (and matters) here: “[t]he distinction
29 But this is not necessarily the case — there are no conceptual reasons to infer
this from Ross’ premises. In fact, there may be opaque facts, that is, facts than
don’t let you see only one evaluation. I thank S. F. Magni for discussion on
this point.
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between the act itself and its attendant mental circumstances
is an artificial and impossible abstraction. The act is grasped
immediately as having a definite “sense” and only in this way
becomes an act of a definite kind (p. 80).”
Ross’s argument goes further and objects to Lady Wootton
that outward conduct is not at all objective, and it is also hardly
understandable if considered alone, without reference to mental
elements.
Three objections: First, a hard physicalist may well think that
those “mental elements” (intention, will, etc.) are all well re-
ducible to physical (i. e. cerebral) elements (if, of course, he
admits their existence). This would make them as objective and
describable (with the right techniques) as outward conduct is,
thus cutting Ross’s objection of any relevance. Clearly, this is
subject to accepting the bold assumptions of a hard physicalist.
Second, it sounds funny to me that Ross, who advocates for a
pan-normative understanding of responsibility (guilt, imputabil-
ity, imputation and so on), is concerned with an “objective de-
scription” of outward conduct — that seems like a daunting
task.
Third, it may be replied to Ross that an activity, or an action,
can be judged fairly well by looking at (and assessing) circum-
stances: a stone-throwing game and a stoning occur in very dif-
ferent — and fairly objectively recognizable — circumstances,
even if there is a part of stipulativeness involved. I reckon that
there might be cases where the difference is tiny or non-existent:
but that is a risk in every human enterprise, probably.
2.3.3 J. Glover’s Double Critique
In his Responsibility, Jonathan Glover moves a twofold critique to
Lady Wootton’s system, in his broader discussion of the issue of
mental illness and the foundations of punishment.30
In particular, he focuses on the distinction between penal pun-
ishment and medical treatment. As I explained above, Lady
30 Thanks to M. Bazzoni for bringing this passage to my attention.
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Wootton thinks this distinction should gradually blur to become
non-existent in the near future. Glover, instead, thinks this dis-
tinction fundamental for society and is reluctant to accept it as a
doable way to go, mainly for two reasons: (ix) punishment for a
helpless act is unjust and (x) the fact that medical treatment and
penal punishment have different aims.
(ix) liability for helpless actions In his own words, “[u]n-
der a system where someone who could not help his act is not
convicted, he is spared this stigma (Glover, 1970, p. 170-4)” that
typically characterizes conviction. In Wootton’s system, Glover
adds, even he who could not have avoided what he did would
be convicted (because of the elimination of responsibility and
mental elements, capacities etc.) and therefore stigmatized. And
among other considerations, it might well be the case that this
stigma has a preventive dimension (and thus it could be accept-
able to Wootton) inasmuch as it contributes to deterring people
from breaking the law.
(x) treatment and punishment have different aims Treat-
ment and punishment have different aims: medical treatment is
to directly benefit the treated, whereas penal punishment — ac-
cording to one’s point of view and to one’s country laws — is
either retribution, benefit to society at large and re-education for
the convicted or a mixture of the two.
Glover thinks it is important medical treatment and punish-
ment be kept separate because of the different principles they
can be justified with. Penal punishment can be justified with
retribution, benefit to society at large and re-education for the
convicted or a mixture of the two, whereas compulsory medical
treatment can be justified much more convincingly on paternal-
ist grounds, than on the grounds of a general benefit to society.
One may prefer to act on paternalist grounds, the other on the
grounds of benefit to society, and therefore argue for or against
compulsory medical treatment.
But this kind of discussion would be swept away in a system
such as Lady Wootton’s.
2.4 five criticisms from a contemporary perspective 65
2.4 five criticisms from a contempo-rary perspective
This section is roughly split in two. In Section 2.4.1, I put for-
ward five criticisms against Lady Wootton’s arguments. I shall
not be concerned with her formal arguments, but rather with
the philosophical import of her discussion. Section 2.4.2, along
with the next chapter, is devoted to expanding Lady Wootton’s
model and to seeing the extent to which these criticisms apply
to a possible modern strict liability-based criminal system.
2.4.1 Assessing Lady Wootton’s Proposal
In this subsection, I assess Wootton’s proposal from a philosoph-
ical, rather than legal or practical, perspective. I am not con-
cerned with her actual formal arguments. I see three major flaws
in Wootton’s argumentation: (i) one in the system’s premise, (ii)
one in the system’s very machinery, and (iii) one in the wished
consequences.
2.4.1.1 (i) Prevention vs. retribution: a blurred distinction
As Hart and Ross also noticed, all Lady Wootton’s hatred against
the traditional criminal system is founded on the premise of it
being completely retributive. But since responsibility based on
mens rea is necessarily tied to a retributive system, and since
retribution is not a fair aim for criminal law, then with the aim
of the system we must change also its functioning, with the elim-
ination of traditional responsibility.
The thesis that punishment cannot be retributive is held for
instance by Moritz Schlick, because “[...] the opinion that with
more sorrow, past sorrow can be made again good is completely
barbarous (Schlick, 1930, Ch.7. trans. mine).” Of course Schlick
thought the aim of punishment to be totally preventive — but
this did not lead him to discard responsibility; quite on the con-
trary, he tried to provide a compatibility account between (pre-
ventive) responsibility and determinism.
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Unfortunately for Lady Wootton, and as several commentators
pointed out, her very first presupposition is manifestly wrong.
The criminal system she takes into account (and by extension all
western modern legal systems at least) are neither factually nor
theoretically exclusively retributive.
In fact, there is always a mixture of retribution and preven-
tion in criminal systems: at times, the aim of prevention is even
stated formally as a constitutional provision, maybe as a reform
provision for the offender31 — even when the punishment seems
de facto only retributive, it might be argued that this prevents the
offender from committing further crimes and serves as an exam-
ple to society as a whole.
Since the major premise of Wootton’s argument is patently
wrong, her subsequent theses are shaky. But there are reasons
independent of (i) to doubt her argument.
2.4.1.2 (ii) Mens rea: culpability vs. imputability
Let us put aside (i) and focus on the second premise: problems
with mens rea. Mens rea is scientifically non-provable. This has
nasty consequences for the legal system and in the end for soci-
ety: criminal law remains antiquate, criminal liabilities are dis-
cretionary and there is a risk of punishing the mentally ill with
the sane, because the difference between: “he had not resisted
his impulse” and “he could not have resisted his impulse” is
practically unascertainable.
For those reasons, Lady Wootton proposes all crimes be crimes
of strict liability, that is, without mens rea, without reference to
mental elements.
Mens rea, however, makes a spectacular comeback not for con-
viction, but for sentence, in order to choose among different
kinds of treatment, i. e. penal or medical.
Now, if assessing mens rea is scientifically undoable, it is al-
ways undoable: it cannot be the case that one is not able to
establish mens rea for conviction, but one can for sentence.
31 For instance Art. 27 of the Italian Constitution: “La responsabilità penale è
personale. [...] Le pene [...] devono tendere alla rieducazione del condan-
nato.”
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Therefore it is clear that we are considering two distinct things:
culpability and imputability. Both have to do with the mind, but
while culpability is concerned with the actual state of mind at
the time of the offense (say: intention, knowledge and so on),
imputability is concerned with those requirements the law deems
sufficient to stand trial. Of course imputability and culpability
are related — in several ways. It is plausible, for instance, that
absence of imputability may entail no (legal) culpability. But
these connections are to be proven.
Failure to take into account the distinction between culpabil-
ity and imputability leads Lady Wootton to have the very same
problems about the provability of mens rea for conviction with
the provability of mens rea for sentence.
It is true, however, that hypotheses on mens rea, although un-
tenable from a scientific perspective, may be used as clues to
advise on the severity of sentences.
2.4.1.3 (iii) Past crimes and forward-looking punishment
Now I consider (iii), namely, issues on the last part of the system.
For argument’s sake, let us admit that our criminal law is com-
pletely preventive. I shall not enter a thorough discussion on
punishment and its justifiability, but merely touch upon flaws I
see in Wootton’s book concerning this topic.
past crimes Prima facie, it seems counterintuitive to punish,
or to treat, criminal offenders for past crimes on the basis of
pure prevention, because one would need positive evidence of a
correlation of no mens rea crimes with future criminal behaviors.
Of course this practice might be justified if to this “liability” is
attached a strong communicative message to the rest of society,
warning them about possible consequences of criminal acts.
However, this does not seem the case, given that Lady Woot-
ton passim wishes for the removal of any blame attached to crim-
inal liabilities. Ideally, criminal liabilities should not serve as
examples for the rest of society anymore.
But then, in order to punish, or treat, past offenders, one needs
to have very strong evidence that these past offenders are ex-
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tremely likely to commit future offenses. If so, then Lady Woot-
ton’s strategy might be assimilable to preventive custody and be
plausible — or at least justifiable given certain premises.
If my line of reasoning is correct, then there is no need to pun-
ish (in whatever form) any mens rea offenses (such as acciden-
tal, casual and so on) for the benefit or society: since they are
accidental or casual, there cannot be any convincing evidence
that the perpetrators are likely to “commit” them again in the
future, and there is no point in punishing or treating them. Oth-
erwise, in order to prevent future harm for society, one would
need to punish everyone in advance, because everyone can com-
mit harms (or, in a strict liability framework, criminal wrongs)
accidentally or casually.
The only reply Lady Wootton can have is this: past crimes are
sufficient evidence to compel us to cure or treat offenders for
their own good. To this is addressed the following paragraph.
compulsory medical treatment Medical treatment is what
Lady Wootton wishes for, for “normal” and abnormal offend-
ers alike. She insists this is not a form of penal punishment.
So what would happen if those offenders refused medical treat-
ment? Can you impose it, in the same way you impose a penal
sentence? If you can, is this not viewed as a punishment, both by
the offender and by society: as a limitation of freedom instead
of as a treatment or a cure?
abnormality A final remark may be a problem for Lady
Wootton’s approach: on one hand, she is a strong advocate of a
“modernization” towards scientific methods to be used in crim-
inal courts to ascertain abnormality; on the other, she forgot to
notice that what an illness is, science cannot tell. Especially in
the case of a mental illness, values and preferences other than
those found “in the physical world” are necessary.
One may statistically deviate from the mean. But by how
much? For instance it is conceivable that in a hundred years,
people whose IQ is less than 100 (which is now the average) will
be treated like mentally ill people because, due to possible bet-
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terment of life conditions, the average IQ would steadily rise as
it did in the past century (cf. Lynn and Vanhanen, 2002). More-
over, were one to know the exact frequency of a given x in the
general population, one might come to consider it more normal
than abnormal (take myopia, for instance).
One significant difficulty here is that Wootton has not defined
mental abnormality, and in particular the very same word ’abnor-
mality’. Abnormality — as Morse, 1977 reminds us — may refer
to statistical abnormality, dysfunctional, psychological, or irra-
tional (delusional) abnormality.
And again, defining abnormality is a normative evaluation.
2.4.2 Ascription of Responsibility Seems Normative
In this chapter, I have considered a possible way of ascribing re-
sponsibility based on observable facts, namely Lady Wootton’s
proposal. I assessed Hart’s and Ross’s replies and objections
and eventually I directly engaged and evaluated Wootton’s ar-
guments.
I tried to show, both with Hart’s and Ross’s arguments and
with mine, that even if the attribution of responsibility were
based only on observable facts, considering it non-normative
and value-free32 is a self-defeating claim.
In sum, I see two main overarching reasons to refute that
claim:
(i) first, the very choice of one system of responsibility ascrip-
tion over another (say strict liability over mens rea, not to
mention prevention over retribution or a mix of the two) is
itself evaluative (at least);
(ii) second, even ignoring (i), if the ascription of responsibil-
ity were based on a somehow factual system, one would
still need (substantial) norms (moral or legal) to categorize
what to consider punishable.
32 The adjective ’value-free’ is a calque of Max Weber’s ’wertfrei’, It. ’avaluta-
tivo’.
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In this chapter, I hinted that attribution of responsibility may
be normative. The next chapter will be devoted to defending
Lady Wootton’s intuitions from contemporary criticisms (based
on current scientific techniques such as neurosciences) and to
expanding her view into a coherent normative proposal.
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This chapter can be read both independently from and as an
expansion on the last chapter about responsibility attribution.
In the first part, I assess and try to refute the claim that con-
temporary sciences (ie cognitive sciences, neuroscience) can as-
certain those mental elements required for a crime (mens rea)
objectively, both for factual and theoretical reasons.
In the second part, I put forward a theory of responsibility attri-
bution based on strict-liability responsibility, both expanding on
Lady Wootton’s proposal and defending it from some possible
objections.
3.1 introduction
The last chapter was devoted to analyzing Lady Wootton’s claim
that (legal) responsibility should be based on strict liability (ie
external, behavioral elements), without attention to mental ele-
ments (mens rea). This should be the case — among other rea-
sons — because mens rea is impossible to prove (for instance)
scientifically.
This view of responsibility as based on internal (mental) el-
ements may presuppose a descriptive conception: were these
mental elements objectively ascertainable, then responsibility
would collapse on one of its condition (mens rea).
And cognitive sciences (ie neuroscientific techniques) may be
thought to do just this: measuring those mental elements Lady
Wootton believed impossible to ascertain, thus giving a plausible
basis to responsibility as involving descriptive internal contents.
The purpose of this chapter is to weigh up these claims.
First, I shall clarify the terms of the question, distinguishing
between mens rea, capacity responsibility and moral or legal re-
sponsibility.
Second, I show that there is a categorial mistake: mens rea and
capacity responsibility are (possible) conditions of responsibility,
whereas moral or legal responsibility are concepts of responsibil-
ity.
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Third, I shall consider the use of neuroscientific techniques,
showing that they have little or no import to the philosophical
question of responsibility.
Fourth, I shall put forward (and defend) a normative notion
of responsibility in line with Lady Wootton’s: strict liability re-
sponsibility.
the terms of the question Mens rea (standing for purpose,
knowledge, recklessness and negligence, depending on the par-
ticular jurisdiction), is one of the conditions of responsibility in
common law countries.1
Capacity responsibility is the stable possession of all those abili-
ties or powers required to be a “responsible” agent. In continen-
tal systems it may be referred to, for instance, as ’imputability’
(ie Italian: ’imputabilità’).
Both mens rea and capacity responsibility are conditions of re-
sponsibility.
Moral and legal responsibility are instead concepts of responsi-
bility.2
Unfortunately — and wrongly, as I hope to make apparent in
the rest of this chapter — there are two underlying ideas in the
analytical debate on criminal responsibility:
(i) that moral responsibility is necessary for criminal responsi-
bility; and
(ii) that it is the very presence of mental elements, if (morally)
wrong (or morally good), that makes up moral responsibil-
ity.
Given those assumptions, it is easy to reduce criminal respon-
sibility to mental elements (mens rea). And if mental elements
1 This particular formulation is drawn from the Model Penal Code Section
2.02 (1985). Mens rea refers to Anglo-American systems. In continental legal
systems one finds a (or more) mental requirement(s) akin to ’guilt’ (Fr: faute;
Sp. and Pt: dolo; It: dolo and colpa; Ger: Fahrlässigkeit and Vorsatz (or Absicht).
In extra-legal language: Schuld). See for instance Arts. 42-3 of the Italian
Penal Code.
2 For the distinction between concepts and conditions of responsibility, see my
taxonomy supra at Chapter 1.
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were objectively ascertainable, then (criminal) responsibility would
also be objective.
The fundamental categorial mistake here is to identify capac-
ity responsibility — one of the conditions of responsibility and
possibly ascertainable objectively by neuroscience — with moral
(or criminal) responsibility. Moral and criminal responsibility
aren’t conditions of responsibility, but concepts of responsibility.
3.2 criminal liability without respon-sibility?
The aim of this section is to argue that basing legal liability on
moral responsibility (if conceived as I explained above) (Section
3.2.1) and that the very notion of (capacity) responsibility (Sec-
tion 3.2.2) are utterly questionable and problematic to justify de-
scriptively in the law. In Section 3.3, I shall positively argue for
a criminal law system based on a normative notion such as strict
liability-responsibility.
Current legal systems, especially those parts dealing with crim-
inal misdeeds, are very much alike. In most jurisdictions, crim-
inal punishment normally requires moral responsibility, either
directly or indirectly.3 Directly if criminal liability depends on
3 See for instance Hart, 2008, pp. 35-6 reporting on the state of the criminal sys-
tem: “[. . . ] for criminal responsibility there must be ’moral culpability’ [. . . ]
the maxim actus non est reus nisi mens sit rea refers to a morally evil mind.”
G. Dworkin (Dworkin, 2011, p.7) for instance writes “[...] conduct that has
to be forbidden must be wrong, immoral, a violation of rights, or something
along these lines.” Ferzan, 2008; Fischette, 2004; Lippke, 2008 all point in
this direction, as K. Levy, 2011, p.1304-5n notes. Again: “legal liability (in
torts and criminal law) falls only on those who are morally responsible (M. S.
Moore, 2009, p. vii).” For similar remarks, cf. M. S. Moore, 1997. Alexander,
Ferzan, and Morse, 2009 in building a system of criminal law founded on
desert, briefly discuss the issue of moral responsibility. Though the authors
cannot agree on the status of moral responsibility in regard to determinists’
and incompatibilists’ objections, it seems fair to infer that moral responsibil-
ity is the lying principle which sustains their whole architecture. Feinberg,
1990, p. 151: “A system of criminal law, whether or not it is assigned a moral
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moral responsibility without intermediaries; indirectly if crim-
inal liability requires criminal responsibility which in turn is
based on moral responsibility.
It could be interesting to draw examples of moral responsibil-
ity, moral liability, legal responsibility and legal liability in an
intuitive way, without providing definitions or discussion — for
the time being. While in everyday situations they often overlap,
sometimes we can appreciate cases when they are unrelated to
one another.
When one promises her friend he will read and revise her
paper, he has a duty to do it, unless other relevant conditions
apply. It seems one has a prima facie moral responsibility when
one contracts a promise. Unless otherwise stated, this example
does not imply legal issues, so it is a case of moral responsibil-
ity without corresponding legal responsibility. Blaming, censure
or other types of sanction, both social and internal (such as re-
morse), constitute what is often termed moral liability.
When my mother took my grandfather to the hospital she was
in a hurry and there were no parking spots, she left her car un-
der a “no parking” sign and she got a fine. She did not have any
moral fault, but she had nonetheless to bear legal consequences
— she was in fact legally responsible without being morally re-
sponsible.4
Current legal systems, both in civil and common law, have
periods of prescription or statutes of limitations. If one has
been judged responsible for a crime, say bribery, but is convicted
when the terms have expired, one is in fact legally responsible
without being liable for the crime, that is to say, without being
given sanctions.
Punishment without legal responsibility is loosely termed strict
liability-responsibility and it is usually given for particularly
justifying aim, employs an inherently moral (judgmental) constitutive pro-
cess, and that process, in conjunction with the formal principle of fairness, is
what underlies the concern with blameworthiness in sentencing.”
4 Even Hart, 2008, p. 215-6 corrected his earlier thought that one sense of re-
sponsibility is identical with liability; Raz, 2011, p.256 writes “that responsi-
bility should not be identified with liability. Rather liability is —- sometimes
— a consequence of responsibility.”
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harmful or dangerous conducts, regardless of mens rea, such as
statutory rape.
This section is divided into two parts. In the first one, I shall
show the problems of founding criminal liability on moral re-
sponsibility. In the second part, I shall consequently argue that
the very idea of capacity responsibility is questionable in crim-
inal law for three sorts of reasons: (i) semantic, (ii) conceptual
and (iii) factual.
3.2.1 Criminal Liability Has No Necessary Connection withMoral Responsibility
Legal liability5 is usually rooted in moral responsibility6 in two
respects: as regards deciding when to give the liability and as re-
gards the degree of liability imposed. In both respects, criminal
liability could depend either directly or indirectly (via criminal
responsibility) on moral responsibility.
I maintain that none of these should be the case, if we wish to
keep our states as liberal and pluralist as we aim. Two caveats:
first, I shall focus only on some structural/formal elements of
ethics (i.e. beyond its possible contents) out of many possibili-
ties; second, I shall not enter the contemporary debate on moral
responsibility stricto sensu, on which the literature is immense.7
5 I am not maintaining here that morality and law must be kept separated
tout court. As Hart, 2012, p. 185 notes, “[t]here are many different types of
relation between law and morals”: I shall try to narrow my claim only to one
of these relations. See L. Green, 2008; Hart, 1957 and Gardner, 2003, 2009 for
more detailed discussions.
6 Unless otherwise specified, with “moral considerations” I am referring to con-
siderations regarding moral responsibility rather than general considerations
of justice, fairness and so on that could inform legal systems. Every claim
about “ethics” or “morality” should primarily be understood in the narrower
sense.
7 For a general survey and some new proposals, see Björnsson and Persson,
2012; Denaro, 2012; Levy and McKenna, 2009, Fischer and Ravizza, 1993, Levy
and McKenna, 2009 and Eshleman, 2009. Responsibility and moral responsi-
bility are often dealt with in contemporary debates even without reference
to the free will problem. See for instance Bok, 1998, 2002; Braham and van
Hees, 2012; Brown, 2006; Bruckner, 2007; Burrington, 1999; Byrd, 2007, 2010;
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3.2.1.1 Ethics as a Non-formalized System
It is reasonable to require that laws be as clear and explicit as
possible, in order to have them enforced rigorously and consis-
tently.
If criminal liabilities are to be based ultimately (or informally)
on moral responsibility, and moral responsibility depends on
moral theories that are usually hard to formalize and codify,8
then there would be problems in drawing legal provisions —
however indirectly — from moral theories, given their fluid and
shapeless formulation.
I believe sound examples are provided by religious-inspired
ethics. When these were dominant in a given culture or society
and consequently enforced by civil authorities, parts of them
were first enclosed and codified in legal codes.
3.2.1.2 Disagreement
Even if it could be demonstrated that there is only one objec-
tive and just theory of what moral responsibility is and when it
should be ascribed, this does not seem the case. Moreover, there
would be serious concerns in imposing this moral belief to all
citizens, since what seems to be clear in pluralistic states is that
Campbell, 2008; Caruso, forthcoming; Chan, 2000; Ciurria, 2012; Clarke, 1997;
Coates and Swenson, forthcoming; Cobb, 1959; Copp, 1997; Das, 2002; De
Brigard, Mandelbaum, and Ripley, 2009; Denaro, 2012; Dodig-Crnkovic and
Persson, 2008; Downie, 1964; Fischer, 1986, 1999a,b, 2006; Fischer and Ravizza,
1993, 1998a,b; FitzPatrick, 2008; Fletcher, 1967; Kershnar, 2004; King, 2012,
2013; King and Carruthers, 2012; Klampfer, 2004; Knobe and Doris, 2010;
Lang, 1985; Macnamara, 2011; Mason, 2005; Moya, 2005, 2007; Parent, 1975;
Paul, Miller, and Paul, 1999; Pink, 2009; Risser, 1996; Roskies and Nichols,
2008; Rosse, 1973; P. Russell, 2002; Sankowski, 1990; Sheehy, 2006; M. Smi-
ley, 1992; Sommers, 2009; Swinburne, 1989; van den Beld, 2000; van Inwagen,
1997; G. Williams, 2003, 2004, 2008; Young, 1974; Zimmerman, 1988.
8 Because they are subject to inter-community negotiation, emotion-based judg-
ments and other peculiar traits. There is also the problem of legal moralism,
i.e. “the principle that it is always a good reason in support of criminalization
that it prevents non-grievance evils or harmless immoralities (Feinberg, 1990,
p.324).” See passim for discussion on how the state can distinguish illegal
acts among immoral ones and immoral thoughts.
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if the law is valid, one normally has to abide by it, even though
he believes it is wrong or unjust. Instead, if one is unconvinced
by a particular moral theory, he can freely choose whether to
endorse it or not.
3.2.1.3 Partiality/Discretionality
If there was no agreed theory of moral responsibility, criminal
legal systems could hardly be based upon a varying and incon-
sistent set of norms. The attribution of criminal liability would
depend eventually on the moral system endorsed by the judge.9
This seems against a principle of impartiality, because different
judges endorsing different moral theories would in principle be
allowed to take decisions upon them.10 The criminal culpabil-
ity cannot depend on the moral system adopted (if any) by the
defendant or the claimant. Equally, we do not think that non-
confessional states should officially endorse a certain moral sys-
tem.
To reject the claim that criminal liability is to depend on moral
responsibility seems fair for these reasons — namely difference
of moral systems admitted in a non-confessional society, diffi-
culty of enforcing a non-formalized system of norms, need of
impartiality in judgment.
K. Levy, 2011 makes a compelling case regarding psychopaths.
Psychopaths lack some of the conditions usually required to be
held morally responsible (such as moral knowledge, empathy
etc.).11 On this basis, they are commonly thought not morally
responsible and therefore often acquitted.12 Both on consequen-
9 For similar but more detailed remarks, see Sinnott-Armstrong and Levy, 2011,
p.303.
10 But see the interesting case of the Swiss Civil Code, where judges — in ab-
sence of rules or consuetudes — can assume the norm they will follow. See
Di Lucia and Feis, 2013.
11 The weaknesses of this quite widespread view are quite obvious. I do not
endorse it.
12 On responsibility, psychopathy and neuroscience, see for instance Adshead,
1996, 2003; Braude, 1996; Callender, 2010; Caruso, forthcoming; Ciocchetti,
2003a,b; De Brigard, Mandelbaum, and Ripley, 2009; Edwards, 2009; Elliott,
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tialist and retributive grounds though — it is argued — they
are to be held liable for criminal misdeeds, even if they cannot
be morally responsible for them. Failure to acknowledge moral
norms (on which the criminal system is built, it seems) does not
prevent them from knowing what is forbidden by the law and
what is not. Then they should be considered liable on the same
grounds of “normal” people who endorse a different moral sys-
tem (if any) and who know what is illegal but do not think what
is forbidden is also morally wrong.
This example, however imperfectly, shows how it is unwise to
build a legal system on moral provisions to attribute legal liabil-
ity. In the case of psychopaths the lack of morality is somehow
intrinsic. Normal people could endorse or engage in another set
of moral norms, thus the lack of (relevant) morality is contex-
tual and factual. The practical result is the same: for different
reasons, both the psychopath and the weirdo do not abide by
the common moral standard (and are allowed to do so in liberal
and pluralistic states) but both must abide by the law.
In this section, I have highlighted several problematic issues
for legal liability to be founded on moral responsibility. In the
next section, I shall turn my attention to the very idea of respon-
sibility in law.
3.2.2 Capacity Responsibility and Neuroscience
If the arguments developed in Section 3.2.1 are sound, then the
moral-based responsibility system sketched above is seriously
faulty. Nonetheless, let us put the moral part aside for a moment
and consider criminal liability based on criminal responsibility.
1991, 1992; Faraci and Shoemaker, 2010; Fields, 1996; Fingarette, 1955; Frier-
son, 2008; Glannon, 2008; Greenspan, 1987, 2003; Grenander, 1982; Haji and
Cuypers, 2004; Hindriks, 2011; Knobe and Doris, 2010; Maibom, 2008; Malat-
esti and McMillan, 2010; Martin, 2010; Mayerfeld, 1999; McMillan and Gillett,
2005; Meynen, 2010; Morse, 2008; Nadelhoffer, 2004; Nahmias et al., 2005;
Pizarro, Uhlmann, and Bloom, 2003; Schauber, forthcoming; Schoeman, 1987;
Shoemaker, 2009, 2011a,b; Sneddon, 2005; Sommers, 2012; Vargas, 2010a,b,
forthcoming; Vincent, 2008; Wigley, 2007; G. Williams, 2003.
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I shall tackle the issue of responsibility by itself, putting for-
ward (i) semantic, (ii) conceptual and (iii) factual reasons to ar-
gue that the kind of responsibility required by the law is an
unclear concept, theoretically defeasible and practically hard to
ascertain, if it is identified with capacity responsibility from a
purely factual perspective: capacity responsibility is at most one
of the conditions of (legal) responsibility, and cannot exhaust it.
3.2.2.1 (i) Semantics
The word ’responsibility’ is in itself well polysemic. One way to
sum this up is the expression ’syndrome of concepts’ coined by
Vincent, 2009 to account for the several different meanings used
in everyday life and language. Even in the legal discourse then,
it is confusing if we refer to someone as ‘responsible’, meaning
one or more of outcome-responsible, causal-responsible, role-
responsible, capacity-responsible, to name but a few.13
The word ’responsibility’ has not only different meanings, but
arguably different and heterogeneous referents (cf. for instance
Hart, 2008, Postscript).
Confusion in language leads to confusion in thought. Before
ascribing responsibility, one should have in mind which respon-
sibility he is ascribing, on which grounds and how he can do so.
Certain scientific techniques, for instance, may let us measure
or ascertain capacity-responsibility. From there, it is not great
a leap to ascribing responsibility tout court, confusing a part for
the whole. But that capacity-responsibility is by itself a sufficient
condition for “full” responsibility is still to be proven.
This kind of semantic unclarity may well lead to conceptual
and factual problems, as I argue in what follows.
3.2.2.2 (ii) Conceptual Issues
The very idea of responsibility seems theoretically questionable
on deterministic grounds. Loosely, some think determinism
would undermine alternative possibilities, i.e. the possibility to
do otherwise, which is one of the condition usually required for
13 For other concepts of responsibility, see my taxonomy supra at Chapter 1.1.
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freedom.14 Without freedom one could not have done otherwise
and therefore — the master argument goes — is blameless for
an action he could have not chosen.15
Neuroscience would be able to prove (brain) determinism and
this — as more and more judges seem to understand — would
undermine (moral) responsibility and/or some sense of freedom.
Levy 2011, for instance, argues that no one is ever responsible
for anything and no one ever acts freely. Waller, 2011 argues
for the total elimination of the idea of moral responsibility. If
accepted, this line of argument would likely force our societies
to reconsider not only our justifications of punishment, but the
whole criminal system, since “current law envisions a criminal
defendant as a free-willing, rational creature operating in a nor-
mal brain environment with the mental intent (either general or
specific) to accomplish a crime (Gazzaniga, 2008).”
Increasingly, empirical scientists have started to investigate al-
legedly voluntary acts to see whether they are pre-determinated
and hence not really “free”. This, in turn, has been influencing
the philosophical and legal sphere with respect to the ascrip-
tion of responsibility. Results such as Libet’s 2004 or Soon and
colleagues’ 2008 would pose a serious threat to the common un-
derstanding of voluntary acts and therefore to the possibility of
ascribing any sort of responsibility.16
However, state-of-the-art science cannot provide us with con-
clusive or crucial reliable evidence for this complex matter on
which current criminal law systems are heavily relying. It would
be dishonest, then, to attribute serious liabilities based on a
14 For further discussion on the distinction between concepts of responsibility
and conditions of responsibility, see supra at Chapter 1.2.
15 Of course the argument is much richer and many refined versions of deter-
minism overcome this objection. For a recent account see Greene and Cohen,
2004. There are also philosophical theories arguing for compatibilism or semi-
compatibilism between determinism and free will, and between determinism
and responsibility. See for instance Fischer and Ravizza, 1998b; Kane, 2011.
The discussion, however, exceeds the purpose of this work.
16 For a recent take on this issue, see Libet, Sinnott-Armstrong, and Nadel, 2011,
in particular Alexander, 2011. But for an informative account of how neuro-
science can be conciliated with traditional justifications of punishment, see
Pardo and Patterson, 2013.
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model we do not have deciding proofs thereof, conforming to
it “as it were true”. It would be fairer to recognize, at least, that
the whole system is problematic and to try to rethink it on new
conceptual bases.
3.2.2.3 (iii) Is-Ought Gap
While the ascription of responsibility is deemed normative,17 it
is increasingly done via scientific descriptive ways, especially
with neuroscientific techniques. This factual gap is problematic
and should not be underestimated.18
Were our social practices of holding responsible and of pun-
ishing not “mirroring nature” (according to our latest theories
and practices), we should definitely reconsider them inasmuch
as they are not rooted in a world empirically testable.19 The
general and common assumption here is that there is a natural
(and therefore scientifically observable) or intuitively true basis
on which we should ground our practices of ascribing respon-
sibility.20 If it is correct to say that ascription of responsibility
is — at least partially — normativity-based, and if one follows
the above line of reasoning, he is committing what has been
known as “naturalistic fallacy” or in other terms, one is violat-
ing Hume’s law, that is, deriving an “ought” from an “is”. But
how?
First — positively — neuroscience is thought useful for assess-
ing whether an individual possesses the required set of men-
17 Isolating a factual basis before and independently from the attribution of
responsibility is problematic because it seems to require evaluative consider-
ations. See for instance Ross, 1975, p.29 and Feinberg, 1970; Hart, 1948. For
further discussion on this point, see infra in Chapter 5.
18 The use and the admissibility of neuroscientific evidence in courtrooms has
been discussed extensively. For instance Weisberg et al., 2008 points out how
neuroscientific evidence acquires an allure of truth — on this see also Aspin-
wall, Brown, and Tabery, 2012; Compton, 2010 discusses admissibility, cur-
rent usage and risks. For other broadly skeptical takes, see Schleim, Spranger,
and Walter, 2009; Schleim and Walter, 2007.
19 Feinberg, 1970, pp.26-7 put it in this way: “Legal responsibility [...] cannot
simply be "read off" the facts”.
20 As Gommer, 2010 very counterintuitively argues.
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tal capacities to be held responsible for certain misdeeds. This
builds on the unproven assumption that there is a minimum
set of internal factors responsibility requires — cf. for instance
Hart, 2008, p.218. Moreover, the issue of naive physicalism, accord-
ing to which mental capacities would be directly and univocally
reduced to neural states or correlates, is constantly underrated.
This is far from obvious.21
Second (and negatively), some judiciary cases22 employed neu-
roscientific evidence to assess whether an individual deviates
from the standard of normality, thus having some excuse to be
exempted from regular ascription of responsibility. This latter
use is less theoretically demanding and builds on the assump-
tion that everyone “normal” can be held responsible and thus
responsibility (or in other terms liability or imputability) is the
common standard condition (see famously Austin, 1956, 1966).
Again it is a problem to define what is normal — which may
not be so straightforward but might require an evaluation rather
than a descriptive finding.
The use of (neuro)scientific techniques in ascertaining respon-
sibility is increasing. I have underlined how this use presup-
poses problematic assumptions that are mostly unjustified. Ar-
guably, in turn, those issues would factually undermine the whole
practice.
In this section, I have highlighted that responsibility is more
than one of its conditions (capacity responsibility) and therefore
it cannot be scientifically ascertained in an objective manner. I
have argued that its polysemy generates conceptual confusion,
that it is questionable on grounds that are more and more en-
dorsed by the scientific community and that its ascertainment
through certain techniques can be both logically fallacious and
factually doubtful.
21 For instance Morse, 2011a,b define this approach as “fundamental psychole-
gal error”. See in general Freeman, 2011. Others (among which there is San-
toni de Sio, 2013) call this the “mereological fallacy”.
22 Notably the Albertani and Trieste cases in Italy.
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The idea of capacity responsibility could be retained by crimi-
nal law at a high price: that of an uncertain, unclear, ill-founded
belief, philosophically questionable, with little or no empirical
evidence.
Lady Wootton’s theses (influenced by behaviorism) on the sci-
entific improvability of mens rea seem to hold even against cur-
rent scientific techniques and, most importantly, they seem to
hold not merely in a contingent way, but because of those con-
ceptual reasons I underlined in this section.
3.3 law without capacity responsibil-ity
The preceding skeptic critiques to responsibility are more than
justified — but they presuppose a notion of responsibility that
needs descriptive premises, and they work only against such a
conception.
I am going to argue that our normative systems (and crimi-
nal legal systems, to begin with) can survive (and are probably
better off) without this descriptive presupposition.
I’ll show that a normative notion of responsibility can over-
come the objections the skeptic may put forward (at least those
that I summarized in the preceding section).
We have seen (in Section 3.2) that many problems with re-
sponsibility in (at least criminal) law are due to its mental “roots”.
What if the skeptic is completely right, and then (capacity) re-
sponsibility is either non-existent or impossible to prove? What
would happen if this kind of responsibility were not part of legal
systems anymore?
In the rest of this chapter, I shall assume that skeptics are
right and the concept of responsibility — at least as currently
conceived in legal systems — is untenable.
I shall show that, instead, a normative conception (of respon-
sibility) can do as well, without the downsides of non-normative
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conception of responsibility. In order not to confound the matter,
I shall call this (mostly) normative notion ’liability-responsibility’
— even if that phrase is already in use as a part for the general
category of responsibility.
For the purpose of this chapter, I assume that the skeptic is
right, and try to meet his challenges with a twofold strategy.
First, how to assign liabilities? This question goes deep into
the structure of the criminal system and it is related to the justi-
fication of the criminal law as a whole. In what follows, I argue
that criminal law is justifiable regardless of capacity responsibil-
ity, (a) by considering legal systems as groups coherent in them-
selves and not based on external factors (Sect. 3.3.1); and (b)
by founding legal systems on strict liability-responsibility (Sect.
3.3.2).
Second, why assign liabilities? This one is the classic problem
of justifying punishment. It will be dealt with briefly in Section
3.4 in regard to the arguments developed in this section.
3.3.1 Law, Games, Conventions
In this section, I try to put forward some analogies in order to
show how a responsibility system may be justified without ca-
pacity responsibility.
Here, I shall hint at an analogy between legal systems and
ludic systems. This analogy is neither new nor life-changing,
but I contend that it is useful to our investigation with regard to
the problems I discussed above.
3.3.1.1 Chess as a paradigm
Let’s consider chess. Chess is a game where pieces, their moves
and their actions are defined by a set of rules (some chess-rules
are constitutive rules).23 The king, whatever meaning it has out-
23 What is defined is, of course, the type of action and the type of moving
pieces are allowed to do, not the actual tokens of actions. I am referring here
to what Ross, 1959, Ch.3 calls “primary rules”, that is to say, rules governing
the moves and the pieces and not to what is called “theory of the game”, that
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side the chess-world, is defined so-and-so in the game, according
to its functional meaning.24 It usually can only move one square
in any direction, or — if under attack — it must move, if it can
do so legally. In the chess-world it is not important that the King
is king-shaped, but that it move and play as a King according to
chess-rules.
However there are what we call, outside the chess-world, ex-
ceptions. The King, under particular circumstances, can move
two squares (in castling). This is not an actual exception, but the
fact that the King can move two squares is part of the definition
of chess-King, i.e. what we mean by king in the context of the
game of chess.
Moreover, were I — as a chess-player — to decide to move a
Pawn backward, I would not be playing chess badly, but I would
be playing another game.25 Then, even if I am moving a piece
called King, I do not have to consider what a real-life (outside
the chess world) king is doing, in order to move my chess-King.
3.3.1.2 Unfolding the analogy
Now let’s consider law. Law might be thought of as a game
where agents, actions and sanctions are defined so-and-so by
and in a set of rules.
• Those rules are the necessary condition of conceivability and
existence of what they regulate: they are super-imposed
on reality, but should not be logically dependent on and
strictly adherent to it. On the contrary, regulative rules
are a mere contingent conditioning of actions: they sug-
gest a way to regulate a conduct already in existence. For
instance, take enhancement of one’s capacity. It can be de-
fined, for legal purposes, as involving drugs (as opposed
to private tutoring or particular alimentation). In sporting
is, strategies tied to the specific aim of winning the game. On chess, see also
Schwyzer, 1969, 2012 and Roversi, 2006, 2012.
24 ’Functional meaning’ is a calque of ’funktionale Bedeutung’, Mally, 1971, For-
malismus I, quoted in Conte, 1995c.
25 To play chess badly, one needs at least to play chess, i.e. following all the
chess-rules. Cf. Wittgenstein, 1970, n.320, p.355
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performance it is illegal and considered doping, while in
academic or working settings it is not the case — until now.
Therefore while in reality — descriptively — there is an en-
hancement of one’s cognitive or physical capacities, in the
first case it is cheating, in the second it is not. The rules of
the game (opposed to other descriptive knowledge) create
the nets of meaning we use to navigate our world for legal
purposes.26
• Those rules may keep an internal coherence,27 and need not
to respond to external factors, exactly as a chess-king must
move according to chess-rules, not according to what the
King of X is doing right now. For instance, once a concept
like responsibility has been established, scientific or philo-
sophical objections should be ignored inasmuch as they are
external to the system, i.e. based on determinism and in-
compatibilism grounds. This would prevent the law from
continuous theoretical attacks and would move the debate
to the process of crafting and agreeing laws (for which see
3.4).
This game-like architecture can answer to the issues raised
against current legal systems in Section 2.1, namely formalism,
disagreement and impartiality.
Games as Formalized Systems - Legal provisions should be stated
as explicitly, consistently and rigorously as possible — just like
game rules are — in order to avoid uncertainty and to keep the
system less prone to in-group negotiation and the like.
Disagreement is not an issue in the game. Agents can ignore
the (moral) value of regulative rules whose (theoretical) validity
26 On this point Czesław Znamierowski was probably the first to distinguish
constructive norms [normy konstrukcyjne] from imperative norms [normy
imperatywne], thetic acts [akty tetyczne] from psycho-physic actions — cf.
Znamierowski, 1921, 1924.
27 On coherence and consistency, cf. Conte, 2007c, p.57-8. For instance, between
two constitutive rules there cannot be antinomy. Consider (i) If the king is in
check, castling is mandatory; (ii) if the king is in check, castling is forbidden.
There is not any contradiction, because (i) and (ii) constitute two different
games and different intensions of ’king’ and ’castling’: respectively king-(i)
and castling-(i); king-(ii) and castling-(ii).
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they recognize; this cannot evidently be the case with consti-
tutive rules. The proper room for disagreement is when laws
are crafted and agreed. Furthermore, disagreement can be also
found in applying rules. This points us toward two aspects: a
need for extreme clarity in setting the frame at the beginning and
the room for discretionality of officials (or the game referees).
Impartiality Application of the rules is subject to interpretation
and opens up the room for discretionality. Judges (or whoever
has to decide) therefore have evaluative elbow room, which must
be granted within the judiciary system and cannot be based on
any (external) principles whatsoever.
Exceptions — what in the real world are seen as exceptions,
excuses, justifications for K in the game become part of the def-
inition of K. A King that cannot move two squares under the
circumstances qualifying for castling, is not a chess-King, but
something pertaining to another game, not to chess. In an anal-
ogous fashion, we must define L as so-and-so in the law game.
What may be considered exceptions in the real (i.e. outside the
game) world are part of the definition: L is not L in the game,
unless considered so-and-so.
3.3.1.3 Limits and Objections
The example of chess is meant only to provide us with a clear in-
stance of an organic group of rules: however enlightening, analo-
gies are still imperfect. I am not claiming law should become
chess-like; quite on the contrary, I am directing our attention to
the logical structure of chess. One can raise several objections
based on this analogy: the apparent uselessness of referees, the
consciousness of playing a game versus being engaged in real
life and the fact that chess is too perfect to serve as an analogon
are just three possible instances.
Given the variety of laws even within the criminal domain,
one could maintain that only some laws can be considered this
way. What about power-conferring rules or rules describing the
functioning of courts, for instance?28 According to the thesis
28 Like those described by Hart, 2012, ch.3.
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held here, those laws should be considered as adeontic constitu-
tive rules, i.e. rules constituting states-of-affairs.
One could object that it is possible to keep a rule-based (chess-
like, game-like) view of law and moral external grounds. There
are two ways this might be done: first, by a strict legal moralism;
second, by diminishing the autonomy and coherency of rules,
having them referred or vaguely inspired to moral guiding prin-
ciples judges can apply as and when. Both are prone to issues
raised in Sect. 2.1, but the second is logically incompatible with
such an architecture as put forward in this subsection, which
needs to be closed and self-reliant.
But there is a third, middle way. While keeping the sharp dis-
tinction between moral principles and the group of legal rules
in their application and enforcement, the moral dimension can
intervene when legal rules are established or agreed. After that,
the fact that some legal rules are morally shaded should be irrel-
evant.
The issue of our psychopath of Section 3.2.1 should therefore
be solved: on the one hand, he should be able to follow game-
rules free of (direct or indirect) moral references; on the other
hand, the system can punish him for violations and crimes even
if he cannot grasp the “wrongfulness” of his acts — which is not
at stake in the proposed model.
Hart famously described an “internal” point of view (when
people accept norms as regulating their behaviors, as reasons to
do something) and an “external” point of view (when people
refuse — or do not understand — norms, but take them as signs
or clues of the fact that people will behave in a certain way or
that certain sanctions will follow): those of psychopaths, who
admittedly cannot understand norms as reasons for action, is
an external point of view. A psychopath might think that a red
light does not constitute a reason to stop, but it should be a clue
that others will stop, and so should they. Inasmuch as they can
do this reasoning, I think they can be subject to legal liability —
even if they cannot be morally responsible.29
29 On the many problems of rule-following, see at least Kripke, 1982; Wittgen-
stein, 2009. On nomotropic behavior (that of a cheat, for instance) see the work
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This subsection showed how the understanding of legal sys-
tems I proposed can help us in freeing the law of problematic
considerations, in gaining in rigor, clarity and fairness. The next
subsection is devoted to demonstrating how we can retain crim-
inal liability regardless of a capacity-conceived responsibility.
3.3.2 Strict Liability-Responsibility
In this subsection, I offer a stipulative definition of strict liability-
responsibility. Then I argue that legal strict liability-responsibility
should substitute capacity responsibility in criminal law: crimi-
nal law should function regardless of a notion of responsibility
that presupposes only descriptive elements.
The standard model reads that (some sort of) responsibility is
necessary for legal liability.30 If our society is to keep assigning
sanctions and punishment, it first has to ascribe responsibility.
But were it proven that — for any of above reasons — responsi-
bility is seriously flawed, dubious or untenable, then should we
stop assigning legal liabilities, because there must be no liability
without prior responsibility? Or should we continue?
The problem needs careful evaluation. In what follows, I as-
sume that the legal practices of punishing are to continue.31 I
hold that they are justifiable regardless of responsibility, that is
(i) even if there is no moral (or legal) responsibility (as skeptics
have it) or (ii) there are overwhelming difficulties in ascribing it.
Criminal law systems are justifiable with the principle of strict
liability-responsibility.32
on nomotropism of Conte (Conte, 2011) and others (Passerini Glazel in Colloca,
2013).
30 Except the limited number of strict liability-responsibility offenses already
enforced.
31 I do not commit to any practical form or content of punishing — which I
believe should be thoroughly re-thought anyway.
32 Even Hart, 2008, p. 226 notes that a legal system could require strict liability-
responsibility for all crimes without ceasing to be a legal system — contrary
to strict “moral” responsibility, there are no conceptual barriers. But for oppo-
site claims, that is for some form of strict moral responsibility (better: liability)
see Duff, 2008 and McKenna, 2012, pp. 187-95.
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A variety of meanings have been attached to strict liability.33
I will not enter the perilous meanders of various criminal sys-
tems described in works on strict liability, but I will content
myself with a stipulative provisional definition of strict liability-
responsibility.
Strict (criminal) liability-responsibility then is criminal liabil-
ity regardless of mens rea for any material element of the offense.
Regardless here means that (i) there are no mens rea elements
required for the offense to take place; (ii) mental elements are
irrelevant for the offense.34
We have seen in Section 3.2 that legal responsibility is deeply
rooted in mental elements: some degree of mens rea is usually in-
dispensable to attribute someone responsibility (and thus culpa-
bility) for criminal actions. If all crimes were redefined on a strict
liability-responsibility basis, only material elements would play
a role in criminal law, without references to mental elements.
And without references to mental elements, all legitimate refer-
ences to capacity-responsibility cease, taking with them all prob-
lems raised in Section 3.2.2. This proposal is comparable to Lady
Wootton’s.
Difference with Hart’s Liability-Responsibilty
Hart, 2008, Postscript characterized legal liability-responsibility
in a quite complex way. He made it more extended than legal
responsibility. In fact (at least in my interpretation), legal re-
sponsibility requires three elements (mental elements — de facto,
capacity-responsibility — a certain connection with the act and
certain relationships between the agents), which are neither suf-
33 See, for instance, Duff, 2009; S. Green, 2005; Honoré, 1999a; Husak, 1995;
Perry, 2001; Simons, 1997. For a survey see Shen et al., 2011, n.4, that presents
an informative set of historical examples of strict liability-responsibility
crimes, such as damages caused by one’s property (including slaves) — an
idea compared to today’s products liability — and the old English and Norse
deodand, according to which property that injured others was destroyed. For
the origins of explicit strict liability crimes in common law jurisdictions, see
Singer, 1988.
34 Note that mens rea and fault are not the same thing. For instance cf. Gardner,
2005, p.69.
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ficient nor necessary for legal liability. Legal liability can be as-
signed according to legal rules that may or may not require legal
responsibility. Legal responsibility is, so to speak, reflecting peo-
ple’s intuitions, and keeps a descriptive or factual basis. Hart’s
model is subject to my earlier criticisms because of the factual
component, and moreover it is not clear at all on the mutual
relationship between liability and responsibility.
According to my definition then, mine and Hart’s model are
comparable insofar as his is deprived of the capacity-responsibil-
ity part — to leave room for normative elements (contingent as
they may or may not be).
But why would we want to endorse such a counter-intuitive
idea as strict liability-responsibility?
As a matter of fact, strict liability-responsibility is already en
force, though in a limited number of cases: my proposal would
be to generalize and extend what is already done in few circum-
stances to almost all criminal occurences.
I will now go through the issues I raised on responsibility in
Section 3.2.2, namely (i) semantic, (ii) conceptual and (iii) factual
problems, to show how this proposed shift in paradigm would
account for them. Then I will consider a real life example and
propose an analogy with fencing to explain my understanding
of the issue.
3.3.2.1 (i) Semantics
Strict liability is hardly spoken of in everyday language: it is un-
likely to cause confusion or obscurity. Moreover, strict liability-
responsibility has to be founded on rules — rules that seem
more conventional than their classic counterpart.
3.3.2.2 (ii) Conceptual Issues
While the idea of responsibility we considered before was said to
be questionable on deterministic grounds, this is not the case for
strict liability-responsibility. In fact, strict liability-responsibility
is not based on a concept such as “freedom of the will” or “al-
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ternative possibilities” which can be put in question by certain
empirical results (or by the idea of certain empirical results).
3.3.2.3 (iii) Is-Ought Gap
The strict liability-responsibility view does not commit to any
descriptive notion, but it is purely a normative concept: it does
not claim to be “out there” in the world, somewhat measurable.
Clearly, it has a factual basis: the material elements of the action.
Neuroscientific techniques may still be used in criminal trials,
but not with the purpose of telling something relevant for the
ascription of responsibility, but only for the unfoldment of what
took place.
psychopaths Let’s consider the case “reported by Burns and
Swerdlow, 2003 — namely, of a 40 year old school teacher who
developed an obsession with child pornography due to a tu-
mour that pressed on his orbitofrontal region, and who was un-
able to stop himself from acquiring such pornographic material
(and doing various other things) despite knowing that what he
was doing was wrong (Vincent, 2009).”
If “our brain makes us do it” (that is, there’s no “I” different
from my brain who is overall responsible for “my” actions), one
might claim that it was the teacher’s brain that “made him do
it” no differently from how another person’s brain (without the
tumor) didn’t.
While it’s rather easy to see that this tumor caused the sufferer
to deviate from the physiologically normal person, this is not
always the case. Several neurological studies tell us there is no
normal or standard brain. The expertise ordered in the Como case,
to pick one, made a comparison between the defendant’s brain
and several other people’s, drawn from girls about the same age,
education and comparable backgrounds.
Were we to judge the school teacher for a criminal act (related
to his pathology), we wouldn’t hold him as liable as an individ-
ual without the brain tumor. But in our framework this is not
the case because the teacher didn’t possess the relevant mental
capacities (i.e. self-control) to be held responsible, but because
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we originally stipulated in our law code certain requirements
for liability, explicitly excluding cases like these.
It is more a matter of imputability rather than fault.
Neuroscientific (diagnostic) methods should be used not to
establish whether he was responsible — an evaluative task —
but to assess whether he was liable — i.e. that he fulfilled the
factual requirements that constitute the offense.35
3.3.2.4 An analogy with fencing
Fencing seems like a good example. As a family of combat
sports, it is a game. Nonetheless, there are different disciplines:
foil, épée, sabre. Before entering the carefully ruled world of
Olympic sports, sword combats have been used (and to an ex-
tent are being used) in wars and duels with different aims: to
kill enemies, to re-establish one’s honor etc. Roughly, in our
analogy, real-life combats count as the moral system, while fenc-
ing games count as the legal system. In comparison to “real life”
combats, these disciplines in fact are highly regulated and — so
to speak — isolated. For instance the valid target, the allowed
hits and even the scoring differ from weapon to weapon.
Compare each discipline to a legal system conceived — I sug-
gest — as a game. Foil-system, for instance, has a so-called
“right-of-way”: when both opponents hit at the same time, the
point is awarded to the one who started the offensive action.
épée-system, instead, awards a “double-hit” (a point to each
fencer) if both touch within 40ms. In most Romance languages,
the “right-of-way” rule is termed with a word usually translated
as “convention”, or stipulation. What counts as point, as target
or as allowed strategy is conventionally established by the rules
of that specific discipline.
We could have a foil-like law-system that decides to recog-
nize or to sanction only voluntary actions, or action consciously
begun by the doer. On the contrary, we can allow for a épée-
like law-system, that — regardless of how one hits — decides
35 In other words, I maintained that a descriptive view of responsibility is un-
tenable: this would mean using neuroscience to assess separately the state-
of-affairs while leaving the evaluative dimension of ascribing responsibility.
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to give credit for the simple touch, if it fulfills some require-
ments.36 Loosely then, we may want to identify foil-systems
as system sanctioning only voluntary or “meant” actions,37 and
épée-systems as attributing a sort of strict-liability, that is to say,
sanctioning all hitting-actions regardless of other considerations,
such as who started the attack.
This analogy shows two facets of my proposal: (i) legal sys-
tems as games bearing little reference to the outside moral uni-
verse can be seen in fencing as opposed to pre-Olympics, real-
life combats (Sections 3.2.1 and 3.3.1); (ii) the principle of respon-
sibility of current criminal systems opposed to the proposed
principle of strict liability-responsibility can be seen in the op-
position between foil and épée (Sections 3.2.2 and 3.3.2).
In this section, I have offered a stipulative definition of legal
strict liability-responsibility and I have argued that criminal law
systems might be based on strict liability-responsibility to over-
come the problems of moral and legal responsibility underlined
in Section 3.2.
The attribution of liability depends only on internal (to the
law-game) conditions, and it is not subject (a) to the uncertainty
and ambiguity of responsibility as a concept or ideal require-
ment; (b) to threats from empirical or theoretical extra-legal po-
sitions; (c) to different methods and criteria to ascertain respon-
sibility as a state-of-affairs.
The next section replies to possible objections and discusses
how this proposal would impact on the criminal system, were it
to be adopted.
36 While in épée-fencing those could be something like the time span and the
pressure of the hit, in law-systems other relevant characteristics (and exemp-
tions) have to be agreed on.
37 Who voluntarily started an action may be inferred — exactly as in the crimi-
nal trial — by environmental clues, as it were.
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3.4 punishment & consequences
In this last section, I will summarize my argument and consider
the problems my proposal leaves open and the objections aimed
at (a) the idea of strict liability-responsibility; (b) the proposal in
general.
I have argued that our criminal law systems are justifiable
even if there is no objectively measurable capacity responsibility.
In fact, I have suggested putting aside the concept of capacity
responsibility (i.e. attention to mental elements): the guiding
principle in assigning sanctions should be that of strict liability-
responsibility (i.e. importance of material, external elements of
the action, plus rules and evaluations). This strategy works neg-
atively contra skeptics of moral and legal responsibility, under-
mining their argument against the criminal system; it works pos-
itively making our system more rigorous and harmonious with
empirical findings, even in the worst-case scenario.
This shift of paradigm comes at a cost. First, along with re-
sponsibility, we probably have to put aside direct references to
moral foundations of criminal punishment. This does not mean
that morality has nothing to do with legal provisions, but its in-
fluence must be thought over. Second, we have to think of laws
differently: they can no more regulate our conduct according
to some other pre-existent (moral) principle, but should create
what they prescribe.38
3.4.1 Some Consequences
Even if we take for granted the usefulness of my proposal, sev-
eral issues remain to be addressed. In particular I try to isolate
and answer objections directed to (a) strict liability-responsibility;
(b) the system in general.
38 In this sense I think that Hart’s 2008, p.181 objection to strict liability-
responsibility (namely, that it prevents us from planning the “future course
of our lives”) is ill-founded.
98 responsibility and neuroscience
3.4.1.1 (a) Objections to Strict Liability-Responsibility
In a strict-liability framework, there would be no difference be-
tween crimes distinguished only by mental elements: the differ-
ence between voluntary (or first class) murder and manslaugh-
ter would formally vanish, roughly because in current jurisdic-
tions the former requires intention to murder, while the latter
is a result of some other activity not meant to murder. Clearly,
then, the difference would not be one of kind, but of degree
— at the sentencing stage by carefully accounting for the cir-
cumstances. This counter-objection should also serve to set-
tle the question whether I need two senses of strict liability-
responsibility, namely, to mirror the old distinction of respon-
sibility without liability in case of periods of prescription or
statute of limitations. My answer is on the negative side: one
can be judged liable for an offense without being given a sen-
tence for it — but the difference is simply one of degree.
If my model excludes mental elements for any material el-
ement of the offense, how do I account for “external” causal
control of the agent, such as in cases of electrical stimulations,
post-hypnosis, drugs raised by Scanlon, 1998, p. 277-8? It seems
to me these cases do not significantly differ from the brain-tumor
one I tackled supra.
Luck instead poses no particular objection to my model than
to every other conception both of moral and legal responsibil-
ity.39 In a way, the strict liability-responsibility model can be
a solution to this problem, since it outsources — as it were —
the basis of sanctioning from internal to external conditions: if
one may say that an unlucky situation cannot bring blame on the
poor fellow (since blame is based on will and will is independent
from bad luck), unluckiness refers properly to external material
elements, exactly those bringing strict liability-responsibility.
If strict liability-responsibility is not based on internal (i.e.
mental) elements, such as alternative possibilities or freedom of
39 For the classical debate, see Nagel, 1979; B. A. O. Williams, 1981. Honoré
1999 discusses luck in responsibility for outcomes according to the principle
of taking the rough with smooth: we cannot accept praise for lucky outcomes
and repudiate blame or liability for unlucky ones.
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the will, it must be based on external elements. Agreement on
what to take in to account (i.e. causation?) may prove wearing
and maybe worse than mental elements, which at least seem to
have an intuitive basis.
Moreover, why not be hard materialists and think that “men-
tal” elements are no more than material elements of the action,
and therefore must be taken into account even under a strict
liability-responsibility principle?
3.4.1.2 (b) Objections to the General Model
The analysis I conducted and the model I put forward are di-
rectly concerned with (criminal) law. Can my model be extended
also to morality, as in fact Hart, 2008, Postscript did with his le-
gal liability-responsibility to moral liability-responsibility? That
I don’t yet know.
Can this proposed system be discussed independently from
a purely forward-looking notion of punishment as “social hy-
giene”?40 Ultimately, it might be the case. But for the time
being, I think it is more useful to assume the non-philosophical
justification (and aim) of punishment embedded in western legal
systems: a mixture of backward- and forward-looking (roughly,
of retribution and prevention) conception of criminal sanctions.
I note here several issues I cannot answer. One may say that
my model detaches law from its action-guiding and motivating
dimension; that this model may bring about overcriminalisation;
that without desert we lack a correlate to establish the length
and severity of punishment; that we would need a never-ending
list of regulations and exceptions, falling in a casuistic view of
laws.
3.4.2 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have considered the ascertainment of responsi-
bility, working on the proposal of Lady Wootton discussed in
the preceding chapter. To start with, I put forward a distinction
40 Basically such as Lady Wootton, 1963 proposal. Cf. ch. 2.
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between moral and legal responsibility, and moral and legal lia-
bility.
I then argued that several scientific and neuroscientific tech-
niques can be (are) used to give a substantial contribution to
the ascertainment of responsibility. Their use, however, already
presupposes a conception of responsibility as made of elements
descriptively ascertainable.
I tried to show this is not the case and that both the con-
cept and this conception of responsibility should be normativity-
based, thus seconding Lady Wootton’s intuitions.
The next chapter is devoted to an analysis of the relationships
between responsibility and causation, another element consid-
ered by some as a descriptive basis for responsibility.
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Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas.
Publius Vergilius Maro, Georgicon 2. 490
In jure non remota causa sed proxima spectatur.
Francis Bacon, The Elements of the Common Law of England, 1630
4.0 introduction
This chapter deals with the relationships between causation, re-
sponsibility and normativity, both conceptually and in the works
of Kelsen, Hart and Honoré, and M. S. Moore.
I consider the claim according to which responsibility is (i)
ascribed on a causal basis, and (ii) therefore descriptive.
I offer two arguments to sustain my thesis: (i) there exist sev-
eral non-causal forms of responsibility (and if they are actual
forms of responsibility and ab esse ad posse valet consequentia...);
(ii) causation is not completely descriptive, but subsumes an
evaluative part, contrary to what many theorists and practition-
ers working in normative domains assume.
In this chapter causation will not be dealt with as an indepen-
dent topic, ie causation tout court, but always in a certain nor-
mative system — excluding those within the domain of hard sci-
ences. The non-descriptive aspects of causation are well-known
in philosophy of science, starting clearly from Hume to Van
Fraassen.1
’Cause’ is a rich and polysemic term. Just using ‘cause’ or
‘causation’ does not explain anything — arguably, in fact, not
only are there different concepts of causation, but also different
conceptions of cause and causation, in different disciplines, used
for different aims.2
Dealing with causation in the law is a complex task for two re-
lated terminological problems and not only for reasons intrinsic
1 For a general introduction to the issue of causation in philosophy, see Beebee,
Hitchcock, and Menzies, 2009.
2 For evidence bearing on this point, see my discussion of ’αἰτία’ — meaning
both “guilt” and “cause” — supra in the Introduction (Chapter 0).
104 responsibility and causation
to the matter of causation. In law, there is no bijective relation be-
tween the words ‘cause’ and ‘causation’ and the things “cause”
and “causation”.3 Every time the law speaks of ’cause’ and ’cau-
sation’, it does not necessarily refer to cause and causation (a
well-known example is, in Italian civil law, the use of ‘causa’ to
refer to the functions or reasons of contracts); 4
Clearly, there is nothing special about the ambiguity of natu-
ral language employed in legal contexts, but we should be fore-
warned not to take this language at face value.
To discuss causation with a clearer focus below, I shall sketch
here a brief taxonomy of causation in extra-scientific domain.
We may be interested in causes with three different aims in mind.
Those aims can significantly overlap sometimes, but what con-
cerns us here is that they can be kept separate for philosophical
inquiries.
Causation1: forward-looking causation [causalità prospettiva].
This particular type is concerned with individuating possible
future probable outcomes, given a certain state-of-affairs or a
certain set of situations, ie “causes”.
Causation2: backward-looking causation [causalità retrospet-
tiva]. This particular type is concerned with individuating those
states-of-affairs or certain sets of situations whose prior exis-
tence necessarily(?) determined a given outcome. It has an ex-
planatory aim.
Causation3: causal responsibility [responsabilità-causalità].
This particular type is concerned with ascribing to an agent (not
necessarily a living agent) a given outcome, “that his, her or
its agency serves to explain and that can therefore plausibly be
treated as part of the agency’s impact on the world (Honoré,
2010).”5
3 S. F. Magni points out to me that this is the case also of the extra-legal word: it
is the general problem of reference [Bedeutung]. This passing note was meant
to show how unreliable it is to count too much on language — even legal
language, by all means more formalized and accurate of everyday language,
is potentially misleading.
4 Cf. Italian Civil Code, artt. 1325, 1343–45.
5 For similar remarks, see Hart, 2008 and Feinberg, 1965, 1970.
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Clearly, causation is relevant in all three declensions, but while
causation1 is probably more considered in the legislative, law-
making process, it is causation2 and causation3 that play the
prime role in (criminal) courts. Causal responsibility especially
concerns us here: it is arguably the most important of all three
for criminal law (even though its importance it is not limited to
law or morality, but extends to history for instance). As Honoré
(Honoré, 2010) points out, it is not clear whether the concept
of causation used in legal settings is different from other simi-
lar uses and requires a different understanding and explanation
from causation1&2. Now, in order to better appreciate the subtle
distinctions of philosophers and commentators, I ask the reader
to keep in mind three different points, and to focus his attention
on their mutual relationships:
(1) moral/legal responsibility;
(2) the relation between responsibility and causation;
(3) the notion of causation employed, varying among
causation1, causation2 and causation3.
To conclude the introduction, let’s sketch a provisional map
of the possible relationships between criminal liability and cau-
sation.6
cn: causation is necessary On this view, causation is nec-
essary for criminal liability, but not sufficient. It means that one
can be punished only for those offenses one has caused, but not
for all offenses one has caused. This seems to be Moore’s view:
he has to build up a complex theory of causation in order to be
able to account for those threshold cases where apparently there
are no traces of causation. Another vivid example of this view
6 The matter is complicated because we have three unknowns, so to speak:
moral responsibility, criminal responsibility and causation. A general and
convincing theory must of course fully take into account the relationships
among all three unknowns. In Chapter 3.2.1, I defended the view that there
is no necessary connection between moral responsibility and criminal liability.
I will expand on this view with regard to causation infra.
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is Antony Duff’s jurisprudence, according to which causation is
necessary (although not sufficient) for responsibility (cf. Duff,
2008, 2009). Example: justifications.
cs: causation is sufficient On this rare view (possibly
more common in tort law), one is liable for all offenses one has
caused, but not only for them. The fact that someone has caused
an offense leads directly to criminal liability, but this view does
not exclude that there can be other foundations for criminal lia-
bility.
cns: causation is jointly necessary and sufficient On
this view, causation is jointly necessary and sufficient for crimi-
nal liability. It means that one is criminally liable for all and only
those offenses he has caused.
nnns: causation is neither necessary nor sufficient
On this view, causation is neither necessary nor sufficient for
criminal liability. The basis for liability may be causation, but it
may not be. Example: vicarious responsibility.
4.1 first argument: queer respon-sibilities
Betrachte einmal die Vorgänge, die wir “Spiele” nennen. [. . . ] Denn,
wenn du sie anschaust, wirst du zwar nicht etwas sehen, was allen
gemeinsam wäre, aber du wirst Ähnlichkeiten, Verwandtschaften,
sehen, und zwar eine ganze Reihe. [. . . ] Wir sehen ein kompliziertes
Netz von Ähnlichkeiten, die einander übergreifen und kreuzen.
Ähnlichkeiten im Großen und Kleinen.
Wittgenstein, 2009, §66.7
7 “Consider the activities we call “games”. For it you look at them, you won’t see
something that is common to all, but similarities, affinities, and a whole series of
them at that. We see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-
crossing. Similarities in the large and in the small (Wittgenstein, 2009, Ch.66).”
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This section argues that responsibility is not only descriptive,
for instance based on an alleged descriptive trait such as causa-
tion. In particular, I shall point out several kinds of non-causal
responsibility. The phenomena — legal and moral — usually
grouped under the umbrella term of ’responsibility’ are so con-
ceptually diverse that they cannot admit a common metaphysi-
cal basis.
4.1.1 Strict Liability vs. Collective Responsibility
I have investigated the phenomenon of strict liability supra in
Chapters 3.3 and 3.3.2. It may be, however, of help to recall the
definition I have provided supra. Strict (criminal) liability, then,
is criminal liability regardless of mens rea for any material element
of the offense. Regardless here means that (i) there are no mens
rea elements required for the offense to take place; (ii) mental
elements are irrelevant for the offense.8
In this subsection, I focus instead on other kinds of “queer”
responsibility, namely those I group under the term ’collective
responsibility’. While in strict liability the actus reus and the
possible sanctions pertain to the very same individual, collective
responsibility places the various elements (actus reus, mens rea and
possible sanctions) across several individuals.9
8 Of course mens rea and fault are not the same thing, as I already pointed out
in Chapter 2.2.3.
9 For a systematic analysis and classification of various forms of non-standard
responsibility see Faroldi, 2013a.
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4.1.2 The Various Cases of Collective Responsibility
In this section, I focus on collective responsibility.10 I show that
collective responsibility has at least three different “realizations”:
(i) group responsibility, (ii) shared responsibility, (iii) vicarious
responsibility. I use this differentiation as a hint towards the
idea that there cannot be a metaphysical property (or a state-of-
affairs) common not only to various instantiations of collective
responsibility, but to responsibility phenomena tout court.
DEFINITION: Responsibility is collective when the ac-
tus reus, mens rea and possible liabilities are not per-
taining to the very same individual.
4.1.2.1 Group Responsibility
Group responsibility is defined as when the responsibility for ac-
tions is imputed to members of that group qua group members,
regardless of any actus reus or mens rea they could have or not
have had, done or exercised.
A paradigmatic example is, I think, the responsibility for geno-
cide imputed to Nazi party members following Nuremberg re-
gardless of their intending or knowing the plan or putting it into
practice.
4.1.2.2 Shared Responsibility
Shared responsibility is defined as when the responsibility for
actions is equally imputed to members of a group qua members
of that group, assuming that all of them need to do or intend to
do the action in question; or in defect of this, everyone is held
10 For the concept (and consequences) of collective moral responsibility, see, for
instance, Arendt, 1987; Feinberg, 1968; M. Smiley, 2011 and Benjamin, 1976,
1998; Bobzien, 2006; Braham and van Hees, 2012; Caruso, forthcoming; Cor-
lett, 2001; Fischer, 2006, 2012; Gilbert, 2006; K. Graham, 2006; Isaacs, 2006,
2011; Mäkelä, 2007; Miller, 2001a,b, 2006; Miller and Mäkelä, 2005; Nahmias
et al., 2005; Nelkin, 2007; Risser, 2009; Sheehy, 2006; Shoemaker, 2009; Silver,
2006; Soares, 2003; Tollefsen, 2003; Velasquez, 2003; G. Williams, 2006.
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equally liable. Group responsibility differs from shared respon-
sibility because the former requires a status (being member of a
group) regardless of any action or intention, whereas the latter
assumes actions and intentions as prior.
A paradigmatic example is, I think, the responsibility of clean-
ing a shared kitchen by members of an apartment block. All
and single members need to clean the kitchen, but it might
be the case that, for special arrangements, only a part of the
group is entrusted with this task. Were the kitchen unclean, all
members would be held equally liable, regardless of previous
arrangements among the parties.
4.1.2.3 Vicarious Responsibility
Vicarious Responsibility is defined as when an individual is held
responsible (and consequently presumably liable) for an actus
reus someone else committed.
Vicarious Responsibility differs both from group responsibil-
ity and from shared responsibility because the individual held
responsible or liable has — ex definition — no bearing on the act
in question, either factually or mentally (no actus reus nor mens
rea) — although he can (and often ought to) exercise control over
those whom he is vicariously responsible for.
A paradigmatic example is, I think, the vicarious responsibil-
ity of an employer for his employees or that of a managing editor
[Italian: direttore responsabile] for what has been published on the
publication he edits.
4.1.3 Accomplice & Corporate Responsibility
Accomplice and corporate responsibility are examples of non
personal responsibility.11
11 On the moral significance of corporate responsibility, see Dubbink and Smith,
2011; French, 1984; Garrett, 1989; González, 2002; K. Graham, 2001; G. Moore,
1999; Risser, 1985; Silver, 2006; Smith, forthcoming; Soares, 2003; Velasquez,
2003; Welch, 1992; Wilmot, 2001.
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Corporate social responsibility seems to me a very complex
and interesting form of responsibility (if it is a case of respon-
sibility stricto sensu, of course), but I won’t deal with it in this
work.12
Accomplice responsibility will be dealt with in Section 4.2.1.3.
4.1.4 Qualified Responsibilities
The considerations in this subsection are merely of support to
my general argument — I do not claim they are definitive.
Responsibility is often qualified through the use of adjectives,
but in formal and informal contexts. Thus we have, in English
law, the notion of “diminished” responsibility.
Over these past few days, we have heard — variously in the
Italian press — acts qualified as “responsabilità gravissima”, “as-
sumerci pesantissime responsabilità”.
Now, it is clear that ordinary speech is not the spring of good
philosophy, but let’s take these qualifications as a further sign of
the fact that responsibility is not even perceived by ordinary men
as purely objective.
All these forms of collective responsibility, however diverse,
have enough traits in common to suggest they are not based on
a traditional notion of causality (for instance, they are not based
either on causation1 or causation2). This seems the case for
two reasons: first, the source of responsibility is not individu-
ated in agency, but rather in a given status of an individual or
a group, a status more often than not resulting from normative
relations; second, the contribution (or omission) of a particular
individual cannot be singled out independently from the rules
ascribing these people their responsibility.
In this section, I have shown that there are many substantially
(and metaphysically) different phenomena grouped under the
umbrella term of ‘responsibility’ — many of which are even non-
causal. All these phenomena have nothing descriptive (factual)
in common, and therefore (in these important cases) responsibil-
12 On corporate social responsibility, see for instance Azzoni, 2004, 2012.
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ity cannot be explained away by pointing to a (common) meta-
physical, descriptive trait of the world, such as causation (M. S.
Moore), culpability, intention and so on.
The next section is devoted to exploring, and eventually refut-
ing, the idea that the descriptive substratum of responsibility is
causation.
4.2 second argument: responsibil-ity and causation
Wie ist denn der Begriff des Spiels abgeschlossen? Was ist noch ein
Spiel und was ist keines mehr? Kannst du die Grenzen angeben?
Nein. Du kannst welche ziehen: denn es sind noch keine gezogen.
Wittgenstein, 2009, §6813.
This section deals with the relationship between legal respon-
sibility and causation.14 I argue that responsibility is not descrip-
tive because the argument that it is rooted in causation fails.
The general claim I aim to disprove is that responsibility is
objective or descriptive because it is fundamentally rooted in
causality, and causality is metaphysically real and founded. My
strategy is twofold.
First, I show that there are significant and independent non-
causal forms of responsibility that cannot be reduced to causal
responsibility; second, I show that the very notion of causality
is — lato sensu — not plainly descriptive. The sub-thesis of this
section is that even causation is tied to evaluative elements.
This section is split into two parts: in Section 4.2.1, I shall give
an account of the three most discussed contributions to the rela-
13 For how is the concept of game bounded? What still count as a game, and what no
longer does? Can you say where the boundaries are? No. You can draw some, for
there aren’t any drawn yet (Wittgenstein, 2009, §68).
14 I chose to limit my discussion to legal responsibility because it is more struc-
tured and this lets me avoid all those clumsy Gedankenexperimente. I am aware
that this choice belittles the philosophical import of my argument, but I hope
that if the reader accepts this argument with regard to legal responsibility, he
can think of an analogous strategy for moral responsibility.
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tionship between causation and responsibility (legal and moral)
in the last 50 years: H.Kelsen’s Society and Nature (1948), Hart
and Honoré’s Causation in the Law (1959) and finally M. Moore’s
Causation and Responsibility (2009).
In Section 4.2.2, I shall defend the thesis that causation, at least
in law and morals, is fundamentally non-descriptive.
4.2.1 A Bird’s Eye View
4.2.1.1 Kelsen: Kausalität und Zurechnung
Hans Kelsen (1886 – 1973), one of the major legal philosophers
of the twentieth century, engaged with the problem of causation
and responsibility in several works (cf. Kelsen, 1939, 1943, 1960,
1973a).15
This section is roughly split in two: in the first part, I shall ac-
count for Kelsen’s understanding of imputation (that is the prin-
ciple, analogous but distinct from causation, we use to ascribe
responsibility in normative domains); in the second, I shall show
how Kelsen argues that causality is not a given, but a cultural
category of modern societies — and therefore causality pertains,
as imputation does, to a normative, and not descriptive, sphere.
zurechnung For Kelsen, the principle we apply when we
consider human society as a normative order (in law, morals,
sociology, politics) is not causality [Kausalität] but “may be called
imputation [Zurechnung] (Kelsen, 1967, p. 76).”
A rule of law [Rechts-Satz] (different from the legal norm
[Rechts-Norm]) connects two elements, “precisely like a law of
nature (p. 77)”: “If an individual commits a crime, he ought
to punished (p. 76)”.16 But the connection between effect and
cause in the law of nature and the connection expressed in the
15 A note of caution: I really dislike the translation of Zurechnung as imputation,
but use it nonetheless so as not to confound the anglophone reader. I warn
Italian readers that the once-common Italian translation of ’Zurechnung’ as
“contrappasso” seems to me even worse.
16 “Wenn ein Mensch ein Verbrechen begeht, soll eine Strafe über ihn verhängt
werden (Kelsen, 1960, p. 80).”
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rule of law are “entirely different (from causality)”. “The rule of
law [Rechts-Satz] does not say, as the law of nature does: when A
is, “is” B; but: when A is, B “ought” to be [sein soll], even though
B perhaps actually is not (p. 77).”17
And why is there this difference? Because “the connection
described by the rule of law is brought about by a legal author-
ity (by a legal norm [Rechts-Norm] created by an act of will),
whereas the connection of cause and effect is independent from
such human interference.”
As for the relationship between imputation and responsibility
[Verantwortung]:
that an individual is responsible [zurechnungsfähig]
for his behavior means that he may be punished for
this behavior; and that he is irresponsible [unzurech-
nungsfähig], or not responsible, means that he, for the
same behavior — because he is a minor or insane —
may not be punished. That means [. . . ] that the be-
havior is or is not a condition for punishment; that
punishment is or is not imputed to the behavior (p.
81).18
And again,
Imputation [Zurechnung] merely consists in this con-
nection between delict and sanction. Imputation ex-
presses itself in the concept of responsibility [Verant-
wortung] [. . . ]. [T]he sanction is imputed to the delict,
but the sanction is not “effected by” (is not “caused
by”) the delict. The science of law does not aim at
a causal explanation [. . . ] it is not the principle of
17 “Im Rechtssatz wird nicht, wie im Naturgesetz, ausgesagt, daß, wenn A ist,
B ist, sondern, daß, wenn A ist, B sein soll, auch wenn B vielleichl tatsächlich
nicht ist (Kelsen, 1960, p. 80).”
18 “Zurechnungsfähig ist, wer wegen seines Verhaltens bestraft, das heißt: dafür
zur Verantwortung gezogen werden kann, während unzurechnungsfähig
jener ist, der wegen eines gleichen Verhaltens — etwa weil er unmündig oder
geisteskrank ist — nicht bestraft, das heißt: dafür nicht zur Verantwortung
gezogen werden kann (Kelsen, 1960, p. 85).”
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causality which is employed, but [. . . ] imputation (p.
81).19
kausalität For a good half of Society and Nature,20 based
on evidence from anthropology and conceptual analysis, Kelsen
argues that the principle of causality to explain natural events
is “the achievement of a relatively advanced civilization (RR, p.
82).”21
Primitive men were likely to explain natural phenomena in
terms of imputation:
condition and consequence are not connected accord-
ing to the principle of causality [. . . ]. If an event was
regarded as harmful, it was interpreted as a punish-
ment for bad behavior; if beneficial, as a reward for
good behavior. Misfortune (poor harvest, defeat in
war, illness, death) were imputed, as punishment, to
the wrong behavior of group members [. . . ] (p. 82-
3).22
19 “Das heißt aber, daß die Zurechnung in gar nichts anderem als in dieser
Verknüpfung von Unrecht und Unrechtsfolge besteht. [. . . ] Die Zurechnung,
die in dem Begriff der Zurechnungsfähigkeit zum Ausdruck kommt, ist die
Verknüpfung eines bestimmten Verhaltens, nämlich des Unrechts, mit einer
Unrechtsfolge. Daher kann man sagen: die Unrechtsfolge wird dem Unrecht
zugerechnet, sie wird aber nicht durch das Unrecht — als ihre Ursache —
bewirkt. Daß die Rechtswissenschaft durchaus nicht auf eine kausale Erk-
lärung der Rechtsphänomene: Unrecht und Unrechtsfolge, abzielt, ist selb-
verständlich. In den Rechtssätzen, mit denen sie diese Phänomene beschreibt,
wendet sie nicht das Prinzip der Kausalität, sondern ein Prinzip an, das man
— wie diese Analyse zeigt — als Zurechnung bezeichnen darf (Kelsen, 1960,
p. 85-6).”
20 Kelsen, 1943 but also in Kelsen, 1939, 1973a. For critical remarks, see also
Stockhammer, 1970 and Paulson, 2004.
21 “Dieses Prinzip ist die Errungenschaft einer verhältnismäßig vorgeschritte-
nen Zivilisation (Kelsen, 1960, p. 86).”
22 “In dieser Grundregel sind Bedingung und Folge miteinander nicht nach
dem Grundsatz der Kausalität. [. . . ] Wenn ein Ereignis als Übel empfunden
wird, wird es als Strafe für ein schlechtes Verhalten, ein Unrecht, wenn es
als Wohltat empfunden wird, als Belohnung für ein gutes Verhalten gedeutet.
Mit anderen Worten: Unglück, das heißt nachteilige Ereignisse, wie schlechte
Ernte, erfolglose Jagd, Niederlage im Krieg, Krankheit, Tod, werden, als
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Theirs was not a causal, it was a normative interpretation of
nature. Animism might be a striking factor to account for the
matter: if things had a soul, then they would behave toward
men like men treated each other: according to the principle of
retribution. In consequence, “the concept of nature as an or-
der of elements connected together according to the principle of
causality, cannot be formed in the thinking of primitive men (p.
83).”23
Nature is part of society, and the primitive man does not dis-
tinguish, Kelsen tells us, natural as causal and society as norma-
tive: “nature as a causal order was created by science only after
[mankind] liberated itself from animism. The instrument of this
liberation is the principle of causality (p. 84).”
The “natural” question from the reader might now be: So
what? Now comes the best bit! In fact, Kelsen argues that the
principle of causality has its origin in retribution (imputation):
It is significant that the Greek word for cause, ’αἰτία’,
originally meant guilt: the cause is “guilty” of the ef-
fect, is responsible for the effect; the effect is imputed
to the cause in the same way that the punishment is
imputed to the delict. [. . . ] The decisive step [. . . ]
consists in men becoming aware that the relations be-
tween things [. . . ] are independent of a human or
superhuman will, or [. . . ] not determined by norms
(p. 84-5).24
Strafe, dem normwidrigen Verhalten der Mitglieder der Gruppe, vorteilhafte
Ereignisse, wie gute Ernte, erfolgreiche Jagd, Sieg im Krieg, Gesundheit,
langes Leben, werden, als Belohnung, dem normgemäßen Verhalten der Mit-
glieder der Gruppe zugerechnet (Kelsen, 1960, p. 87).”
23 “Folglich kann es im Bewußtsein des Primitiven so etwas wie Natur im Sinne
moderner Wissenschaft, eine Ordnung von Elementen, die nach dem Prinzip
der Kausalität miteinander verknüpft werden, überhaupt nicht geben (Kelsen,
1960, p. 88).”
24 “Es ist höchst bezeichnend, daß das griechische Wort für Ursache: ’αἰτία’,
ursprünglich soviel wie Schuld bedeutet: die Ursache ist schuld an der
Wirkung, ist verantwortlich für die Wirkung, die Wirkung wird der Ursache
so zugerechnet wie die Strafe dem Unrecht. [. . . ] Der entscheidende Schritt
in diesem Übergang von einer normativen zu einer kausalen Deutung der
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And now, from Society and Nature (SN):
The transformation of the notion of causality, the last
step of which is the replacement of absolute necessity
by simple statistical probability, is correctly consid-
ered "revolutionary" in scientific thinking. Its signifi-
cance lies in the fact that the notion of causality was
stripped of its most important element, with which it
was still burdened as the heir of the principle of ret-
ribution: Α᾿νάγκη. This is necessity with which Δίκη,
the goddess of retribution, punishes evildoers and at
the same time keeps nature in its prescribed course
(p. 262).
Admittedly, Kelsen — in the quoted passages — does not care
about causation, but about our knowledge and interpretation of
natural events as causal. Even if he was non-committal about
causation, it is quite clear that he did not believe causation to be
a given, either naturally, factually, descriptively (as a noumenon,
one might say with reference to Kelsen’s neokantianism) or oth-
erwise (as a scheme of the intellect, epistemological category
and so on).25
Quite on the contrary, the principle of causation (probabilis-
tic or otherwise) is used by hard sciences to describe nature,
whereas the principle of imputation is used by normative sci-
ences (namely law and morals) to study society qua normative
body, an entity governed by human-made norms.26
But in the end, causation and imputation are severed (at least
from an epistemological point of view): there is no evidence to
Natur, vom Prinzip der Zurechnung zum Prinzip der Kausalität, besteht
darin, daß sich der Mensch bewußt wird, daß die Beziehungen zwischen
den Dingen — zum Unterschied von Beziehungen zwischen den Menschen
— unabhängig von einem menschichen oder übermenschlichen Willen oder,
was auf dasselbe hinausläuft, nicht von Normen bestimmt sind (Kelsen, 1960,
p. 88-9).”
25 This is slightly surprising, given Kelsen’s usual depiction as a neokantian
and Kant’s description of causation as one of intellect’s category.
26 This is not to say that society is not part of nature, or that causation is not at
work in society. Social sciences — sociology, economics — study society as
governed by causal laws.
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affirm that for Kelsen imputation stemmed from causation (nor
the other way round), or that the two need to be necessarily
connected. Thus, imputation (and thence responsibility) is not
necessarily allocated on a causal basis: it may well be, but this is
not necessarily the case.
This conclusion flows well with the rest of Kelsen’s pure the-
ory of law: once we have the principle of imputation, it is for the
actual laws to fill it with practical criteria. There is no need for
responsibility to be based on causality.
We shall shortly see that not all legal theorists were of the
same opinion.
4.2.1.2 Hart and Honoré: Causation in the Law
Published in 1959, Hart’s and Honoré’s (hereafter HH) monu-
mental study Causation in the Law sought to found (normative)
principles for attributing moral and legal responsibility on the
(descriptive) principle of causation.
The principles for moral and legal responsibility are not “in-
ventions of the law” but rather are “common-sense principles of
causation” that are “part of the ordinary man’s stock of general
notions” and based on questions of fact “similar to the conven-
tional view of the law’s use of other highly general notions such
as those of temporal or spatial location” (Hart and Honoré, 1959,
pp. 91-2). And again,
[W]henever we are concerned with [. . . ] assessing re-
sponsibility [. . . ] we employ a set of concepts restrict-
ing in various ways what counts as a consequence.
These restrictions colour all our thinking in causal
terms; when we find them in the law we are not
finding something invented by or peculiar to the law,
though of course it is for the law to say when and
how far it will use them and, where they are vague,
to supplement them (p. 70).
HH were concerned with the concept of causation commonly
used by ordinary people (and therefore — for them — reflected
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in law via ordinary language)27 rather than those used by philoso-
phers or physicists (cf. pp. xxxiii-xxxiv, 1-3).
In an extreme synthesis and taking into account the three
points (1–3) I highlighted above, HH’s argument can be sum-
marized in the following way:
(1) Legal responsibility (the criteria for) is justified if it tracks
(the criteria for) moral responsibility.28
(2) Causation is a necessary condition for moral responsibil-
ity.29
(3) This causation is the concept commonly used by ordinary
men in speech.
Now, what is this “ordinary speech” causation? It is useful to
split HH’s reasoning about causation into three separate points.
(i) HH started with a counterfactual concept of cause: cause
must be at least a necessary condition for its effect.30 (They later
27 The work was in fact implicitly and explicitly influenced by the then-
fashionable linguistic analysis, as Honoré himself acknowledges in the pref-
ace of the second edition.
28 Needless to say, they need not be coincident: “we must bear in mind the
many factors which must differentiate moral from legal responsibility in spite
of their partial correspondence. The law is not only not bound to follow
the patterns of moral attribution of responsibility, but, even when it does, it
must take into account, in a way in which the private moral judgment need
not and does not, the general social consequences which are attached to its
judgments of responsibility [...]. [T]he fact that the individuals have a type of
[causal] connection with harm which is adequate for moral censure or claims
for compensation is only one of the factors which the law must consider (p.
66).”
29 And then cf. with legal responsibility: “to say that someone is responsible
for some harm means that in accordance with legal rules [...] it is at least
permissible, if not mandatory, to [...] punish or exact compensation from
him [...]. [D]oing or causing harm constitutes not only the most usual but the
primary type of ground for holding persons responsible in [this] sense.” (p.
65, emphasis added).
30 Note that (i) is the classic doctrine of condicio sine qua non, endorsed, for
instance, by the Italian penal code, Art. 40.1: “ Nessuno può essere punito per
un fatto preveduto dalla legge come reato, se l’evento dannoso o pericoloso,
da cui dipende la esistenza del reato, non è conseguenza della sua azione od
omissione.”
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dropped this position to endorse a more nuanced one; see infra
for discussion.)
(ii) But then, not all necessary conditions of w are causes of
w. Only two kinds of necessary conditions can be causes: (ii.a)
voluntary human actions and (ii.b) coincidences or “abnormal
conjunctions of natural events (p. 103)”. All other necessary con-
ditions for a w to obtain are merely “background conditions”.31
(iii) So you have initial necessary conditions and the final event
they cause. Yet, intervening causes (defined again as voluntary
human actions and coincidences) can intervene and break the
causal chain — more, they annihilate preceding causes and be-
gin a new causal chain.
Finally, HH came up with a sort of standardized test, accord-
ing to which:
(HH test:) “A ’causally relevant factor’ need merely
be ’necessary just in the sense that it is one of the set
of conditions jointly sufficient for the production of
the consequence: it is necessary because it is required
to complete this set’ (p. 112).”
The test put forward by HH was refined and popularized by
Wright 1988 as the NESS test; since then, it has become the de
facto test for causation — at least in US courts.32
Unfortunately, the HH test is a petitio principii: it is not a test
for causation, it is a stipulative meaning of it. Their explana-
tion explained nothing, because it assumed a definition of the
explanandum.
linguistic analysis First, linguistic analysis (the method
chose by HH to tackle the issue of causation) does not exhaust
31 Again, HH’s (ii) is mirrored in Italian jurisprudence with the doctrines
of “causalità adeguata”, that excludes extraordinary events, and “causalità
umana”.
32 Here, it is a proper formulation of Wright’s NESS test. I shall not discuss it
here.
NESS test: “a condition contributed to some consequence IFF it was necessary
for the sufficiency of a set of existing antecedent conditions that was sufficient
for the occurrence of that consequence (Wright, 2003, p. 1141).”
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empirical and conceptual aspects of the problems. It is thus a
dubious method to investigate such a complex task.
which event is a cause? Since we have seen that not all
necessary conditions (for the sufficiency of the set) are causes,
why is that the case? Because what can be a cause is not natural
or descriptive, but depends on the aim we have to ascribe an
action to that agent, and is therefore the evaluative part of the
process.
Involuntary human actions, for instance, cannot be causes in
HH’s view. I suggest this is the case because the fact we hold
someone (morally or legally) causally responsible is not only a
purely descriptive act, but it is mediated by the aims and pur-
poses of the law — or of a certain kind of law tracking its under-
lying morality. Let me explain: if it is considered “immoral” to
punish involuntary actions, it would thence also be illegal, even
if involuntary human actions can perfectly be (natural) causes of
events.
As HH admit, what is a “voluntary33 human action”, “abnor-
mal” and therefore a “cause” depends on the interests and pur-
poses of the person making the causal statement (pp. 35-7, 62),
and that “[i]n relation to human conduct [. . . ] the notion of what
is ‘natural’ is strongly influenced by moral and legal standards
of proper conduct (p. 183).”34
which cause is relevant? Once we have a list of causes for
our event, we still need to choose which is relevant. Think of
a so-called overdetermination case. A fire, deliberately started
by John, reached Rachel’s house and was about to burn it down.
Suddenly, a violent earthquake made the house collapse.
Now, both events were independently sufficient to destroy the
house. There’s an important difference though: while the fire
33 For the problem of voluntariness, intention, justifications and excuses, see
supra in Chapter 3, passim.
34 For a similar, striking position on the relationship between law and moral of
Hart the positivist, see Section 2.2.3; for a general critique of this position, see
Section 3.2.
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was lit by John with the purpose of destroying Rachel’s house
(and let’s take that for granted), the earthquake was a natural,
“extraordinary” event.
According to HH’s test, both the fire and the earthquake are
causal relevant factors, because each was independently nec-
essary for the sufficiency of the set of factors that destroyed
Rachel’s house.
Now, is John to pay for reparation, even if the event that de-
stroyed Rachel’s house was the earthquake? It seems we must
choose which cause is relevant for our purposes. If we adopt a
mere chronological criterion, the earthquake was the most recent
event and therefore causally responsible, perhaps. But again,
this sort of relevance decision seems based not on purely arbi-
trary factors, but at least on evaluative premises.
As for “intervening causes”, HH simply invented — it seems
to me — a new, queer entity (the intervening cause) in order to
account for difficult legal counterexamples otherwise almost im-
possible to explain in a metaphysically-robust theory. In more
than one way, they made up that sort of “legal fiction” that
Hart’s great inspirer, J. Bentham, so radically criticized.35
In the end, HH overlapped and conflated the issue of natu-
ral causation with the issue of responsibility-attribution. They
failed to see that the attribution of responsibility can be non-
causal, and therefore that natural causation and the attribution
of responsibility cannot be accounted for in the same (causal)
way.36 Natural causation and responsibility are different — though
not unrelated — “things”.37
35 See Bentham, 1996 and Hart, 1982.
36 For a parallel reading of HH, cf. Wright, 2008: “they insisted that the prin-
ciples of attributable responsibility should be treated as causal rather than
noncausal principles. They seem to assume that in order to avoid ad hoc,
policy-driven determinations of attributable responsibility, the principles of
attributable responsibility (beyond the basic natural causation principle) must
be ’causal’ principles” (p. 177).
37 The classical debate in (at least common) law was dominated by minimalists
works (holding that the criteria for the attribution of responsibility are not
objective nor causal) such as Posner, 1972, 1973 and maximalists (there are
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4.2.1.3 Moore: Causation and Responsibility
I shall examine now the position of Micheal S. Moore, expressed
in particular in his latest book, Causation and Responsibility. Apart
from his independently important and sustained contribution to
the field of legal and moral philosophy in general, I think con-
sidering his stance would benefit my argumentation, because he
takes a side quite opposite to mine — although I will be directly
concerned only with small portions of his huge book.
I said opposite, because Moore has a number of theses con-
trasting mine. He thinks, for instance, that legal responsibil-
ity should closely track moral responsibility,38 and that moral
responsibility is based on natural, empirical properties such as
causation, which is necessary for it and purely descriptive.39
I shall now quote two brief passages and then try to formalize
and dismantle his argument.
“The metaethical postulate is that moral responsibil-
ity [...] supervenes on natural properties like causa-
tion, intention, and the like. The postulate of legal
theory is that legal liability (in torts and criminal law)
falls only on those who are morally responsible (M. S.
Moore, 2009, p. vii — cf. also M. S. Moore, 1997).”
In other words,
[A]ll law, on my view of it, must be based on policy
[...]. This policy would be to attach legal liability to
morally blameworthy actions. It is morality, not legal
policy, that tells us that actions that cause harm are
more blameworthy than those that merely attempt or
risk such harm. It is metaphysics, not legal policy,
that tells us when an action causes a certain harm (M.
S. Moore, 2009, p.230).
factual causal criteria for attributing responsibility) cf. for instance Epstein,
1973.
38 I rejected this thesis back in Chapter 3.2.1.
39 For a position different from both mine and Moore’s, see Stapleton, 2008,
2009: for her, the notion of cause in legal settings, must be “untainted by
normative controversies”.
4.2 second argument: responsibility and causation 123
Moore’s complex and rich book, Responsibility and Causation,
is devoted to showing that
(i) moral responsibility depends (necessarily but partially) on
causation, and since
(ii.a) criminal liability (and lato sensu criminal law) is based on
moral responsibility, and since
(ii.b) criminal liability (and lato sensu criminal law) ought to be
based on moral responsibility, then
(iii) criminal liability substantially depends on causation and
(iv) criminal liability ought to depend (ie it is justified in de-
pending) on causation.
I do not think Moore’s reasoning sound, and I reject both con-
clusion (iii) and (iv), for three main reasons. First, I have shown
in Chapter 3.2.1 that both premises (ii.a) and (ii.b) are false or
to be rejected. Second, I shall argue (infra at Accomplice Liabil-
ity) that premise (i) is false too: responsibility in general is not
necessarily based on causation — even if it may be contingently
based on causation. Third, I am going to argue that Moore’s un-
derstanding of causation (in law and morals) as naturalistically
justified is fundamentally wrong — cf. infra in Section 4.2.2.
To compare with HH’s argument, here is the Moorean version:
(1) Legal responsibility (the criteria for) is justified if it tracks
moral responsibility (the criteria for).
(2) Causation is a necessary condition for moral responsibil-
ity.40
(3) This causation is NOT the concept commonly used by ordinary
men in speech. A careful metaphysical theory of causation is
needed to justify moral and legal doctrines.
40 “[A]bsence of causation eliminates responsibility (by licensing consequential-
ist justifications), rather than merely reducing it (when justifications are not
in issue) (p. 77).”
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Moore rejects both HH’s claim that we must content ourselves
with the use of ‘cause’ in ordinary speech (but alas, that was
the philosophical agenda of the 50s); and their analysis of “in-
tervening causes” (those — for HH — ultimately relevant for
law and morality) as metaphysically unfounded and unjustified,
especially because — by resting on common, “stipulative” use
of what counts as a cause, of what ‘cause’ means — such an
approach would cut off any possible scientifically-informed in-
vestigation on the nature of causation.
Moore’s aim, then, is to provide us with a convincing theory
about causation tout court and causation in the law, starting from
the role of causation for moral responsibility and moral blame-
worthiness. The whole point of the discussion is to root our re-
sponsibility practices in something naturalistic, descriptive and
scientifically based, justified as causation.41
But responsibility in general is not based necessarily on cau-
sation. As a matter of fact, there are several phenomena we want
to call ‘responsibility’ that are not causal-based, as my argument
ex differentia showed in Section 4.1.
Now, for Moore it is quite the contrary: all responsibilities
must be causal. Therefore, he has almost no choice: either his
theory is factually disproved, or those non-causal responsibili-
ties (vicarious responsibility, accomplice liability) must not be
considered proper cases of responsibility. The latter is precisely
his strategy.
The next paragraph is devoted to showing how Moore ignores
the facts (the reality of accomplice, non-causal liability) to fit his
theory (no liability/responsibility without causation).
accomplice liability The key test of the notion of causation,
both in the law and in metaphysics, is to account for accomplice
liability. Obviously, an accomplice is a person who presumably
helps or instigates the wrongdoer to bring about the crime, but
41 “The nature of causation — what causation is — is a matter of fact, inviting
theoretical speculation”. Causation is “a real relationship in the world” — cf.
M. S. Moore, 2009, passim.
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the extent to which the accomplice’s contribution is a causal con-
tribution is open to question.
It is plausible this instigation require both an actus reus and a
mens rea to be considered accomplice liability.42 Let alone the ac-
tus reus requirement, is mens rea limited to knowledge (of possible
consequences) or does it possibly require purpose (the purpose of
helping the future wrongdoer)? And must there be an intention
to merely help the future wrongdoer, or intention to bring about
the criminal offence, directly or indirectly via the wrongdoer?
Unfortunately, Moore limits his discussion only to the actus reus
requirement.
Moore seeks to abandon the accomplice liability doctrine. Why?
I try to summarize (and alas simplify a little bit) his argument
here.
(i) The attribution of responsibility (here, liability) must be stri-
ctly causal.43
(ii) An accomplice has a causal role only in HH’s intervening
cause sense.
(iii) HH’s idea of intervening causes is metaphysically unfounded
and should be abandoned.
(iv) The role of an accomplice cannot be causal (in regard to the
offence) in any sound metaphysical sense. Therefore,
(v) There must be no accomplice liability.
But accomplice liability is a perfectly accepted form of (at least
legal) responsibility, and since there are great difficulties to in-
terpret accomplice liability in causal terms, it seems advisable to
forgo the causal requirement, as I maintained supra.
causation in law (and morals) In the last part of his book,
Moore finally tackles the “beast”: the metaphysical notion of
cause (causality). His analysis is roughly split in two: (a) an
42 As many criminal statuses do — cf. Model Penal Code.
43 Vide supra for my account of Moore’s justification of this argument.
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analysis of causal relata and (b) an analysis of the causal rela-
tion. In other words, to account for what causation is (“counter-
factual dependence, nomic sufficiency, probabilistic dependence,
regular concurrence, something else or nothing at all (p.327)”) is
quite different (yet related) to account for what entities causation
links (“events, aspects of events, facts, negative events (p. 327)”).
(a) causal relata: a deontic fallacy As for (a): causal
relata, we might start to notice a crack in his mechanism. He
loosely argues for a distinction between metaphysics and the
law. In metaphysics, the true causal relata are “fine-grained”
things: states-of-affairs. Instead,
[t]he relation most desirable for use in law is different:
(coarse-grained) events are the relata on which legal
liability should turn, recognizing that such relata will
be constructions based on the true relata of the causal
relations, which are states of affairs (p. ix, emphasis
added).
Now, let me just put forward two informal objections:
First, he commits a robust deontic fallacy:44 the fact that some-
thing is desirable or should obtain (for instance, responsibility
must be based on causation), determines our thinking that the
world is as it should be (that responsibility is based on causation,
all other non-causal forms of responsibility do not exist).
Second, from the basic descriptive level we creep into the do-
main of the normative. He said that we need an objective, de-
scriptive account of the metaphysics of causation and causal re-
lata (as fine-grained states-of-affairs) and then he changes his
mind and builds up new causal relata especially for the law, as
the above quotation shows. Why? Because this relation is “most
desirable for use in law”. Those two different theories do not
seem either equivalent or interchangeable. He simply appears
to pick the most convenient, regardless of which is true.
44 For which see Faroldi, 2012a. A deontic fallacy is deriving in some way an
“is” from an “ought”, for instance by acknowledging the reality of something
not as it is, but how it should be.
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(b) the nature of causation As for (b): the nature of cau-
sation (see pp. x-xi and part IV), things continue to be mud-
dled. Moore identifies law’s causal theory as counterfactual de-
pendence.45 For the law, counterfactual dependence (roughly,
the thesis that c is a cause of offense y iff y would not have oc-
curred if c had not occurred) is both necessary and sufficient for
causation.
Moore adopts a twofold (and almost inconsistent) strategy: first,
he provides us with a series of reasons and arguments against
both the sufficiency and the necessity of counterfactual depen-
dence for causation (citing, among others, the existence of non-
causal counterfactuals, the need to consider omissions as causes,
overdetermination etc.): counterfactual dependence and causa-
tion are not the same thing; but second, he confidently argues
that counterfactual dependence is a legal and moral “desert-
determiner independent of causation (p. 426).” This is to say
that blameworthiness (and mutatis mutandis liability) depends
not (only) on causation but (also?) on counterfactual depen-
dence. How and when? Moore presents us with counterintu-
itive cases, such as symmetrical and asymmetrical overdetermi-
nation (see Sartorio, 2012) and blameworthiness for omissions
and preventions — cases hardly accountable for in terms of non-
counterfactual causation. There, counterfactual dependence oc-
curs without causation, and Moore wants to assign liability with-
out causation.
45 I cannot go into detail about counterfactual dependence here. In sum, this
view descends from this much quoted passage in Hume, 1902, p. 87: First defi-
nition: “We may define a cause to be an object followed by another, and where
all the objects, similar to the first, are followed by objects similar to the sec-
ond.” Second definition: “Or, in other words where, if the first object had not been,
the second never had existed” (emphasis added for the definition of counterfac-
tual dependence). Please note that in this quoted passage, Hume equated a
regularist and a counterfactual (in italics) view of causation: these views are not
extensionally equivalent. This equation is problematic, as for instance notes
Beebee, 2013. For a general interpretation of causality and responsibility in
Hume, see P. Russell, 1995 and P. Russell, 2008. Counterfactual dependence
has been recently questioned widely in philosophy in general and ethics in
particular following Frankfurt, 1969, who argued for a non-counterfactual-
based attribution of responsibility.
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For this last part on causation and counterfactual dependence,
I shall adopt the so-called charity principle in reading Moore’s
theory. Above, we have seen that Moore’s idea is that causa-
tion is necessary for responsibility (liability). Then, we saw how
desert is often determinable only by using a criterion of coun-
terfactual dependence; but we have seen how — according to
Moore — counterfactual dependence neither is, nor implies, cau-
sation.
Now, I would prima facie say that there is a non-sequitur in
Moore’s argumentation. But on a more charitable reading, we
might try to apply the familiar, legal distinction between con-
viction and sentence. In this way, causation is necessary for
conviction (ie, the attribution of responsibility/liability); coun-
terfactual dependence determines instead the (severity of the)
sentence — even if I cannot say to what extent counterfactual
dependence would be either sufficient or necessary for the sen-
tence.
But in the end, I think Moore’s arguments are simply unten-
able. Just one example. We have seen that
(a) he considers causation necessary for responsibility/liability;
(b) he repeatedly states that “omissions cannot be causes (p.
444)”
(c) he thinks that there must be liability for omissions (pp.
444ff.)
And these three premisses are simply inconsistent. If (b) holds,
than we must discard either (a), so that causation is not nec-
essary for responsibility/liability, or (c ), that is, we cannot at-
tribute liability for omissions, since (b) they cannot be causes.
I do not think Moore’s reasoning sound, and I have rejected
both conclusion (iii) (that liability necessarily depends on causa-
tion) and (iv) (that liability must depend on causation), for three
main reasons.
First, I have shown in Chapter 3.2.1 that both premises (ii.a)
and (ii.b) are false or to be rejected.
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Second, I have argued (supra in Section 4.1) that premise (i)
is false too: responsibility in general is not necessarily based on
causation — even if it may be contingently based on causation.
Third, in this last part, I have argued that Moore’s reasoning is
at least inconsistent, as the case of omissions shows.
The next section, 4.2.2, is devoted to showing that Moore’s
(and not only his) understanding of causation (in law and morals)
as naturalistically justified is fundamentally wrong. This is my
second argument, ex causatione.
4.2.2 Causation as Normative
The scope of this subsection is to hold the following thesis. Even
if causation were jointly necessary and sufficient to determine
responsibility,46 this would not show that responsibility is non-
normative, that is, grounded in something ultimately descrip-
tive.47
The general, common argument can be summarized as fol-
lows:
• (i) causation is necessary for responsibility;
• (ii) causation is descriptive, objective, or non-normative
(because it is scientifically provable, etc.); therefore
• (iii) (at least causal-) responsibility is necessarily descrip-
tive, objective, or non-normative.
I will reject the conclusion. My strategy is twofold: tackle both
premise (ii), showing that causation is not descriptive, objective,
or non-normative and premise (i), showing that causation is not
necessary for responsibility, adapting my argument from Chap-
ter 3.2.1.
46 Alternative formulation: if causation were the sole criterion to assign respon-
sibility, ...
47 For both subjective and objective limitations, I shall not be concerned here
with a critique of the general, metaphysical notion of “causation”. This sec-
tion’s title might also be read as “Moral and Legal Causation as Normative”.
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4.2.2.1 (i) Causation is not necessary
As for (i), causation is apparently not necessary for responsibil-
ity, whether we distinguish responsibility from liability (to pun-
ishment or blame) or not.
I put forward two arguments to sustain my thesis: that of (i.a)
vicarious responsibility and that of (i.b) consequentialism.
(i .a) vicarious responsibility Vicarious responsibility in
law (and morals too) consists in ascribing responsibility/liabil-
ity for an action someone else committed (employer/employee,
parent/children). The relationship according to which liability
is attributed is not causal.
We have two ways out of this impasse: first, to disown vicari-
ous responsibility as an actual form of responsibility (because it
is not causal-based) — but this would be question-begging; sec-
ond, we may acknowledge that there are forms of responsibility
de facto non causal. I have expanded a little bit on this problem
in Section 4.1.
(i .b) responsibility for consequentialists In a strict con-
sequentialist view, one can do away with causation — exactly as
with desert: what matters is not (only) past deeds, but what
happens next. If the state-of-affairs justifies placing responsi-
bility (or blame, or punishment) on someone completely unre-
lated to the action in question, an act-consequentialist is prima
facie compelled to accept the fact that causation is not necessarily
linked to responsibility (although it might contingently be). And
since (act-)consequentialism is a legitimate (even if not necessar-
ily true or correct) moral theory that can account for responsi-
bility, then it is not even a conceptual truth that responsibility
is necessarily based on causation, but this would eventually de-
pend on the (meta-)normative theory of values one endorses (his
Wertanschauung).
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4.2.2.2 (ii) Causation in law and morals is not descriptive
I shall put forward three arguments, that, even conceding premise
(i) for the argument’s sake, I think summarize the problems
with premise (ii), ie considering causation (in law) descriptive:
first, the problem of remoteness; second, what I call the “causal
sorites”; third, the heterogeneity of actions with regard to omis-
sions.
regressus ad infinitum/remoteness This problem is pretty
familiar (also) to lawyers: how far should one go before causes
become irrelevant? Several acts are jointly necessary for an ac-
tion to happen, and these acts can be remote. Now, are these
remote acts (still necessary for further necessary things to ob-
tain) of legal relevance for the action in question?48
Take a murder. If the killer’s mother and father had not met,
this particular homicide would not have occurred, because — it
seems, on an intuitive reading — this particular killer would not
have existed (and so on, back in time).
It seems that from a purely descriptive point of view, the en-
counter of the killer’s mother and father is a necessary condition
for the killer’s being there (and eventually committing the mur-
der): so it should be considered a cause, or at least part of the
relevant causal chain. In a counterfactual analysis, if the killer’s
mother and father had not met, then this killer would not have
existed and this homicide would not have been committed.
Now, the law (and morals) is usually not interested in this
kind of “causal” chains. Instead, judges and lawyers are more
concerned with a specifically legal cause, called also proximate,
that is “near and immediate, or directly traceable, or foreseeable
(Feinberg and Coleman, p.603)”. The legal or proximate cause is
called also cause-in-fact.
Now, it seems very hard to justify such a choice on purely
descriptive grounds. The only real difference I can think of in the
murder example is that of a temporal factor — but still this does
not clearly point out why more recent or more remote causes
48 Here, I am using ’act’, ’action’ and ’event’ in a non-technical way.
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are to be preferred or discarded without a choice already made
on our part.
Please keep in mind that this argument has a specific diachro-
nic dimension.
the causal sorites paradox A lesser problem — quite dis-
tinct from the “regressus ad infinitum” — is the causal version
of the Sorite paradox: not how far back in time we should go to
pick the relevant cause, but how much our cause has contributed
to (say) the offense. Let’s grant that causation is metaphysically
primitive (ie not reducible to other physical things or forces). Still,
it is plausible that causation is a ’scalar relation’ (M. S. Moore,
2009, p. 105) and therefore a matter of degree.49
This might be a problem with accomplice liability, if we, coun-
terintuitively, admit that the accomplice has had a causal (albeit
maybe non-physical) role in the offence.
It is for the law (or for morals) to “draw the line”: to decide
whether a certain amount of contribution is going to count as a
cause or not. And it is apparent that this line is not descriptively
fixed or scientifically discoverable but always based on some sort
of evaluation.
Please note that the “causal sorites” is quite different from
the “regressus ad infinitum”: the former is a synchronic problem,
while the latter is diachronic.
actions vs. omissions A notion of responsibility necessar-
ily requiring a descriptive conception of causation has a problem
with omissions. In fact, whereas omissions are of some impor-
tance at least for criminal responsibility, descriptive criteria for
causation cannot easily track the intuitive distinction between
actions and omissions. Either omissions cannot cause anything
(and one cannot be responsible for an omission, contra the evi-
dence from criminal law), or—in order to give responsibility for
omissions—omissions are causes: this either makes them coin-
cide with actions, or escalates into counterintuitive conclusions
49 For the general problem of vagueness, see at least Williamson, 1994 and Luz-
zati, 1990.
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(for example, that roughly the whole humanity should be held
responsible for the effects of any omission whatsoever).
Consider two situations where a person dies. Now, let’s stipu-
late that situation (a), where a robber shoots a passerby, may be
prima facie described as “killing”; another situation (b), where
nourishment for a terminally ill patient isn’t provided, may be
described as “letting die”. Do (a) and (b) differ? Moral philoso-
phers do not agree on this problem, so let’s keep our discussion
to the legal domain. It seems that they may be considered dif-
ferent, for instance in the distinction between active and passive
euthanasia or in radically different charges you can incur: to pick
an example from Italian criminal law, (a) would possibly get
you a sentence for “omicidio volontario” [approximately: mur-
der] (up to 21 years in prison), (b) for “omissione di soccorso”
[approximately: duty to rescue] (1 year sentence or a 2.500-euro
fine).50
If (a) and (b) were two different things (as criminal law seems
to recognize), then a possible grounding would be identifying
(a) — killing — with an action, and (b) — letting die — with an
omission: actions would be causes, whereas omissions would
not. On these grounds killing could be punished because some-
one actively caused it — in a legal (moral) framework where
causation is necessary for responsibility. Given that, it is easy to
see why in (a), murder, one is responsible. But (b), letting die,
is rather puzzling. Either omissions are causes, and then there
should be no difference in responsibility between (a) and (b), be-
cause the effects are the same; or omissions are not causes, and
so no responsibility is warranted.51
Carolina Sartorio (for instance cf. Sartorio, 2009 and Sartorio,
2012) argues that accepting this distinction between causal ac-
tion and non-causal omission is an untenable position, because
it is metaphysically unfounded and because it would force us to
accept absurd consequences (the familiar “Queen of England’s
50 The Italian penal code (Art. 40.2) states (stipulates, prescribes?) that omis-
sions are (to be considered? count as?) causes: “[...] Non impedire un evento,
che si ha l’obbligo giuridico di impedire, equivale a cagionarlo.”
51 I thank Fabio Bacchini for discussion on this point.
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problem” in terms of omissions: if my gardener had watered my
plants, they wouldn’t have died; therefore, the Queen of England
is responsible for my plants’ death, because, had she watered my
plants, they wouldn’t have died). In fact, it is not clear on what
grounds we would count something as an action or as an omis-
sion: if it is independently sufficient to bring about the desired
state-of-affairs? If it is pragmatically salient?
On a philosophically accurate account, it seems that an inde-
pendent, “descriptive” view of causation cannot convincingly
account for the traditional (and legally relevant!) distinction be-
tween killing and letting die, or more generally between action
and omissions. The law “treats omissions both as causes and yet
not as causes (M. S. Moore, 2009, p. 82).”
If we considered responsible someone for an omission, then
(without further qualifications based on specific roles or require-
ments) we should consider responsible all those who haven’t
done that action, because the descriptive criteria are the same
—and literally all those imputable according to the the relevant
criteria (age, (in)sanity, and so on). This suggests that descrip-
tive criteria aren’t enough for responsibility, which needs non-
descriptive elements to discriminate between finer alternatives.
I have argued that causation is neither necessary for responsi-
bility, nor convincingly descriptive. I have suggested that, al-
though based on physical, empirical evidence, both law and
morals need to draw a line based on evaluative considerations.
To sum up, I have shown how there are non-causal forms of re-
sponsibility and how causal facts alone are not sufficient to have
a complete theory of responsibility. Empirical research might tell
us where to look to find causes, but it will not indicate which
causes are relevant in order to ascribe responsibility — or, in
other words, where to draw the line.
The general thesis of this work is that responsibility is funda-
mentally normative. In this chapter I provided two major argu-
ments.
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In the two preceding sections, I argued that there cannot be a
common metaphysical, true real basis of our practice of attribut-
ing responsibility. In section Section 4.1, I held an argument
“from difference”, that is, that not all forms of responsibility are
based on causation.
In Section 4.2, I adopted an argument “from causality”. I hope
to have disproven the claim that responsibility is ultimately de-
scriptive because it is fundamentally rooted in causality, and
causality is descriptive. My strategy was twofold. First, I have
shown that there are significant and independent non-causal
forms of responsibility that cannot be reduced to causal respon-
sibility; second, I have shown that the very notion of causality
(in law and morals) is — lato sensu — normative, or at least non
plainly descriptive.
In the next chapter, I shall provide a third and final argument,
an argument “from negation”.

Part III
The Language ofResponsibility: Semantics andPragmatics
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Der Begriff der Handlung an sich selbst enthält schon ein Gesetz für
mich.
The concept of action already contains in itself a law for me.
Immanuel Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten.
El universo es fluido y cambiante, el lenguaje, rígido.
Jorge Luis Borges
In this chapter, I consider the pragmatics of responsibility, and
in particular all those acts (linguistic or not linguistic) connected
with responsibility such as accusing, excusing, offering justifica-
tions and so on. These I provisionally label responsibility judg-
ments.
The thesis of this chapter is that judgments of responsibility
are normative.
In Section 5.1, I consider ascription, contrasting it with descrip-
tion (Section 5.1.1) and with prescription (Section 5.1.2).
In Section 5.2, I consider ascriptions of responsibility, putting
forward a fourfold distinction between rhetic and thetic ascrip-
tion of responsibility, and between rhetic and thetic denial of re-
sponsibility.
I then present four arguments to maintain that ascriptions of
responsibility are normative.
In Section 5.2.3, I put forward three arguments: the first from
axiological evaluation; the second from normative relationships;
the third from discretionality.
In Section 5.3.2, there is my fourth three-step argument ex nega-
tione (from negation), using negation as a test to discriminate a
normative from a non-normative linguistic entity.
In Section 5.3.2, first, I try to set up a minimal model for
the negation of normative sentences, starting out with sentences
usually accepted as normative, such as (valid) orders or com-
mands. I extend this analysis both to (a) evaluative or axiologi-
cal judgments (A is good; B is morally wrong); and to (b) sentences
pragmatically normative, but without semantic or syntactic clues
of their normative character.
Second, I contrast two sorts of negation: negation of norma-
tive sentences and negation of descriptive sentences, pointing out
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where they differ. My provisional hypothesis is that internal
negation and external negation work in opposite ways for de-
scriptive sentences and normative sentences. (i) In descriptive
sentences internal negation inverts their (truth) value;1 whereas
(ii) in normative sentences it is external negation that changes
their (normative) value, by rejecting their presupposition of nor-
mativity.
Third, in Section 5.3.3, I consider denials of responsibility. I
show that negation of responsibility judgments falls under case
(ii). It is only external negation that inverts the value of respon-
sibility judgments, thus showing that responsibility judgments
should be considered non-descriptive and normative-like.
So my argument runs as follows:
• (i) External negation inverts the value of a sentence if and
only if this sentence is not descriptive;
• (ii) External negation of responsibility judgments does in-
vert their value; Therefore,
• (iii) Responsibility judgments are not descriptive.
At the end of this chapter I consider three apparently possi-
ble objections to my argument: first, I have begged the question
in the definition of responsibility judgments; second, all I have
shown is that external negation inverts the value of sentences if
they are not descriptive, but this tells nothing about the exact
nature of those sentences; third, that these features of negation
hold for other modalities, so there is nothing special about nor-
mativity.
1 Of course the value inversion occurs only in classical two-valued logic. In
multivalued logics, it assigns its complement. This observation applies every
time I mention truth-values.
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5.1 two paradigms: ascription vs. de-scription, ascription vs. prescrip-tion
A possible (and common) account of speech acts is in term of
descriptions (usually considered apophantic, truth-apt) and pre-
scriptions (such as commands, usually considered anapophantic,
truth-inapt).
Are description and prescription jointly exhaustive of all speech
acts? It doesn’t seem the case. To use but a few examples, what
kind of discourse (or acts) are prayers,2 or insults? First, both
prayers and insults don’t describe anything at all3 and they don’t
seem to be true or, respectively, false. Second, they apparently
don’t prescribe anything either.
Thus, description and prescription do not jointly cover all possi-
ble cases of linguistic acts.
My concern in this work is, however, on responsibility. Is/are
the act(s) of attributing responsibility (such as, for one, accusa-
tions) either descriptive vel prescriptive, only descriptive, only
prescriptive or is there a quartum quid, so that they are neither
descriptive, nor prescriptive?
In the following sections I shall introduce two paradigms, where
ascription is opposed to something else:
- in Section 5.1.1, ascription vs. description, I shall introduce
Hart’s thesis that ascription is not reducible to description;
- in Section 5.1.2, ascription vs. prescription, Kelsen’s distinc-
tion between ascriptive primary rules and prescriptive secondary
rules.
2 There are striking analogies between religious language and normative lan-
guage I cannot develop here.
3 This is not to say that from a prayer or an insult one cannot abduce some
information, of course.
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5.1.1 First Paradigm: Ascription vs. Description in Hart
Hart, 1948 maintained two theses: (i) attributing responsibility
(and rights) is an ascriptive act; (ii) ascription is not reducible to
description.
5.1.1.1 First Thesis: Attribution of Responsibility Is an Ascription
Hart’s first thesis is that sentences usually considered to attribute
responsibility to someone for something, sentences such as “you
hit her”, “I did it” are ascriptive.4
The sentences “I did it”, “you did it”,“he did it” are,
I suggest, primarily utterances with which we confess
or admit liability, make accusations, or ascribe respon-
sibility (p. 187).
Again:
[S]entences of the form “He did it” have been tra-
ditionally regarded as primarily descriptive whereas
their principal function is what I venture to call ascrip-
tive, being quite literally to ascribe responsibility for
actions much as the principal function of sentences of
the form “This is his” is to ascribe rights in property
(p. 171).
5.1.1.2 Second Thesis: Ascription Is Not Reducible to Description
Hart’s second thesis is that while ascriptive sentences have an
informative content, they are not reducible to descriptive ones.
Nor, I suggest, can the difference between His body
moved in violent contact with anothers [sic] and “He did
4 For Hart, 1948, ascription is ascription of actions. Hart will retract his theses
after criticisms in Geach, 1960 and Pitcher, 1960 to move towards an ascrip-
tion of liability, for instance in the postscript of Hart, 2008. For a critical
reconstruction of his positions and his critics, see Silvi, 2004a, §3 and Baz-
zoni, 2012, §1. What concerns us here, however, is the focus on ascription as
a peculiar act.
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it” (e.g., “He hit her”) be explained without reference
to the non-descriptive use of sentences by which lia-
bilities or responsibility are ascribed.
What is wrong [. . . ] is identifying the meaning of
a non-descriptive utterance ascribing responsibility
in stronger or weaker form, with the factual circum-
stances which support or are good reasons for the
ascription (p. 189).
And again:
[S]entences of the form “He did it” have been tra-
ditionally regarded as primarily descriptive whereas
their principal function is what I venture to call ascrip-
tive, being quite literally to ascribe responsibility for
actions much as the principal function of sentences of
the form “This is his” is to ascribe rights in property
(p. 171).
Hart puts forward several arguments to back up his theses, ar-
guments having to do with similarities with ascriptions of rights
or properties and the defeasibility of the concept of action — cf.
Hart, 1948, pp. 189–194.5
Very interesting evidence of the fact that ascriptive sentences
are not descriptive is the following: when we retract ascriptive
sentences, we don’t do it because they are factually false, but
because they were wrong or we were unjustified in asserting
them:
if, on investigating the facts, it appears that [. . . ] our
first judgment has to be qualified, [. . . ] it is important
to notice that it is not withdrawn as a false statement
5 In brief, a concept is defeasible if there are no fixed necessary and sufficient
conditions to define it. Hart’s original paper identifies at least two exam-
ples of defeasible concepts: contracts (in common law) and human actions.
Reasoning is defeasible when rationally compelling but not deductively valid.
On defeasible reasoning, see at least Koons, 2013. On defeasibility in the legal
domain, a good survey is in Ferrer Beltrán and Ratti, 2012.
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of fact or as a false inference that some essential men-
tal event had occurred necessary for the truth of the
sentence “He did it.” Our ascription of responsibility
is no longer justified in the light of the new circum-
stances of which we have notice. So we must judge
again: not describe again (p.193).
5.1.2 Second Paradigm: Ascription vs. Prescription in Kelsen
In this section, I shall address in turn these two theses of Kelsen’s:
(i) a distinction between primary and secondary norms; (ii) the as-
criptive character of primary norms contrasted with prescriptive
secondary norms.
5.1.2.1 First Distinction: Primary vs. Secondary Norms
Primary norms, for Kelsen, attach a sanction [Sanktion] to a be-
havior. Secondary norms prescribe [gebieten] the opposite behavior
to that sanctioned by primary norms.
Schon in einem anderen Zusammenhange wurde dar-
auf hingewiesen, daß, wenn eine Norm ein bestimm-
tes Verhalten gebietet und eine zweite Norm für den
Fall der Nichtbefolgung der ersten eine Sanktion sta-
tuiert, beide miteinander wesentlich verbunden sind
Kelsen, 1960, p. 55.6
An example:
(i) One shall not steal; (ii) if somebody steal, he shall
be punished. [. . . ] If at all existent, the first norm is
contained in the second, which is the only genuine
legal norm. [. . . ] the first norm, which demand the
omission of the delict, is dependent upon the second
norm, which stipulates the sanction. We may express
6 It was pointed out earlier that: if one norm commands a certain behavior and
a second norm stipulates a sanction as reaction against nonobservance, the
two norms are tied to each other (Kelsen, 1967, p. 54).
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this dependence by designating the second norm as the
primary norm, and the first norm as the secondary norm
(Kelsen, 1949/2006, p. 61).
Moreover,
Enthält eine Rechtsordnung, etwa ein von dem Par-
lament beschlossenes Gesetz, eine Norm, die ein be-
stimmtes Verhalten vorschreibt, und eine andere Norm,
die an die Nichtbefolgung der ersten eine Sanktion
knüpft, ist die erste keine selbständige Norm, sondern mit
der zweiten wesentlich verbunden; sie bestimmt nur —
negativ — die Bedingung, an die die zweite die Sank-
tion knüpft; und wenn die zweite positiv die Bedin-
gung bestimmt, an die sie die Sanktion knüpft, ist
die erste vom Standpunkt legislativer Technik über-
flüssig (Kelsen, 1960, p. 55, emphasis added).7
5.1.2.2 Second Distinction: Ascriptive Primary Norms vs. Pre-scriptive Secondary Norms
But primary norms are not prescriptive, they are ascriptive, be-
cause they attach [knüpfen] (ascribe, impute) something to some-
thing else (in this case: a sanction to a behavior).
Only secondary norms prescribe [schreiben vor] a certain behav-
ior [Verhalten].8
Ascriptive primary norms are then contrasted with prescriptive
secondary norms — prescriptive secondary norms that are dis-
posable (literally: superfluous [überflüssig]).
7 If a legal order, such as a statute passed by parliament, contains one norm
that prescribes a certain behavior and a second norm that attaches a sanction
to the nonobservance of the first, then the first norm is not an independent
norm, but fundamentally tied to the second; the first norm merely designates
— negatively — the condition under which the second stipulates the sanction;
and if the second one positively designates the condition under which it
stipulates the sanction, then the first one is superfluous from the point of
view of legislative technique (Kelsen, 1967, p. 55).
8 It is interesting to point out that Kelsen’s primary norms became Hart’s sec-
ondary rules in Hart, 2012.
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Enthält eine Rechtsordnung, etwa ein von dem Parla-
ment beschlossenes Gesetz, eine Norm, die ein bestimm-
tes Verhalten vorschreibt, und eine andere Norm, die an die
Nichtbefolgung der ersten eine Sanktion knüpft, ist die er-
ste keine selbständige Norm, sondern mit der zwei-
ten wesentlich verbunden; sie bestimmt nur — nega-
tiv — die Bedingung, an die die zweite die Sanktion
knüpft; und wenn die zweite positiv die Bedingung
bestimmt, an die sie die Sanktion knüpft, ist die er-
ste vom Standpunkt legislativer Technik überflüssig
(Kelsen, 1960, p. 55, emphasis added).9
(Interestingly, Kelsen uses ’it designates’ [bestimmt] for pre-
scriptive norms and again ’knüpft’ (“it ties, it stipulates”) for
ascriptive primary norms.)
Thus the law can be characterized as a coercive order even
though not all norms are prescriptions. To sum up:
Aus dem Gesagten ergibt sich, daß eine Rechtsord-
nung, obgleich keineswegs alle ihre Normen Zwangs-
akte statuieren, dennoch als Zwangsordnung insofern
gekennzeichnet werden kann, als alle Normen, die
nicht selbst einen Zwangsakt statuieren und daher
nicht gebieten, sondern zur Setzung von Normen er-
mächtigen oder positiv erlauben, unselbständige Nor-
men sind, da sie nur in Verbindung mit einer einen
Zwangsakt statuierenden Norm gelten. Aber auch nicht
alle einen Zwangsakt statuierenden Normen, sondern
nur jene, die den Zwangsakt als Reaktion gegen ein
bestimmtes menschliches Verhalten, und das heißt als
9 If a legal order, such as a statute passed by parliament, contains one norm
that prescribes a certain behavior and a second norm that attaches a sanction
to the nonobservance of the first, then the first norm is not an independent
norm, but fundamentally tied to the second; the first norm merely designates
[bestimmt] — negatively — the condition under which the second stipulates
[knüpft] the sanction; and if the second one positively designates [bestimmt]
the condition under which it stipulates [knüpft] the sanction, then the first one
is superfluous from the point of view of legislative technique (Kelsen, 1967,
p. 55).
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Sanktion statuieren, gebieten ein bestimmtes, näm-
lich das gegenteilige Verhalten. Daher hat das Recht
auch aus diesem Grunde nicht ausschließlich gebie-
tenden oder imperativischen Charakter (Kelsen, 1960,
p. 59).10
5.1.3 Ascription, Responsibility, Imputation
Ascription and responsibility have multiple connections: beyond
being ascribed, responsibility is conceptually and historically
linked to Zurechnung or imputation.11
As I pointed out above in Chapter 4.2.1.1, primary norms are
characteristic of what Kelsen calls ’Zurechnung’ [“imputation”].
Zurechnung is — according to Kelsen — the paradigmatic exam-
ple of the normative (as opposed to Kausalität [causality] in the
natural domain).
But ’Zurechnung’ started out as a purely descriptive term, as the
etymology from rechnen (“to count”, “to compute”) suggests (cf.
Polish ’rachunek’). A similar evolution had the term ’imputation’
[imputatio] from ’puto’, ’putare’ (“to count”).12)
The underlying idea is akin to Latin ’redde rationem’, It. ’fare
i conti’, an idea that I see in Engl. ’accountability’ — the idea of
10 It follows that a legal order may be characterized as a coercive order, even
though not all its norms stipulate coercive acts; because norms that do not
themselves stipulate coercive acts (and hence do not command, but authorize
the creation of norms or positively permit a definite behavior) are dependent
norms, valid only in connection with norms, that do stipulate coercive acts.
Again, not all norms that stipulate a coercive act but only those that stipulate
the coercive act as a reaction against a certain behavior (that is, as a sanction),
command a specific, namely the opposite, behavior. This, therefore, is another
reason why the law does not have exclusively a commanding or imperative
character (Kelsen, 1967, p. 58).
11 At least according to Ricœur, 1994 and Fonnesu, 2013. Both works suggest
that imputation was the conceptual (and real) ancêtre of responsibility and
work their way through modern philosophy, at least starting from Pufendorf,
1672/1934. For a useful history of the concept, see Nüssel, 2011; for etymol-
ogy, see Köbler, 1995.
12 “’Imputare’ [est] nativa significatione terminus arithmeticus” Thomasius,
1718/1979.
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a record on which to write or to a-scribe (Lat: ad-scribere, Germ:
zuschreiben) everyone’s (moral or legal) “bill”.
This moral record (the ledger) is that which is involved in a
contemporary conception of responsibility also called “ledger
view” (see previous discussion in Chapter 1.3.1.1).
5.1.4 Ascription and Thetic Acts
We have seen contrasted ascription, description, and prescription,
and we have seen that they do not jointly exhaust the whole
domain of speech acts.
Anyhow, we can heuristically (and quite naively) characterize
them in the following (defeasible) way with a provisional defi-
nition: descriptions say something; prescriptions rule on some-
thing; ascriptions produce something, or alter the “normative sta-
tus quo”, for instance by conferring or claiming rights, or ad-
vancing accusations.
It is quite natural, at this point, to note a striking parallelism
between ascriptions and thetic performative acts,13 that is, acts
producing some kind of entity.14
Thetic performative verbs (see at least Conte, 1995a,b, 2001b)
are a subset of performative verbs. But what is the relationship be-
tween ascriptions and thetic performative verbs? Two questions
come to mind:
1. Are ascriptions reducible to (thetic) performative acts? In
other words, is any ascription done by using a thetic per-
formative verb?
13 It must be noted that my use of ’thetic’ is quite different from that of Czesław
Znamierowski [Warszaw, 1888 — Poznan´, 1967], probably the first proponent
of the word in modern times. In Znamierowski, 1924, for instance, he con-
trasts psycho-physic acts with thetic acts [akty tetyczne]: the latter possess a
conventional significance and depend on norms. For a threefold concept of
theticity in Znamierowski, see Di Lucia, 2013a.
14 For ’thetic’ and thetic acts [atti thetici, actes thétiques, akty tetyczne], I point
the reader to the etymology of Greek ’θήσις’ and ’τίθημι’ from Proto-
Indoeuropean *dhe¯ (“to pose”, “porre”). Cf. Latin ’fa-cere’ and ’cre-do’, Ger-
man ’tun’, English ’(to) do’, Polish ’sa˛d’, and so on.
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2. Are all (thetic) performative utterances ascriptions?
These two questions have one answer: no.
Firstly, not every ascription is (reducible to) a (thetic) perfor-
mative utterance, because if performative utterances require (a)
a specific verb; and (b) the first person (singular), present tense,
then all ascriptions — in order to be reducible to performative
verbs — need to have a specific verb. But there is no specific verb
to ascribe responsibility: in fact, there are ascriptions of respon-
sibility done neither with a specific verb (’It’s your fault’) nor in
the first person, present tense (’It was him’). Most ascriptions of
responsibility are not reducible to performative utterances.15
Secondly, not every (thetic) performative utterance is an ascrip-
tion. I shall show this with three exempla contraria (three coun-
terexamples) of thetic performative utterances that are not as-
criptions.
1. The first exemplum contrarium against the thesis that all
thetic performative utterances are ascriptions: thetic per-
formative utterances done with the verbs ’to forgive’ and
’perdonare’. According to Conte, 1995b, ’perdonare’ is a
thetic performative verb. But saying ’ti perdono’, ’I forgive
you’, while being a thetic performative utterance, is not at
all an ascription, because it does not ascribe a status or
impute to x the consequence(s) y.16 At most it — with a
neologism prompted by Amedeo G. Conte — ab-scribes it.
2. The second exemplum contrarium against the thesis that all
thetic performative utterances are ascriptions: thetic per-
formative utterances done with the verb ’abrogare’ (while
’abrogazione’ in English is ’derogation’, ’abrogare’ is ’to ab-
rogate’, ’to repeal’). According to Conte, 1995b, ’abrogare’
is a thetic performative verb: ’abrogare’ is not saying that a
norm is invalid, but is making it invalid.17
15 The verb ’responsabilizzare’ it is not used to ascribe responsibility. The
verb ’colpevolizzare’ is not used to accuse. Neither ’responsabilizzare’ nor
’colpevolizzare’ are performative verbs.
16 For an analysis of forgiveness, see Silvi, 2004b.
17 On this point, see also Kelsen, 1973b.
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3. The third exemplum contrarium against the thesis that all
thetic performative utterances are ascriptions: thetic per-
formative utterances done with the verb ’scommettere’ (’to
bet’). According to Conte, 1995b, ’scommettere’ is a thetic
performative verb: saying ’io scommetto’ is making a bet.
But making a bet is — in my view — not an ascription at
all, because there is no phenomenon akin to those involved
in ascriptions, ie changing in normative status or claims.
Thirdly, the preceding reasons, if true, shed light on another
fact: that theticity transcends performativity, because there are
thetic states-of-affairs18 that come into being not through (thetic)
performative utterances, but through non-performative ascrip-
tions (such as ascriptions of responsibility).19
These remarks need immediately to stand corrected: at most
they show that theticity trascends explicit performativity. But ex-
plicit performativity doesn’t exhaust performative phenomena.
An informal donation need not be done by uttering: “I give it to
you”, but can be done also by saying: “Eccoti” “Here you are”,
or even non-linguistically.
For these phenomena I propose the phrase: ’implicit performa-
tivity’.
The next section will explore the theticity of responsibility as-
criptions.
5.2 phenomenology of responsibil-ity judgments
In this section, I shall discuss different kinds of ascriptions be-
cause of the different concepts of responsibility (see my taxon-
omy) that can be ascribed.
In particular, I shall put forward two distinctions: one, in the
positive, between mere rhetic description and thetic ascription of
18 Such as “aitiological” states-of-affairs, for instance.
19 On this point, see also Lorini, 2000, §4.
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responsibility; the other, in the negative, between rhetic denial
and thetic negation of responsibility.
5.2.1 Attribution of Responsibility (Accusation)
In this subsection, I put forward a difference between descriptions
of responsibility and ascriptions of responsibility.
Responsibility is — in this respect — akin to what Amedeo
Giovanni Conte calls ’deontic status’: like deontic status, respon-
sibility admits both to a descriptive and a non-descriptive utter-
ance.
In Section 5.2.1.1, I tackle the mere description of responsibility;
in Section 5.2.1.2, I confront with ascriptions of responsibility.
I contextually offer a modest semantic analysis of some En-
glish verbs: ’to credit’, ’to praise’, ’to accuse’, ’to blame’, ’to
condemn’; and of an Italian verb: ’criticare’.
5.2.1.1 Rhetic Affirmation of Responsibility (Credit, Praise)
There is a rhetic affirmation of responsibility when an utterance
is used to (theoretically) describe that someone is responsible
for something — without moving any accusation or holding any
judgment of value.
Rhetic affirmations of responsibility presuppose responsibility
and merely describe it. One paraphrase could be: ’say responsi-
ble’ as in: ’a lightning was responsible for the blackout’.
‘to credit’ A possible rhetic affirmation of responsibility
seems the use of the English verb ’to credit’ (in at least one of
its possible meanings). As a matter of fact, the utterance, ’He
is credited with writing more than a hundred peer-reviewed pa-
pers’ has two presuppositions: (i) the fact in question has really
happened (factive presupposition — cf. Kiparsky and Kiparsky,
1971); (ii) this fact is axiologically positive (axiological presuppo-
sition), but it merely describes the responsibility for it.
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’to praise’ The English verb ’to praise’, instead, presupposes
the responsibility for an act and says that it is (axiologically)
good. (Example: ’She praised me for giving the talk’.)
5.2.1.2 Thetic Ascription of Responsibility: Accusations
In sharp contrast with rhetic affirmations of responsibility (cf. the
preceding section) there are thetic ascriptions of responsibility.
Possible thetic ascriptions of responsibility are accusations [French:
accusation, German: Anklage, Anschuldigung, Beschuldigung, Ital-
ian: accusa, Polish: obwinienie, oskarz˙enie].
That accusations are linked to responsibility is quite appar-
ent (though not definitive) even for linguistic reasons: in at
least three languages (Italian: ’accusa’, French and English: ’ac-
cusation’) the word for accusation is linked to ’cause’; in at
least three words of two languages (German: ’Anschuldigung’,
’Beschuldigung’; Polish: ’obwinienie’) ’accusation’ is linked to the
word ’fault’ [German: ’Schuld’; Polish: ’wina’].20 Both cause and
fault are usually considered fundamental for responsibility.21
That accusations are thetic (and not merely rhetic) ascriptions
of responsibility is pointed out by several clues. At least one
way of accusing (using the verb ’to accuse’) makes up a thetic
performative utterance, as for instance Conte, 1977 maintains.
Another (indirect) piece of linguistic evidence is obtained by
contrasting verbs such as ’colpevolizzare’ vs. ’incolpare’ (’colpe-
volizzare’ means merely saying things to make one feel culpable,
and it is thus rhetic; whereas ’incolpare’ means constituting one
culpable, and it is thus thetic) and ’criminalizzare’ vs. ’incrim-
inare’ (’criminalizzare’ means roughly saying things to make
something appear criminal, and it is thus rhetic; whereas ’in-
criminare’ means formally accusing someone of a crime, and it
is thus thetic).
If using ’to accuse’ in ’I accuse you’ is one possible way to
accuse, and if using ’to accuse’ in ’I accuse you’ is a thetic usage,
20 For a linguistic analysis of fault, guilt and related concepts, see Conte, 2001a.
21 In the Introduction, I noted that the Greek ’αἱτία’ means both “guilt” and
(secondarily) “cause”.
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then accusations moved through ’to accuse’ in ’I accuse you’ are
thetic ascriptions of responsibility.
Of course one can raise accusations without using ’to accuse’
(for instance one can accuse uttering ’it was you!’) but either
these are different kinds of accusations or — for the identity of
indiscernibles — if accusations (raised through ’I accuse you’)
are thetic acts, then each and every accusation — if it is a true
accusation, whatever the way it is raised — must keep its thetic
character.22
Charles J. Fillmore (Fillmore, 1969) denies that ’to accuse’ is a
thetic verb. According to Fillmore, saying ’I accuse you’ is to say
responsible, and not make responsible. Quite on the contrary, one
says ’I accuse you’ in order to make an accusation, to accuse, to
produce a state-of-affairs, not (only) to describe that an accusa-
tion is there.
’criticare’ From accusations differ critiques [Italian: ’critiche’,
plural of ’critica’], in particular those raised with the verb ’criti-
care’.
While an accusation thetically poses responsibility (which may
factually be non-existent), a critique presupposes responsibility
and shouts the wrongness of the presupposed act. ’Criticare’,
moreover, is not even a performative verb (cf. Conte, 2001b,
p.973).
’to condemn ’ From accusations differ condemnations or
sentences [Italian: ’condanna’].
Among the different meanings of the Italian verb ‘condannare’
and the English verb ‘to condemn’, two are outstanding for my
investigation: first, a rhetic meaning (expressing censure or dis-
approval: ’The UN condemns the riots in Syria’); second, a thetic
meaning (take a sentence: ’Questa corte condanna l’imputato a
13 anni di reclusione’).
The latter sense (the thetic one) is not, however, a thetic ascrip-
tion of responsibility: in fact, a condemnation [condanna] does
22 Of course using ’to accuse’ is neither sufficient nor necessary to result in an
accusation.
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not give a responsibility (which is presupposed), but a punish-
ment.23
Blame differs from accusations, and ’to accuse’ differs from ’to
blame’.24
5.2.2 Denial of Responsibility (Excuses, Absolutions)
5.2.2.1 Rhetic Denials: Excuses and Justifications
excuses A possible rhetic negation of responsibility25 may
be considered an excuse.
With ’excuse’ I do not refer to the linguistic act of excusing
oneself (uttering, for instance, ’Excuse me’). The verb ’scusarsi’,
for instance, is a factive performative verb: it presupposes the
truth (the occurrence, the obtaining) of the fact for which one is
excused, and the utterance of the verb ’scusarsi’ constitutes the
offer of excuses.26
23 Even in a predictive (consequentialist) conception of responsibility (responsi-
bility as punishability) it is possible to distinguish punishability from punish-
ment. Common law distinguishes conviction, ie an ascription of culpability
pronounced by a jury, and sentence, ie the attribution of punishment (like a
life-sentence, usually given by a judge).
24 For an excellent inquiry on the presuppositions and the semantics of ’to
blame’, see Fillmore, 1969; for a comparison between ’accusare’ and ’biasi-
mare’, see Conte, 2001b, p. 973.
25 With ’negation of responsibility’ I mean — for the purposes of this chapter
— the denial of the fact that someone is responsible in a given circumstance,
not denial of the very possibility of responsibility tout court, as for instance
G. Strawson, 1994, 2009 and Waller, 2011 maintain.
26 Devoto distiguished two different words (in Italian) for ’excuse’: one singular
(’scusa’), one plural (’scuse’): “Che cosa è la scusa? Propongo “giustificazione
pretestuosa, non necessariamente formulata in cattiva fede”. Esempio: “La
scusa era futile. Avrebbe avuto il tempo di fare le due cose, terminare la
lettera e mettere ordine sulla scrivania. Come si definiscono le scuse? Pro-
pongo “dichiarazione che deplora un torto fatto ad altri per inavvertenza,
motivo grave o forza maggiore. Esempio: “Per mantenere l’ordine, non poté
guardare tanto per il sottile: i primi li ricevette, gli altri li lasciò fuori. A questi
fece pervenire le sue scuse e le sue scuse erano sincere (Devoto, 1968).”
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With ’excuses’ I shall hereby refer to what John Langshaw
Austin called ’excuses’ and contrasted with ’justifications’:27
In the one defense [justification], briefly, we accept
responsibility but deny that it was bad: in the other
[excuse], we admit that it was bad but don’t accept
full, or even any, responsibility (Austin, 1956).
In excuses, in particular,
it is not quite fair or correct to say baldly “X did A”.
We may say it isn’t fair just to say X did it; perhaps
he was under somebody’s influence, or was nudged.
Or, it isn’t fair to say baldly he did A; it may have
been partly accidental, or an unintentional slip. Or, it
isn’t fair to say he did simply A – he was really doing
something quite different and A was only incidental,
or he was looking at the whole thing quite differently
(Austin, 1956).
I argue that the excuses-giving linguistic act is a rhetic negation
of responsibility for the following two reasons:
first, excuses are denial of responsibility because, in giving ex-
cuses, a person contests or opposes a previously ascribed respon-
sibility, by rejecting constitutive elements of the accusation: for
instance, by denying having committed anything. He simply
denies that the previous ascription of responsibility is sound.
Second, excuses are rhetic (and not thetic) negations (denials)
of responsibility because they do not seek to cancel or nullify
responsibility, because they assume that there is no responsibility
whatsoever. Absence of responsibility is constitutive of excuses:
if there were responsibility, they would not be excuses but — at
most — justifications. Excuses do not presuppose responsibility,
but only ascription of responsibility.28
27 At least for the purposes of this work. I’m aware that this use, though quite
well-known in analytic philosophy, is not universally accepted.
28 As I noted with accusations, not all excuses are pled using a verb like ’to
excuse’ or ’scusare’; in an analogous fashion, it is not only the use of ’to
excuse’ or ’scusare’ that can make an excuse.
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justifications Justifications, instead, are not at all negations
of responsibility — a fortiori they cannot be either rhetic, or thetic
negation of responsibility. Justifications aren’t negations of re-
sponsibility because justifications presuppose responsibility: jus-
tifications affirm responsibility, but deny it is responsibility for
something bad. (A paradigmatic example seems to me “self de-
fense”: a admits to having killed b, but b was assaulting him
with a knife, for instance.)29
5.2.2.2 Thetic Denial: Legal vs. Religious Absolution
acquittal (legal absolution) [freispruch] Thetic nega-
tions of responsibility are acquittal or legal absolution (German:
Freispruch; Dutch: vrijspraak; Norwegian: frikjenning; Danish:
frifindelse; Swedish: frikännande; French: acquittement; Polish: uniewin-
nienie).
The judge presupposes the preceding ascription of responsi-
bility as true and poses it as non-true in that legal proceeding,
in and for that convention. Acquittal has two presuppositions:
(i) the preceding ascription of responsibility and, jointly, (ii) the
absence of responsibility.30
29 With ’justification’ I don’t mean what in Italian jurisprudence is called ’causa
di giustificazione’ (ie. legittima difesa, consenso dell’avente diritto, adempi-
mento di un dovere, uso delle armi da parte della polizia, stato di necessità,
esercizio di un diritto). Those “cause di giustificazione”, along with other
classes (such as “cause di non-punibilità”) make what some call ’scriminanti’
or ’discriminanti’. I thank Emil Mazzoleni for an enlightening conversation.
30 The fact that acquittal has certain realizations in a given legal system seems
to me purely contingent. For instance, all six types of acquittal in Art. 529 of
Italian Penal Code are thetic negation of responsibility, because they dissolve
the preceding ascription of responsibility. Those six types are: acquittal be-
cause: (i) il fatto non sussiste; (ii) l’imputato non ha commesso il fatto; (iii) il
fatto non costituisce reato; (iv) il fatto non è previsto dalla legge come reato;
(v) il reato è stato commesso da persona non imputabile; (vi) il reato è stato
commesso da persona non punibile. Of course, these six do not exhaust all
possible forms of acquittal. In particular, there are also “la sentenza di non
doversi procedere del giudice per l’indagine preliminare” and “la sentenza
di non luogo a procedere del giudice per l’udienza preliminare”.
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religious absolution [absolution] Quite on the contrary,
religious (not: legal) absolution (legal absolution in German:
Freispruch) as a sacrament (German: Absolution, Sündennachlaß;
Dutch: absolutie; Norwegian: absolusjon; Danish: syndsforladelse;
Swedish: absolution; French: absolution; Polish: rozgrzeszenie, ab-
solucja) a fortiori is not a thetic negation of responsibility, because
it is not a negation of responsibility at all.
Religious absolution not only presupposes responsibility but
also requires responsibility to be completed, that is to release the
penitent from his sins (absolution cancels one’s sins, not one’s
responsibility or punishment for them.)31
5.2.3 Ascription vs. Description of Responsibility
In this section, I shall argue that responsibility judgments are
normative when used ascriptively.
I shall now put forward three considerations.
First, not every ascription is a judgment of responsibility. In
other words, not every ascription is concerned with responsibil-
ity. Questions of responsibility arise when we have a special
interest or aim to pursue, when a situation deviates from the
norm or the standard, when we want to understand more, as
Feinberg, 1965 points out.
Second, the very same sentence can be used to ascribe respon-
sibility or to describe, but when used descriptively that sentence
is not describing responsibility, but is doing something else.
Third, judgments of responsibility are such only when they are
used to ascribe responsibility.32
31 I think my point is confirmed by the practice of “plenary indulgence”.
Among the requisites of plenary indulgence stands some act (say, a pilgrim-
age) and, necessarily, formal penance. If religious absolution were — alone
— sufficient condition of the removal of every possible punishment, then all
other required acts for that indulgence would be useless (for plenary indul-
gence). From this reasoning I abduce that religious absolution “cancels” sins,
but not the responsibility thereof — responsibility connected to some form of
punishment untouched by religious absolution. Many thanks to don Paolo
Pelosi for discussion on this point.
32 For a similar opinion, see Feinberg, 1965 and Feinberg, 1970.
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For argument’s sake, let’s admit two possible uses of respon-
sibility judgments: descriptive and ascriptive.33 For ascriptive re-
sponsibility judgments there is no conceptual problem. Let us
then turn to descriptive responsibility judgments.
Can responsibility be an object of description? Or can it only
be ascribed?34 Prima facie, it seems possible to utter a respon-
sibility judgment only to inform that someone is responsible of
something.
Now, descriptive judgments may be either
(i) independent from ascriptive judgments (ascription-independent);
or
(ii) dependent on ascriptive judgments (ascription-dependent).
In case (i), descriptive judgments of responsibility are indepen-
dent of ascriptive judgments. This seems to imply that they (a)
can be true or false and (b) there are “truthmakers”, ie some-
thing in the world that “makes” these judgments true or, respec-
tively, false.35 This presupposes that responsibility is objective,
that is, an object that, as such, is independent from human prac-
tices.
In case (ii), descriptive judgments of responsibility are depen-
dent on ascriptive judgments. I see two possibilities:
(ii.i) Ascriptive judgments are (temporally) prior to descriptive
judgments, and therefore descriptive judgments are used to de-
scribe the historical fact that an ascriptive judgment has previ-
ously taken place.
(ii.ii) Ascriptive judgments are logically prior: an (apophantic)
responsibility judgment can be uttered to inform only if it is
used at the same time to also ascribe responsibility.
33 Is it possible to consider ascriptions of responsibility as prescriptive? I leave
this question open here.
34 There seems to be a striking parallelism with the question Sollsatz vs. Sollnorm
in Kelsen.
35 On truthmakers, see at least Mulligan, Simons, and Smith, 1984; Rodríguez-
Pereyra, 2006 and MacBride, 2013.
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In both cases (ii.i) and (ii.ii) it seems that a descriptive (apo-
phantic) responsibility judgment (if it exists) must presuppose
an ascriptive (thetic) responsibility judgment.
Thus, when I use the phrase ’descriptive responsibility judg-
ment’ I shall mean that they always presuppose an ascriptive
judgment.
The very same sentence, for instance ‘Juan is responsible for
robbing the bank’, may be pragmatically polyvalent [mehrdeutig]:36
it can be used in three ways:
1. to (brutely) state a brute fact (that something has happened
— for instance that Juan got a thousand euros);
2. to (institutionally) describe an institutional fact (a state-of-
affairs — for instance the fact that Juan has been so-and-so
sentenced);
3. to (thetically) ascribe responsibility (for instance to accuse
Juan of robbing the bank).37
5.2.3.1 Metapragmatics of Responsibility
The thesis that ascription is normative-like presupposes that there
is only one possible kind of ascription. But this presupposition
is false. It is false for two reasons: first, I have already shown
that there are at least two (heterogeneous) concepts of ascription:
that considered by Hart (ascription of an action or responsibility
or rights), and that considered by Kelsen (ascription of sanctions
36 On semantic ambiguity vs. pragmatic ambivalence, see Conte, 2007a.
37 Some brief words of justification. First, I shall be content to investigate lin-
guistic entities. I am well aware that some accusation is advanced or some
excuse pled without any words being spoken. Mine shall be a linguistic anal-
ysis, even though I hope that my conclusion will shed some light on the
phenomenon of responsibility judgments in general. Second, since there is no
shared consensus either on what responsibility is or on what responsibility
judgments are, I feel confident in making use of a certain degree of arbitrari-
ness. As a matter of fact, we need at least a prima facie distinction between
responsibility judgments and other kinds of judgments. There is no concep-
tual reason precluding my analysis from being extended further, given the
right premisses.
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to conducts). And since ab esse ad posse valet consequentia, if there
are two concepts of ascription, then there can be two concepts
of ascription. But for argument’s sake let’s assume that this first
reason is false, and only one is the true ascription. But second,
Feinberg acutely showed that even this kind of ascription (ie. as-
cription of responsibility) is not a simple concept, but that there
are at least two different concepts of ascription of responsibil-
ity.38
They do not differ because of the possible object of ascription
(say, several different concepts of responsibility, such as liability-
responsibility or causal responsibility), but they differ in nature.
In order to correctly judge the nature of a responsibility judg-
ment, I shall put forward three considerations.
First, we should grasp what kind of entity we are talking about
in a given responsibility judgment. Two entities that can be as-
cribed are (i) actions; (ii) responsibilities.39
Second, even ascriptions of responsibility depend on the par-
ticular concept of responsibility we are considering. In Part 1,
I distinguished several concepts of responsibility, and many of
these can be ascribed by different speech acts.
A causal judgment on responsibility (’Hitler was responsible
for WWII’) may be considered akin to descriptive judgments,
whereas judgments of responsibility (’It’s your fault’) may be
considered ascriptions.
Third, a good cue (or a prima facie heuristic criterion) to distin-
guish between descriptive and ascriptive judgments of (one con-
cept of) responsibility is the verbal tense. Descriptive judgments
of responsibility usually are in the past tense, whereas ascriptive
judgments of responsibility usually are in the present tense.
I shall now put forward three arguments to back up my thesis
that responsibility judgments are normative.
38 For instance in Feinberg, 1965.
39 Hart, 1948 for one, when talking of ascriptions, meant ascription of actions
(cf. Silvi, 2004a, §3); Hart’s critic, Pitcher, (Pitcher, 1960) meant censurability;
Feinberg, 1965 distinguished ascription of actions from ascriptions of liability;
Hart, 2008 had in mind ascription of punibility.
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5.2.4 First Argument: Axiological Evaluation
First, then, there is some sort of evaluation involved in responsi-
bility judgments: whether the judicata was good or bad, right or
wrong, or even if it fell under a given rubric.
5.2.5 Second Argument: Normative Relationships
Second, it follows from my definition above that in responsibility
judgments there are at least a judge and and a judgee (of course
these may coincide, as Nagel, 1986 points out), and — as it turns
out — those positions (even if temporary) in society are surely
constituted by relationships established by (social, moral or le-
gal) norms, such as roles (a teacher evaluating or scolding his
pupil) or duties.
5.2.6 Third Argument: Discretionality
Third, responsibility judgments are discretionary, because they
always involve a choice or a decision, rather than a discovery.
Choice we find in the selection of the object of imputation (sim-
ple action vs. complex state-of-affairs; causal responsibility vs.
censurability) and in the breadth and depth of the selection.
I believe that these three reasons (evaluations, normative rela-
tionships and discretionality), although not decisive, may back
up my working hypothesis of responsibility judgments as nor-
mative.
If we then — provisionally, but not without justification (cf.
for instance Nagel, 1986; Scanlon, 1998) — consider responsibil-
ity judgments akin to normative judgments — for one, moral
judgments such as ’Abortion is wrong’ — we can start to see
many problems arising.
In fact, normative (and a fortiori moral) judgments have usu-
ally been considered anapophantic, truth-inapt, in other words:
not true or false.
But if responsibility judgments cannot be true or false, and if
negation acts on the truth-value of a sentence, how can responsi-
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bility judgments be negated? And since it seems they are being
negated, what is it that is negated, if not their truth?
I shall tackle these problems in the next section, in Section
5.3.2.
5.3 fourth argument: denial of re-sponsibility
This section has a narrow focus, inasmuch as it is centered on a
particular test-case: norm negation.
The logical status of normative language has long been of in-
terest. In modern times, the question about a possible logic
of norms, following the birth of modern logic from Frege on,
began seriously with Grue-Sørensen, 1939; Jørgensen, 1938a,b,
1969 and has had pundits such as Rand, 1939, 1962, Hofstadter
and McKinsey, 1939, Ross, 1941, Rudzin´ski, 1947, and many oth-
ers.40
The first question usually asked is about the truth-aptness of
normative language. Can imperatives be true or false? Is the
sentence “Abortion is wrong” true or false? Or right, perhaps?
In general, what does it mean for normative language to be
true or false? If we limit our investigation to imperatives, it turns
out that there have been quite a lot of answers. With selected ex-
ceptions, scholars usually deny that imperatives are truth-apt.41
40 For instance cf. Sorainen, 1939 (for which see Faroldi, 2013b). In general, for
the origin of the logic of norms, see Lorini, 2001, 2013. The birth of deontic
logic is usually traced back to Mally, 1926, although “true” deontic logic starts
with Wright, 1951, Kalinowski, 1953 and Oskar Becker.
41 Here it is a partial list of predicates analogous (or homologous) to truth con-
sidered holding for norms:
(i) accountable: Hamblin, 1987, pp. 20, 91-2;
(ii) adempiuta [adempimento = Vollführung]: Rand, 1939; Geach, 1958, p. 58;
(iii) appropriate [appropriata]: Castañeda, 1960a, pp. 35–43, Castañeda, 1963,
p. 278; Kaufmann, 2012, p. 2; Wright, 1968, p. 154;
(iv) assented to: Bhat, 1983, pp. 451, 460; Espersen, 1967, pp. 67-8; Gardiner,
1955, pp. 23-9; Gauthier, 1963, pp. 63-4; Hare, 1952, pp. 19–20; Wright, 1968,
p. 154;
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(v) effettuata (le azioni prescritte) [effettuazione = Ausführung]: Rand, 1939;
(vi) authoritative [autorevole]: Hall, 1952, pp. 120-1; cf. Oppenheim, 1944,
pp. 152-3;
(vii) binding [vincolante]: Dubislav, 1937, pp. 341-2; Lang, 1960, 1962; Prior,
1971, pp. 65-9; Ross, 1968, p. 81; Wedeking, 1969, pp. 20, 93;
(viii) correct [corretta, richtig]: Bohnert, 1945, p. 314; Castañeda, 1960a, p. 36;
Gensler, 1990, p. 194; Grue-Sørensen, 1939, p. 197; Ramírez, 2003, pp. 151, 189,
284;
(ix) in force [vigente, in vigore, in Kraft]: Espersen, 1967, pp. 68-9; Hamblin,
1987, p. 169; Lemmon, 1965, pp. 52-3; Rudzin´ski, 1947 (obowia˛zywanie); Sosa,
1964, pp. 70-1, Sosa, 1967, pp. 60-2; van Fraassen, 1973, p. 15; Wright, 1968,
p. 154; Wedeking, 1969, p. 93; Zellner, 1971, p. 49;
(x) fondata [fondatezza = Begründung]: Moritz, 1941, p. 240;
(xi) justified [giustificata]: Castañeda, 1960a, pp. 35–43, Castañeda, 1960b,
pp. 170-3, Castañeda, 1963, p. 278, Castañeda, 1974, §4; Dubislav, 1937,
pp. 341-2; Espersen, 1967, p. 78; Frey, 1957, pp. 457-8; Gauthier, 1963, p. 63;
Grue-Sørensen, 1939, p. 197; Hofstadter and McKinsey, 1939, p. 455; Jør-
gensen, 1938a, p. 289; Kaufmann, 2012, p. 2; Nielsen 1966: 239; Sosa, 1967,
p. 60; Wilder, 1980, pp. 246-7; Zellner, 1971, pp. 49–51;
(xii) legitimate [legittima]: Broad, 1950, p. 63; Castañeda, 1975, pp. 121-2; Hall,
1947, p. 341, Hall, 1952, p. 115; Wedeking, 1969, pp. 93, 136–41; Raz 1977: 83;
(xiii) obeyed [obbedita]: Adler, 1980, pp. 26, 74; Fisher, 1962b, p. 198, Fisher,
1962a, p. 232; Grant, 1968, p. 195; Hamblin, 1987, p. 26; Jørgensen, 1938a,
p. 289, Jørgensen, 1938b, p. 10; Lemmon, 1965, pp. 52-3; Prior, 1949, pp. 71-2,
Prior, 1971, pp. 71-2; Sosa, 1964, pp. 41–54; P. F. Strawson, 1950, pp. 141-2;
Wright, 1968, p. 154; B. A. O. Williams, 1963, p. 30; Zellner, 1971, pp. 83–97;
(xiv) orthonomica: Conte, personal communication.
(xv) orthopractic: Castañeda, 1960a, p. 37; Wedeking, 1969, p. 107; Zellner,
1971, p. 49;
(xvi) orthotic: Castañeda, 1974, Castañeda, 1975, pp. 121-2;
(xvii) proper: Keene 1966: 60;
(xviii) required: Johanson, 1988, pp. 8, 13, Johanson, 1996, p. 128, Johanson,
2000, p. 247;
(xix) satisfied [soddisfatta]: Beardsley, 1944, p. 178; Bergström, 1962, pp. 29–
30; Clarke 1985: 100; Espersen, 1967, p. 72; Frey, 1957, 450–1; Grant, 1968,
pp. 189–90; Hamblin, 1987, 139–40; Hansen, 2001, p. 207; Hare, 1972, pp. 62–
3; Harrison, 1991, pp. 105-6; Hofstadter and McKinsey, 1939, p. 447; Milo,
1976, p. 15; Ross, 1941, p. 60; Sosa, 1964, pp. 65-6, 76, Sosa, 1966, 225–6, Sosa,
1967, pp. 59-60, Sosa, 1970, p. 216; Weinberger, 1958, pp. 29-30; Zellner, 1971,
pp. 52-3;
(xx) słuszny [giustezza = słusznos´c´]: Sztykgold, 1936;
(xxi) operante [operanza]: Conte, pc.;
(xxii) valente [valenza]: Conte, pc..
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Let’s go into the detail. If imperatives cannot be true or false
— as general consensus has it — can imperatives (and normative
language in general) be negated? Can they be subject to infer-
ences and arguments?42 Since it seems that in fact imperatives
are negated, what does this negation mean? Is the same nega-
tion used in indicative language? Is it analogous? Or is it of a
different kind altogether?
An investigation — not even theoretical — but merely histor-
ical of the most common stances in regard to a logic of impera-
tives (and of normative language at large) exceeds not only the
physical limits of this work but also the capacities of its author.
(xxiii) valid [valida, gültig]: Alchourrón and Martino, 1990, pp. 47, 55;
Bergström, 1962, p. 30; Bobbio, 1958, §2; Espersen, 1967, p. 67; Grue-Sørensen,
1939, pp. 196-7; Kelsen, 1960, pp. 9-10, Kelsen, 1979, pp. 22, 39-40; Nino, 1978;
Prior, 1949, pp. 71-6; Ross, 1941, pp. 58–60, Ross, 1968, pp. 49, 177–80; Wein-
berger, 1957, 109 n.14, 124-5, Weinberger, 1958, p. 4; Wedgwood, 2007;
(xxiv) vera [true, vrai, wahr]: Borchardt, 1979; Conte, 1995a; Gibbons, 1960,
p. 118; Ho, 1969, p. 232; Kalinowski, 1964, 1967; Kanger, 1971, p. 55; Kauf-
mann, 2012, p. 2; Langford, 1968, p. 332; Leonard, 1959, pp. 172, 184-5; Lewis,
1969, p. 150,Lewis, 1983, p. 224, Lewis, 2000, pp. 24-5; Lewis and Lewis, 1975,
pp. 52-4; Scanlon, 2014, §5; Sorainen, 1939, pp. 203-4; Sosa, 1970, pp. 215-16.
(xxv) usata/utilizzata/impiegata: Conte, Nomotropismo, nomotropía;
(xxvi) warranted (garantita; garantitezza = warrantedness) Prior, 1968.
(xxvii) doable [fattibile]: Wright, 1991, 1999.
(xxviii) giusta [giustizia]: Bobbio, 1958, §2;
(xxix) efficace: Bobbio, 1958, §2;
(xxx) osservata [osservanza]: Conte, pc.;
(xxxi) applied [applicata]: Ross, 1968, p. 81;
(xxxii) followed [seguita]: Ross, 1968, p. 81;
(xxxiii) complied with: Ross, 1968, p. 82.
(xxxiv) fulfilled: Wittgenstein, 2009, §§451, 458. For help with this list I extend
special thanks to P. Vranas, Amedeo Giovanni Conte, and Guglielmo Feis; see
also Vranas, 2008, 2011, 2012; Lorini, 2001; McNamara, 2010 and Unwin, 1999,
2001.
42 This has been traditionally known, after Ross, 1941, 1968, as Jørgensen’s
dilemma (in particular following Jørgensen, 1938a,b, for a recent account of
which see Marturano, 2012). As a problem for expressivism that — at least
in Blackburn’s and Gibbard’s versions (Blackburn, 1984, 1998 and Gibbard,
1990, 2003) — considers normative judgments as truth-inapt, this question
is known as the Frege-Geach problem (cf. Geach, 1965, Unwin, 1999, 2001,
Schroeder, 2008a,b, Schroeder, 2008c, Charlow, 2014 and Hom and Schwartz,
2013).
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For these reasons, I shall content myself with a more modest, yet
I hope provocative, analysis of norm negation.
Norm negation is a fair theme, I think, because of the follow-
ing advantages:
• It lets us appreciate the “multidimensionality” of norma-
tive language: not every norm is a normative sentence, nor
normative sentences exhaust the normative domain.
• In the case of linguistic norms, norm-negation compels us
to consider their truth-aptness, in order to refute or accept
it.
• In the case of non-linguistic norms, norm-negation forces
us to ponder what happens when the normative entity we
are negating it is not a sentence.
In general, norm negation provides us with a field test for gen-
eral theories of normativity.
This chapter aims at clarifying the various kinds of negation in
logic and natural language (in Section 5.3.1). It then advances an
interpretation of normative negation (Section 5.3.2) and consid-
ers how this model might shed light on responsibility judgments
and in particular on negative responsibility judgments (Section
5.3.3).
5.3.1 Negation, Negations
I shall now briefly introduce some concepts I use in this chapter,
without even trying to pretend to master the whole topic.43
5.3.1.1 Negation, Denial, Rejection
For the purposes of this chapter, I shall adopt the now common
distinction among negation, denial and rejection.44 While these
43 For an engaging yet theory-driven introduction to negation, see Horn, 1989.
44 For a survey on the matter, see Ripley, 2011. The paper even discusses some
theories about the respective relationships among negation, denial and rejec-
tion.
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definitions are apodictically stated, nothing significant for my
arguments relies on them.
Very roughly, negation [negazione] acts on contents. For in-
stance, ’unhappy’ is the negation of ’happy’.45
Denial [diniego] is, instead, an act. It can be either a linguistic
act, or a non-linguistic act (for instance: shaking one’s head).
Rejection [rifiuto] is, instead, a mental attitude, for instance, that
of one who refuses to accept the death of a relative.46
5.3.1.2 Internal vs. External Negation
Due to a felicitous intuition in B. Russell, 1905,47 the well-known
sentence:
(1) The King of France is not bald
can be given two readings, usually paraphrased as follows:48
(1a) INTERNAL: The King of France is not-bald (is un-bald);
45 We got ’un’, in English, from a reconstructed *en-, from Proto-Indoeuropean
*n- (probably zero grade of *ne-), prefix usually found in most Indo-European
tongues, for instance: Old Armenian: (an-); Armenian: (an-); Proto-Celtic:
*an-; Old Irish: an-, é-; Irish: an-, éa-; Breton: an-; Welsh: an-; Proto-Germanic:
*un-; Old English: un-; English: un-;; Old Saxon: un-; Old Dutch: un-; Dutch:
on-; Old High German: un-; German: un-; Old Norse: ú-, ó-; Icelandic: ó-;
Faroese: ó-; Swedish: o-; Danish: u-; Norwegian: u-; Gothic: (un-); Ancient
Greek: (an-), (ne-), (a-); English: a-; French: a-; Kurdish: na, ne, no, na-,
ne-, me-, ni-; Middle Persian: (an-); Latin: in-, ne-, nasalized i-; English: in-;
French: in-; Portuguese: in-, im- before p, b and m; Sanskrit: (a-); Proto-Slavic:
ne-, ni-; Czech: ne-, ni-; Polish: nie-; Russian: (nje-); Slovak: ne-, ni-.
From Proto-Indoeuropean *ne- we got: Proto-Celtic: *n; Old Irish: ní; Irish:
ní; Welsh: ni; Germanic: *ne, *ni; Sanskrit: (na); Middle Persian: (n); Persian:
(nê), (na); Kurdish: na, ne, no, na-, ne-, me-, ni-; Latin: ne; Slavic: *ne. Cf. at
least Brückner, 1957; Pokorny, 1994; Vasmer, 1958.
46 On rejection, see Gomolin´ska, 1998; Incurvati and Smith, 2010; T. Smiley, 1996;
Tamminga, 1994.
47 As far as I am aware, Frege (for instance in Frege, 1918–9) did not notice this
phenomenon or shunned it.
48 For instance by Horn, 1989, §6.
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(1b) EXTERNAL: It is not the case (true)49 that the King of
France is bald.
The former (1a) is usually read as an example of internal nega-
tion; whereas the latter (1b) is usually read as an example of
external negation.50
In propositional logic internal negation and external negation
are equivalent, that is, they both equally invert the logical value
of a given sentence.51
So, for instance:
(2) Maria is a brunette
changes its truth-value both in (2a) and (2b), examples of in-
ternal negation and external negation, respectively:
(2a) INTERNAL: Maria is not a brunette;
(2b) EXTERNAL: It is not the case (true) that Maria is a brunette.
Please keep this point in mind because it will come in handy
infra in Section 5.3.2, when we shall see that internal negation
and external negation are not equivalent in normative sentences.52
49 ’True’ was proposed by Karttunen and Peters, 1979.
50 Horn, 1989, §6 questions the use of ’true’ and underlines how no known natu-
ral language employs two distinct negative operators corresponding directly
to internal and external negation, even if a given language employs two (or
more) negative operators, for instance (former: declarative negation; latter:
emphatic negation): Ancient Greek: ’ou’ vs. ’me¯’; Modern Greek: ’den’ vs.
’me’; Hungarian: ’nem’ vs. ’ne’; Latin: ’non’ vs. ’ne¯’; Irish: ’nach’ vs. ’gan’;
Sanskrit: ’na’ vs. ’ma¯’. There is another ’un-’ in English which is not a nega-
tive operator, but it is analogous to German ’ent-’ as in ’un-fold’, ’ent-falten’.
See Horn’s interesting list of languages with distinct negative operators on p.
366.
51 But please keep in mind that duplex negatio affirmat only in propositional logic
and some natural languages, for instance contemporary standard English.
Both in Old and Middle English, along with contemporary languages such
as Italian, Portuguese and many others, duplex negatio n e g a t.
52 This point was also noticed by St. Anselm of Canterbury: “dicimus etiam
nos “non debere peccare” pro “debere non peccare”. Non enim omnis, qui
facit, quod non debet, peccat, si proprie consideretur.” Cf. Schmitt, 1936, p.
36. (The extended passage is quoted and translated in Appendix A. For an
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5.3.1.3 Metalinguistic Negation
Metalinguistic negation is defined53 as a formally negative ut-
terance used to object to a previous utterance on any grounds
(even of intonations, assertability, and so on).
Here is an example of metalinguistic negation:
(3) John didn’t manage to pass his viva — it was quite easy for
him. (Emphasis signals stressed intonation here.)
(4) Ben is meeting a man this evening. No, he’s not — he’s
meeting his brother.
Interestingly, Dummett, 1973, p. 330 points out that there can-
not be a “proper” negation of a conditional (material? He does
not say) in natural language but only an objection to its asserta-
bility.
So one does not object to the truth of a sentence, but to its
(felicitous, appropriate) assertability.
Another interesting feature of metalinguistic negation is its in-
ability to be incorporated prefixally:
(5) The King of France is not happy (*unhappy) — in fact,
there isn’t any king of France.54
Sometimes natural languages may be able to discriminate a
descriptive from a metalinguistic use. German and Russian, for
instance, modify the slot of the negative particle:55
(6a) Er besuchte uns gestern nicht. [He did not visit us yester-
day]
(6b) Er besuchte uns nicht gestern, sondern . . . [He visited us
not yesterday, but...]
interesting survey of modal logics in Anselm, see Henry, 1953 and Uckelman,
2007, 2009.
53 For instance by Horn, 1985, 1989.
54 Horn, 1989, p. 392.
55 Cf. Horn, 1989, p. 438-9
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(7a) On etogo ne delal — [He didn’t do that]
he-NOM that-GEN not did
(7b) Ne on eto delal — [It wasn’t he who did that]
not he-NOM that-ACC did
5.3.1.4 Illocutionary or Neustic Negation
Introduced as neustic negation by Hare (Hare, 1952, p. 21 Hare,
1989, p. 35) and later called ’illocutionary negation’ (originally
by Searle, cf. Peetz, 1979; Searle and Vanderveken, 1985), it
should apply to what expresses illocutive force in a sentence
or the neustic.
Here is an example:
(8) I promise to come.
(9a) I promise not to come.
(9b) I don’t promise to come.
According to Searle, (9a) is simply a propositional (or internal)
negation, whereas (9b) is an example of illocutionary negation:
one denies the very linguistic act, not its content. (9a) and (9b)
are not equivalent.
Illocutionary negation, if it exists, seems non-truth conditional.
Is it assimilable to metalinguistic negation? As Moeschler, 2010
maintains, not always: in fact metalinguistic negation need not
be expressed linguistically, whereas illocutionary negation is nec-
essarily linguistic.
Some doubts about the very existence of illocutionary (or neu-
stic) negation are expressed by Cohen, 1964; Garner, 1971; Hoche,
1995 and Moeschler, 2010.
Hoche, 1995 has proposed a very interesting reading of illocu-
tionary negation not as external or metalinguistic negation (ie,
a negation of the whole speech-act), but simply as an internal
negation.
According to him,
(10) It is not the case (that) I promise to come
is not equivalent to (9b).
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But (9b) must be read not as the internal negation of the com-
ing, but as the negation of promise (as in not-promise):
(9b) I don’t promise to come.
(9b) would be — at most — the negation of a preceding speech-
act, rather the negation of that very speech-act produced by ut-
tering (9b).
5.3.1.5 To Sum Up
First, there is logical negation. Logical negation is a logical op-
erator (for instance: ’¬’) which is unambiguous: it always in-
verts the truth-value of a given sentence p.56 Moreover, internal
(logical) negation and external (logical) negation are functionally
equivalent.57
Second, there is natural negation, ie negation in natural lan-
guages. As we have seen supra, negation in natural languages
is much more complex a phenomenon than logical negation.
Firstly, it may be pragmatically ambiguous (as Horn, 1989, Ch. 6
and Speranza and Horn, 2010 masterly argued); secondly, other
than descriptive negation, natural negation can be realized ex-
ternally or metalinguistically, and it is not the case that it always
be used to act on the truth of a given sentence; thirdly, non-
descriptive negation cannot always be semantically analyzed in
terms of external or metalinguistic negation, because there are
pragmatic phenomena (intonation, phonetics, etc.) involved: ex-
ternal or metalinguistic negation can be realized implicitly, with-
out fixed semantic features (’it is not the case that’, ’it is not true
that’, etc.). Fourthly, not all (negated) sentences in natural lan-
guage are truth-functional, but they may be commands, prayers,
wishes or insults.
56 In many-valued logics, it assigns p’s truth-value complement.
57 Of course I am referring here to classical propositional logic. Intuitionistic
logics do not accept the equivalence of internal and external negation, nor the
law of double negation: ¬¬B 6= B. Cf. for instance Heyting, 1930 Brouwer,
1907 (1975), Gentzen, 1934/5.
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Third, natural negation, for instance via metalinguistic nega-
tion, can be used not only to invert the truth-value of a sentence,
but also to reject or question its assertability.
5.3.2 Normative Negation
The last section was devoted to analyzing different kinds of nega-
tion in logic and natural languages.
In this section, I try to give an account of normative nega-
tion. I maintain that it can be differentiated from non-normative
negation because normative negation cancels (at least) one of its
presuppositions, whereas non-normative negation preserves the
presuppositions of the negated sentence.
I have argued elsewhere that is not possible to have distinct
species of negation for descriptive and normative language, but
only different realizations of a single attitude.58 I therefore pro-
pose to extend the model we have sketched in the preceding
sections to normative language.
We have seen that logical negation, although unambiguous,
is quite limited. Natural negation is instead a complex phe-
58 In particular, see Faroldi, 2012b. There, I maintained that norm denial is a
diapraxical act. Diapraxical is an act or an event that is done or obtains only
through another act or event. (The concept of diapraxia has been defined and
explained in Conte, 2012.) Take chess for instance. There is no specific move
for a “check”. A check is another move (let’s say, a pawn advancing, for one)
that counts as the act of check. The diapraxical act (the check) supervenes
on the other moves, given their specific nature and the context of playing.
In a similar way, I maintain that denying norms is a diapraxical act, that is,
an act that supervenes another, more common, act and depends on the very
nature of the negated entities (i.e. their normativity) and the context. To
negate a norm, one does not need a peculiar kind of negation: given negation
and the very nature of what is negated (normative entities), one gets that
particular act we have called “norm negation”. This is shown, I suppose,
from a fact and a theoretical principle of intellectual economy. First, we have
seen that even with simple acts such a internal and external negation (done
by the usual means such as ‘not’) the results one gets are pretty different if
the negated entity is normative. Second, it would be costly (and unjustified,
I think) to admit another kind of negation specific to normative linguistic
entities. Ockham’s razor suggests that we do not multiply items beyond
necessity.
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nomenon, it does not always act on truth-values and it can be
pragmatically ambiguous, divided among at least internal and
external or metalinguistic negation.
Moreover, following Horn, 1989, Ch.6, Grice, Dummett and
Geach, we have noticed that at least metalinguistic negation is
a formally negative utterance used to object to a previous utter-
ance on any grounds, especially its assertability.
I propose to extend this model also to normative language. To
stick to a logical level, even Ross, 1968, Ch.s 31-2 noticed that
while external and internal negation are functionally equivalent
in propositional logic, internal negation and external negation
differ quite radically in deontic logic: the fact you are under an
obligation not to teach deontic logic (O¬δ), for instance, is quite
different from the fact you are not under an obligation to teach
deontic logic (¬Oδ).
In an analogous fashion, I maintain that internal normative
negation keeps the sentence binding or, so to speak, norma-
tive, only to invert its deonticity: from obligatory to forbidden,
and so on.59 (Please note that I am not forced to assign nor-
mative sentences truth-aptness, because truth does not tell us
the whole story even when (non-normative) natural language is
concerned.)
External or metalinguistic negation is a rejection of the as-
sertability (lato sensu) of a prima facie, allegedly normative sen-
tence. Specifically, though, rejection of the assertability of a nor-
mative sentence is (implicity, I maintain) not a normative judg-
ment, but a judgment on its normativity (or bindingness, or you
name it). If a speaker feels60 a given (non-normative) proposi-
tion unassertable, he rejects it metalinguistically; if he feels a
given (prima facie normative) proposition not binding or not nor-
59 I am well aware that not all normative sentences (or propositions) are in
deontic terms. This was only an example to illustrate the general principle I
want to bring forth.
60 Please note that ’to feel’ here is used generally and has no intended reference
to emotivism or expressivism.
5.3 fourth argument: denial of responsibility 175
mative, he rejects it metalinguistically or externally, canceling its
presupposition of normativity.61
Consider the following normative sentence:
(1) Abortion is wrong
and its prima facie negation:
(2) Abortion is not wrong.
Both are moral (normative) judgments, and share — among
others — the following presupposition:
(0) Abortion can be an object of a genuine moral judgment.
Now consider external negation of (1):62
(3) It is not the case that abortion is wrong.
Now, while (2) is still a normative judgment, (3) seems a judg-
ment on the normativity of (1).
(3) cancels (1)’s and (2)’s presupposition (0), because it simply
rejects that abortion can be object of (that) moral judgment.
Let’s now make a comparison with internal and external nega-
tion of non-normative sentences.
Let’s consider
(4) He stopped beating his wife
its internal negation:
(5) He didn’t stop beating his wife
and its external negation:
(6) It’s not true that he stopped beating his wife.
Neither (5) nor (6) modify the (“factive”) presuppositions of
(4) such as that he has a wife and that he used to beat her.
Since — as we have seen — not every instance of external or
metalinguistic negation is analyzable with distinct semantic fea-
tures, I assume a paraphrase in terms of external negation will
account for the phenomenon, at least for our present purposes.
Considering the problem with normative negation only from
the point of view of truth is quite limited, because truth does not
61 I am using this as a sort of a term of art, in order to make a general point
without supporting a substantive theory of normativity either in terms of
reasons (cf. for instance Scanlon, 2014; Skorupski, 2010), good (cf. Thomson,
2008) or oughts.
62 Of course it can also be realized metalinguistically.
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tell the whole story even in non-normative negation, as I pointed
out in the case of metalinguistic negation. This turns out to be
a plus, because normative sentences are usually not considered
truth-apt.63
In this section, I contrasted descriptive and normative sen-
tences by considering negation. I showed that normative nega-
tion, usually realized externally or metalinguistically, cancels its
presupposition(s) of normativity.
The next section applies this conclusion to judgments of re-
sponsibility, showing that their structure with respect to nega-
tion is akin to normative sentences.
5.3.3 Denial of Responsibility, Formalized
In the last section, I contrasted descriptive and normative sen-
tences by considering negation. I showed that normative nega-
tion, usually realized externally or metalinguistically, cancels its
presupposition(s) of normativity.
63 And consequently one may maintain that (a) what you negate is not their
truth; or that (b) norms cannot be negated. (a) was the position of the very
first philosopher known to have written on this topic: Jerzy Sztykgold. In
Sztykgold, 1936, he argued that you cannot negate the truth of norms, but
only their righteousness [righteousness, giustezza = słusznos´c´] in terms of
non-righteousness [non-righteousness, non-giustezza = niesłusznos´c´].
Righteousness and unrighteousness are, for Sztykgold, the strict análogon of
truth and falseness. (For Sztykgold’s positions, see appendix D.)
(b) was instead the position of Karel Engliš (Engliš, 1947), according to which:
(i) logical operations are possible only for “descriptive judgments” [soudy]);
(ii) negation [poprˇení] is a logical operation;
(iii) norms [normy] and postulates [postuláty], although sentential, are not
“descriptive judgments”;
and therefore
(iv) logical operations don’t apply to norms and postulates.
In particular:
(v) norms cannot be negated.
Of course Engliš’ argument shows — at most, if premise (i) holds — that
negation as a logical operator doesn’t apply to norms. But negation is not
exclusively a logical operator. Negation exists outside logic, in natural lan-
guage, with different characteristics.
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In this section, I apply these results to judgments of respon-
sibility, in order to provide a fourth and final argument to the
thesis that responsibility judgments are normative, and namely
an argument “from negation”. I shall show that when one de-
nies responsibility, what happens is (a) what happens when one
denies normative statements; (b) what happens is the case only
when normative entities are concerned. This might show that
judgments of responsibility are normative.64
Here is a more schematic version of my fourth argument:
1. When you deny a responsibility judgment, what happens
(what obtains) is a cancelation of its presuppositions;
2. Canceling of presuppositions obtains only when normative
judgments are negated;
3. Therefore, responsibility judgements are normative judg-
ments.
Let’s begin. I shall use negation as a test to isolate a norma-
tive entity. We have seen back in Section 5.3.2 that negation of
descriptive and normative entities differs in at least one substan-
tial point: internal and external negation work in opposite ways.
Here is an example for descriptive statements:
Internal negation (1) “John isn’t tall’
vs.
External negation (2) “It’s not the case that John is tall”
Now, let’s take a normative statement (for simplicity’s sake, I
shall consider an imperative):
Internal negation O(¬W) (3): “Don’t shut the window!” (that is:
“Shut not the window”).
64 This is by no means the standard theory. When judgments of responsibil-
ity are kept separate from responsibility or concepts of responsibility, they
are usually considered non-normative; for example, judgments of responsibil-
ity are considered explanatory by Björnsson and Persson, 2012, forthcoming.
Anderson, 2011, Sect.3.1 considers responsibility judgments to be normative,
even though he does not provide any arguments for this thesis.
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Note that (3) and its “positive”
(3a) Shut the window
share a presupposition of normativity.
Now, (3a)’s external negation:
External negation ¬O(W) (4a) “I do not accept that is the case of
shutting the window”/ (4b) “I do not accept the command
’Shut the window”’/ (4c) “I don’t care”.65
instead, rejects (cancels) the presupposition of normativity that
both (3) and (3a) shared.
As I explained in Section 5.3.1, for descriptive sentences it is
internal negation that might change their truth-value (from truth
to false and viceversa); vice versa, for normative (imperative,
in this case) sentences, it is external negation that changes their
normativity-value, by rejecting the presupposition of normativ-
ity.
Now, let’s apply this test to responsibility.
Internal negation (5) “He is not responsible for killing A, be-
cause. . . ”
vs.
External negation (6) “It is not the case that he is responsible for
killing A, because. . . ”/
Now, if (5) stands to (1) as (6) stands to (2), we can confidently
conclude that (5) and (6) are statements analogous to (1) and (2),
that is, non-normative.
Quite on the contrary, if (5) stands to (3) as (6) stands to (4),
we can confidently conclude that (5) and (6) are statements anal-
ogous to (3) and (4), that is, broadly normative.
It turns out, unfortunately, that you cannot really tell if (5) —
internal negation of responsibility — tells us something of signif-
icance, for the very simple reason that its interpretation requires
65 Of course, I am aware these are only some possible paraphrases — there
might be many more. The most important fact is that internal and external
negation can consistently be kept separable.
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an understanding of responsibility. If you think responsibility
is an objective state-of-affairs, that can be somehow empirically
ascertained, then you would interpret (5) as a descriptive state-
ment, whose truth-value is to be checked against the world; and
vice versa.
Therefore, let’s turn to (6) to seek some clarification of the
matter.
My hypothesis is that a statement such as (5) stands for a
justification; while (6) stands for an excuse. I take advantage of
the paradigm excuse vs. justification developed in Austin, 1956.
With a justification, I maintain, we remain in the domain of
the normative: we accept A, and even add some reasons for it.
The presupposition of normativity is kept.
Quite on the contrary, an excuse, in a way, suspends what
was going on; it makes “normativity freeze” because it refers to
conditions other than the very act A, conditions that (by defini-
tion) rule out responsibility (duress, infancy, mental incapacity,
maybe psychopathy for moral responsibility). The presupposi-
tion of normativity is canceled.
In the words of Austin:
[i]n the one defence [= justification], briefly, we accept
responsibility but deny that it was bad: in the other
[= excuse], we admit that it was bad but don’t accept
full, or even any, responsibility (Austin, 1956).
it is not quite fair or correct to say baldly "X did A".
We may say it isn’t fair just to say X did it; perhaps
he was under somebody’s influence, or was nudged.
Or, it isn’t fair to say baldly he did A; it may have
been partly accidental, or an unintentional slip. Or, it
isn’t fair to say he did simply A – he was really doing
something quite different and A was only incidental,
or he was looking at the whole thing quite differently
(Austin, 1956, p.2).
I am going to illustrate the difference between justification and
excuses. As usual, I ask the reader to imagine two fictional crim-
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inal cases (both involve a death), and to abstract from particular
legal systems in order to focus on the general point.
In the first, let’s call it WIFE, a man comes back home and
sees an intruder trying to rape or kill his wife. By chance, there
is the intruder’s loaded gun at hand. The man picks it up, aims
and finally shoots the intruder down — killing him. In court,
he admits the murder and puts forward his reasons. His lawyer
says: “Look, he is not responsible for the killing, because that was
self-defense: he was trying to defend and save his own wife.”
This is a justification: you admit your deed (there are all the rel-
evant required elements: actus reus, mens rea, volition, intention,
knowledge and so on to make that killing a murder) but you
have a (good) reason for your action.
In the second, let’s call it MAD, a mentally-ill man escapes
from a psychiatric hospital, manages to get a gun, and shoots
down a random passer-by. His lawyer says: “Look, he is not
responsible for the killing, because it is not the case he is (= can be)
responsible at all: he is mad (under duress, in infancy. . . ).” This
is an excuse: you may admit the deed, but it was done without
the relevant required conditions: without mens rea, for instance,
or without those capacities required for a death or a killing to
be a murder.
To sum up, with a justification you deny your responsibility
for that deed qua a particular action (but you admit, nonetheless,
that you are under the domain of responsibility, that you can
be responsible); with an excuse you deny your responsibility
tout court, you deny that you are under the very domain of
responsibility.
The lawyer’s sentence in WIFE: “he is not responsible for the
killing” is comparable to (3): “Don’t shut the window” and (5):
“He was not responsible”, inasmuch as they are internal nega-
tions.
On the contrary, the lawyer’s sentence in MAD: “it is not the
case he is (= can be) responsible at all” seems to me analogous to
(4): “It is not the case you order me to shut the window” and (6):
“It is not the case that he is responsible for A, because. . . ”
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As (3) conserved the imperative nature of the sentence, so
WIFE conserved the domain of responsibility. As (4) instead
went outside the domain of the imperative, to make a non-imperative
claim, in the same way MAD appealed to a condition — in a way
a non-normative, even factual condition — to be excluded from
the domain of responsibility.
This linguistic evidence is consistent with the conceptual ar-
guments I put forward earlier in this section: while justifications
aren’t at all denial of responsibility because they presuppose re-
sponsibility, excuses are in fact denial of responsibility, because
they reject it.
With justifications and excuses, negation of responsibility co-
incides both with a linguistic act (denial) and a mental state (re-
jection).
We suggested that
• (i) when we deny responsibility, we have (at least) two
cases: internal negation (which stands for a justification)
and external negation (standing for an excuse). Then, we
have seen that
• (ii) internal negations of responsibility do not exit the do-
main of responsibility (they presuppose responsibility);
whereas external negations do (they reject the presupposi-
tion of responsibility). But this was exactly what happened
with normative sentences (as I showed in Section 5.3.2): in-
ternal negation keeps the sentence normative (it keeps the
presupposition of normativity), whereas external negation
rejects it (it cancels the presupposition of normativity).
If we suppose that this kind of negation is at work only with non-
descriptive (and namely, normative statements), we can there-
fore conclude that
• (iii) since judgments denying responsibility are structurally
akin to normative sentences, responsibility judgments are
akin to normative sentences.
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5.3.3.1 Caveats & Assumptions
Now, some caveats. I have limited my discussion to the word
(and the concept) of responsibility in the proper, fuller sense. I
am very aware that there may be pragmatic ways to express a
responsibility judgment without mentioning the word ‘responsi-
bility’ or any related. I am also aware that we may get indicative
(or descriptive) sentences (to express/ascribe responsibility).
Last but not least, my argument makes the following assump-
tion: there are only two kinds of language relevant to our inves-
tigation here: descriptive and normative language. This may not
be the case: there are several other language domains I am not
considering: prayers, exclamations, insults, whose “status” with
regard to negation is unclear. Therefore, it might be the case that
the different ways negation works (in descriptive and normative
domains) is not exclusive: negation might work in prayers as in
normativity, and the second premise of my argument would be
factually undermined. Assuming the prima facie evidence I dis-
cussed as conclusive might be too strong, and other interpreta-
tions are certainly possible depending on substantive theories of
normativity, modality, and responsibility. But even if in general
this argument does not prove to be conceptually unassailable, I
think it is still very telling.
5.3.3.2 Objections
There are two apparently possible objections to my argument:
first, I have begged the question in the definition of responsi-
bility judgments; second, all I have shown is that external nega-
tion inverts the value of sentences if they are not descriptive,
but this tells nothing about the exact nature of those sentences;
third, these features of negation may be shared by other kinds of
modality, so there is not special about normativity.
To the first objection, I put forward a twofold reply: first, there
is no shared consensus either on what responsibility is or on
what responsibility judgments are: a degree of arbitrariness is
needed anyway; second, there is no conceptual reason precluding
my analysis to be extended further, given the right premisses.
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To the second objection, I reply that I have at least shown that
responsibility judgments are not descriptive; nonetheless I be-
lieve a linguistic test such as mine cannot exhaust the richness
of human practices – in other words, normativity is not a sheer
linguistic notion.
To the third objection, I reply that, examples with “oughts”
notwithstanding, it is not clear whether normativity is a modal-
ity or not (it may be a property, for one). Moreover, other modal-
ities may be normative as well (recently Skorupski, 2010 so ar-
gued for necessity, the a priori, and other modalities), and thus
these features of negation shouldn’t come as a surprise.
This last consideration leads me to the next section, where I
recap my arguments and point to future directions of research.
5.4 the relevance of context: prag-matics and normativity
In this chapter, I analyzed ascriptions as judgments of respon-
sibility. What stands out in my analysis is (i) the relevance of
context; (ii) the normative nature of ascriptions as judgments of
responsibility.
But they are interrelated.
In case (i) (Section 5.2), ascriptions of responsibility are consid-
ered as acts (sub specie actus). The normative nature of ascriptions
of responsibility as acts emerges from the context, in the contin-
uous and multidimensional interplay between facts, perceptions,
interpretation and policy.
In case (ii) (Section 5.3.2), ascriptions of responsibility are con-
sidered as sentences (sub specie dicti). The normative nature of
ascriptions of responsibility as acts emerges from their negation.
But we can grasp that their negation is a negation of normative
entities because it is realized metalinguistically, that is, at the
pragmatic level, where context rules.
Both normativity and responsibility transcend the boundaries
of our language.

6 THE NORMAT IV I TY OFCONTEXT
"No olvidemos el Goofus Bird, pájaro que construye el nido al revés y
vuela para atrás, porque no le importa adónde va, sino dónde estuvo."
Jorge Luis Borges
In this work (The Normative Structure of Responsibility), I have
argued for two theses: first, that responsibility is normative; sec-
ond, that responsibility should be normative.
I tried to show that we can reach a better understanding of
responsibility through pragmatics — both through an analysis
of pragmatics and a pragmatic analysis, that is, paying attention
to context (utterances, speakers, situations) and to contextual
considerations (policies, normative systems).
Recall I have distinguished between two senses of normativity:
axiological and nomophoric. I have also distinguished respon-
sibility in praxical responsibility (ie responsibility for human ac-
tions) and non-praxical responsibility (ie responsibility not for
human actions).
If responsibility is praxical, then responsibility is normative in
the nomophoric sense: responsibility for actions (a) is attributed
because of rules (explicit or implicit, legal, moral, reasons-derived
or otherwise); and, moreover, (b) the concept of action is not de-
scriptive.1
If responsibility is non-praxical, then responsibility is norma-
tive in the axiological sense: responsibility for things other than
actions depends on standards of evaluation and presupposes a
system of (moral) values, as the case of causation shows. Al-
though I did not consider explicitly the reasons approach to nor-
mativity, it shouldn’t pose problems to my arguments. If reasons
1 I have not given evidence for this claim in my work, but see at least Hart,
1948, Feinberg, 1965, 1970, Wilson and Shpall, 2012. For a partially contrary
view, see Geach, 1960. 185
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theorists are right about the basicness of reasons, then there are
reductions (or non-reductive analyses, maybe) of nomophoric
and axiological concepts to reasons, and my point should gener-
alize.
I do not know yet whether these conclusions may shed some
light on different phenomena, such as the difference between
morals and the law, or whether they admit a modular approach,
that is, they can serve well and can be integrated with different
normative theories (cf. Vargas, 2013, p. 185).
My dichotomy may not complete and responsibility may not
be captured completely by it, but I hope to have shown (or
started to show) that conceptual analysis coupled with pragmat-
ics and attentions to contexts may reveal more, not only on re-
sponsibility but on normativity itself. But what normativity is I
am still asking:
V’è sempre, nel piú profondo del nostro io, una risposta
che ci assilla, e questa risposta è la domanda stessa.
Daniel-Robs, Nocturnes, 1956.2
2 Daniel-Robs is the nom-de-plume of Henri Petiot [Épinal, 1901 — Cham-
béry, 1965]. The original work is Daniel-Rops, 1956. The Italian translation by
Franca de Angelis is in Daniel-Rops, 1958.
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Appendix A: Anselm’s “Debe¯re” (from Lambeth’s Fragments)
Appendix B: Rudzin´ski’s “Z logiki norm”: a Fragment
Appendix C: Sorainen’s “Der Modus und die Logik”: a Fragment
Appendix D: Sztykgold’s “Negacja normy”
I include here four (partial) works relevant to chapter §5. These
works are hard to find or not available in English.

A ANSELM ’S “DEB E¯RE ”
St. Anselm of Canterbury [Aosta, 1033 or 1034 – Canterbury,
1109] in what are now known as Lambeth’s Fragments, dealt with
internal and external negation of deontic operators. I shall quote
a brief passage from Schmitt, 1936, p. 36. The English translation
from Latin is mine.
[. . . ] dicimus nos ‘non debe¯re peccare’ pro ‘debe¯re non peccare’.
Non enim omnis, qui facit, quod non debet, peccat. [. . . ] Sicut dicimus
‘non facere esse’ pro ‘facere non esse’: ita dicimus ‘non debe¯re
facere’ pro ‘debe¯re non facere’; et ideo, ubi est ‘debe¯re non pec-
care’, dicitur pro eo ‘non debe¯re peccare’. Quod in tantum obtinuit
usus, ut non aliud intelligatur, quam ‘debe¯re non peccare’.
We say ’non debe¯re peccare’ for ‘debe¯re non peccare’. Indeed, not
everyone who does what he ought not [qui facit quod non debet],
sins. [. . . ]
As we say ’non facere esse’ for ’facere non esse’, likewise we say
’non debe¯re facere’ for ’debe¯re non facere’; and, in a similar fashion,
for ’debe¯re non peccare’ we say ’non debe¯re peccare’.
In our use, when we say ’non debe¯re peccare’ we mean ‘debe¯re
non peccare’.
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B RUDZ IŃSK I ’ S “ Z LOG IK INORM” : A FRAGMENT
Aleksander Witold Rudzin´ski, born Witold Steinberg [Kraków,
4.3. 1900 — New York, 1989], was a Polish scholar and diplomat.
He earned his PhD in philosophy and law at the Jagellonian
University and taught philosophy of law there and in Łódz´, be-
fore emigrating to the US and becoming a professor at Columbia
University.1
Some of his personal papers and pictures are collected in the
“The Aleksander and Anna Rudzin´ski Collection”, The New York
Public Library, New York.
Here I report and translate some excerpts from his Rudzin´ski,
1947, p. 9. The translation from Polish is mine, although due
thanks go to Amedeo Giovanni Conte and Katarzyna Nowicka,
and to Edoardo Fittipaldi for bringing this work to my attention.
prawda i fałsz na terenie normaty-wnym
Czy obowia˛zywanie lub nieobowia˛zywanie normy jest analogiczna˛
cecha˛ do prawdy lub fałszu sa˛dów?
Musiałoby byc´ wówczas relacja˛.
I tak jest istotnie.
1. Prawda jest, mówia˛c całkiem z grubsza, relacja˛ sa˛du do rzeczy-
wistos´ci (faktów), a
2. obowia˛zywanie [jest] relacja˛ normy do osób (adresatów).
1 For more biographical information, see his obituary on The New York Times:
Pace, 1989. 193
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truth and falseness at the norma-tive level
Is validity [obowia˛zywanie] (or, respectively, invalidity [nieobow-
ia˛zywanie]) of a norm [norma] the analogon [analogiczna cecha] of
the truth [prawda] (or, respectively, falseness [fałsz]) of judgments
[sa˛d = judgment]?
If so, there would be a relation [relacja] between validity and
truth (or, respectively, between invalidity and falseness).
And that is the case.
1. Truth [prawda] is a relation [relacja] of the judgment [sa˛d] to
the reality (of facts) [rzeczywistos´c´ (faktów)].
2. Validity [obowia˛zywanie] is a relation of a norm [norma] to
persons [person = osoba], to addressees [addressee = adresat].
C SORA INEN ’S “DERMODUS UND D IE LOG IK ” :A FRAGMENT
Kalle Sorainen, Der Modus und die Logik [Verbal Mood and Logic],
"Theoria", 5 (1939), pp. 202–204. English translation by Federico
L. G. Faroldi.1
1. Sorainen’s Question
Eine interessante Frage ist es auch, warum gerade der modus indica-
tivus, wie Professor Jørgensen meint, eine unabweisliche Vorausset-
zung falscher und wahrer Urteile ist.
An interesting question is the following: Why only the indicative
mood (as Jørgensen believes) is an indispensable prerequisite
[unabweisliche Voraussetzung] of true or false judgments [falscher
und wahrer Urteile]?
2. Sorainen’s Answer
Ein Imperativ kann auch als wahr oder falsch betrachtet werden, je
nachdem derselbe in Übereinstimmung mit seinem Grundwert steht.
1 The full text and translation of Sorainen, 1939 is archived at
https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/7646829/Sorainen39ita.pdf. A brief
note on the author and his work can be found in Faroldi, 2013b. 195
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Also an imperative can be considered true [wahr] (or, respec-
tively, un-true, false [falsch]), when it is (or, respectively, it isn’t)
in accordance with [Übereinstimmung] its fundamental value [Grund-
wert].
D SZTYKGOLD ’S “NEGAC JANORMY ”
Jerzy Sztykgold, Negacja normy [Norm Negation], "Przegla˛d filo-
zoficzny", 39 (1936), pp. 492-494 (Sztykgold, 1936). Partial En-
glish translation by Federico L. G. Faroldi. Due thanks to Kata-
rzyna Nowicka.
i .1
Normatywne teorje prawa pragna˛ byc´ teorjami zdan´, wyraz˙aja˛cych
powinnos´c´[,] a nie byc´ logika˛ formalna˛.
Szukaja˛ specyficznych metod i w rezultacie nie wychodza˛ poza te
poszukiwania i definicje prawa.
Psychologiczna teorja etyki nie zajmuje sie˛ normami.
Nikt nie zebrał dota˛d tez logiki formalnej maja˛cych zastosowanie do
norm, nikt nie ustalił warunków równowaz˙nos´ci norm. Psychologis´ci
nie wiedza˛ nawet, czy pewnemu przez˙yciu etyczemu odpowiada na
ekranie naszej mowy jedno tylko sformułowanie tres´ci tego przez˙ycia,
czy tez˙ kilka równowaz˙nych sobie norm.
Nie wiedza˛ takz˙e, czy i odwrotnie dla kaz˙dego sformułowania tres´ci
normatywnej istnieje odpowiednik w postaci odre˛bnego specyficznego
przez˙ycia etycznego, czy tez˙ istnieja˛ tres´ci normatywne, których psy-
chika nasza nie aktualizuje w specyficzny dla sa˛dów etycznych sposób.
Normative theories of law wish to be theories of duty-expounding
sentences [duty-expounding sentence = zdanie wyraz˙aja˛ce powin-
nos´c´], rather than a formal logic. 197
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Normative theories of law aim to specific methods; therefore
they do not stretch these boundaries beyond it nor beyond legal
definitions.
The psychological theory of ethics is not concerned with norms
[norm = norma].
Until now, no one has tried to apply formal logic to norms, no
one has tried to establish conditions of equivalence [equivalence
= równowaz˙nos´c´] for norms.
Psychologists do not know whether — in our language — a
moral emotion [moral emotion = przez˙ycie etyczne] is correlated
with only one formulation [formulation = sformułowanie] of its
(semantic) content [(semantic) content = tres´c´] or there are sev-
eral equivalent norms.
They do not even know whether, vice versa, for every formu-
lation of a normative content [normative content = tres´c´ normaty-
wna] there is a relatum through a specific moral emotion, or
there are normative contents that our mind does not actualize
[actualize = aktualizowac´] specifically for moral judgments [moral
judgment = sa˛d etyczny].
2
Zarówno normatywna, jak i psychologiczna teorja prawa zamuje sie˛
wyła˛cznie sa˛dami (logicznemi wzgl. psychologicznemi), wyraz˙aja˛cemi
prawa i obowia˛zki, zas´ w definicjach prawa te sa˛dy, w których słwierdzamy
brak prawa lub brak obowia˛zku. Tezy tych teoryj sa˛ jednak prawdziwe
takz˙e i w stosunku do tych ostatnich.
Both the normative theory of law and the psychological theory
of law deal only with (logical or psychological) judgments [judg-
ment = sa˛d] expounding rights [right = prawo] and duties [duty
= obowia˛zek]; in their definition of law those theories do not take
into account those judgments affirming the nonsubsistency [non-
subsistency = brak] of a right or, respectively, a duty.
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The theses of these theories are nonetheless applicable even to
negative judgments.
3
Nalez˙y ustalic´, które tezy logistyki, tej skrystalizowanej juz˙ nauki o
wyraz˙eniach, maja˛ zastosowanie do zdan´, wyraz˙aja˛cych (i) uprawnienia
i (ii) obowia˛zki, (iii) brak praw i (iv) brak obowia˛zków.
One must determine which theses of formal logic, as a crystal-
lized science about linguistic expressions [linguistic expression
= wyraz˙enie], can be applied to sentences expressing:
(i) rights [uprawnienie = right, entitlement],
(ii) duties [obowia˛zek = duty],
(iii) non-existence of rights [brak praw],
(iv) non-existence of duties [brak obowia˛zków].
i i .1
Do norm maja˛ zastosowanie kryterja słusznos´c´ i niesłusznos´c´, odpowia-
daja˛ce s´cis´le kryterjom prawdy i fałszu.
Wszystkie tezy rachunku zdan´ maja˛ zatem zastosowanie takz˙e i do
norm. [. . . ]
Criteria of rightness [rightness = słusznos´c´] and non-rightness
[non-rightness = niesłusznos´c´] apply to norms. These two criteria
stands strictly for those of truth [truth = prawda] and falseness
[falseness = fałsz].
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All those theses of logical calculus, therefore, apply also to
norms. [. . . ]
iv.1
Nie moz˙na stworzyc´ adekwatnej logistycznej “czystej teorji prawa”,
lecz moz˙na wypowiadac´ sa˛dy logistyczne, maja˛ce znaczenie dla teorji
prawa.
It is not possible to build a proper logical “pure theory of law”;
however, it is possible to formulate logical judgments relevant
for a theory of law.
2
Dla psychologicznej teorii etyki wynika z powyz˙szych rozwaz˙an´, z˙e dla
pewnego przez˙ycia etycznego istnieja˛ przynajmniej dwie równowaz˙ne
sobie projekcje — sformułowania w s´wiecie mowy, z˙e zatem doszuki-
wanie sie˛ odre˛bnego i specyficznego przez˙ycia dla kaz˙dej normy, która˛
sobie moz˙emy pomys´lec´, jest metodycznym błe˛dem i nie moz˙e dac´ zada-
walaja˛cych wyników.
From what I said above, it follows a relevant consequence for a
psychological theory of ethics.
For a given moral emotion, there are at least two equivalent
projections [projection = projekcja] in the language-world (two
equivalent linguistic formulations).
Thus, it is methodologically erroneous to look for only one
specific moral emotion for every conceivable norm.
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In the bibliography backreferences point to the pages where the works
are cited.
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